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ABSTRACT
The world situation, and life, in the contemporary West, since the rise o f
modernity, has been described most frequently as one of crisis, marked by a breakdown
of life's intelligibility. It is the aftermath o f  the "death of God," the disappearance o f
humanity's relationship to a transcendent reality which historically has served as the
center o f meaning, effecting what has been called the world's disenchantment or the life-
world's despiritualization, marked by a loss o f soul. This process has involved a
reduction o f what constitutes the cosmos and human existence in it. In addition, reason,
believed in as humanity's guiding principle, has become reduced to a tool in the service o f
technical society. The "soul" o f reason, grounded in the question o f the good, has been
%
lost, in this way, followed by a growing indictment against reason itself as the source o f 
contemporary woes.
The intent o f this study is to explore this crisis o f Western culture, particularly to 
identify and investigate its origin and development as the logic or reign o f "death" in 
human consciousness. The aim is to look into the ensuing spiritual crisis: from the 
"death o f God" to the "death" o f faith, o f the cosmos, o f the human subject, and also of 
reason. Required is an inquiry into the "kernel" o f Western Civilization which can be, 
perhaps, most accurately depicted as the relentless pursuit o f reason and an unwavering 
faith in it as humanity's hope for achieving the knowledge of the good, and the good 
itself and the true and beautiful—the legacy o f Plato, and Socrates. Such involves an 
attempt to elucidate the relationship between reason and faith, and their historical
vii
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dissociation and antagonism, and also to understand the project o f education, as the 
guardian o f reason and the avenue through which human faith in reason is expressed, and 
the crisis in which this project, too, has culminated. Advocated is a reconciliation o f 
faith and reason, a redemption o f the foundational insight from which education in the 
West emerged, seemingly lost or forgotten, that the unexamined life is not worth living
viii
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PROLOGUE: GOING OUT, NOT KNOWING WHITHER
By faith Abraham, when he was called to go o u t..., went out, 
not knowing whither he went. (The Holv Bible. 1985, Hebrews 11:8)
It is required o f me that I begin this work with an introduction, a beginning by
which to bring my reader into the life and purpose o f this work, hi truth, I grasp for
such a beginning, yet find myself unable to find one, or unable to settle upon one among
many possible beginnings. The task amounts to rendering an account for what I have
said, to granting the reader some insight into the questions and understandings which
have led me to  say what I have said in the way that I have said it, and even to telling and
explaining to the reader what I have in fact actually said in this work. Thus, I begin with
Abraham, because like him, I not only presently "go out" not knowing exactly whither,
but also I have "gone out" in this work, in my own education, and in my life, because of
a certain call, though definitively an uncertain one, shrouded in mystery, not knowing,
and not knowing whither I went. This autobiographical confession is, as well, not only
significant with regard to the project which I have here taken up, but directly related to
it, in fact.
The call o f which I speak, for lack of a better language, is the call of faith, o f 
spirit, o f the sacred, o f the inescapable and essential mystery of life. In a very real sense, 
it is the call o f the universal, o f the eternal, and of the divine, as well, and the recognition 
of its import and place in the particularity, historicity and temporality o f human life. For 
humanity, the being whose very being is at issue and whose existential meaning is care in 
its temporality (Heidegger, 1927/1962), faith is universal (Derrida, 1994, October 3); in
1
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the words o f Paul Tillich (1957), faith is "the state o f being ultimately concerned" (p. t). 
According to Clement o f Alexandria, "faith is the ear o f  the soul" (cited in Mead, 1989, 
p. 131). It hears and hearkens, and, more often than not, is compelled to go out not 
knowing whither. "Faith is the daring o f the soul to go farther than it can see" (Clarke, 
cited in Mead, 1989, p. 131).
Yet faith can be sorely tried and lost, in the sense o f having been forgotten or 
denied, or become idolatrous, perversely directed against life and spirit, the animating 
principle o f life, toward the visible only. In this way, it is possible for humanity, in 
forgetfUlness, to set under erasure even the idea o f the invisible, and the very question of 
ultimacy and concern itself: ideals regarding the good, the true and the beautiful in the 
life-world not taken for granted or argued over even, but completely buried and entirely 
unthought. As it is said, "Where there is no vision, the people perish..." (The Holy 
Bible, 1985, Proverbs 29:18) because faith is perishing, the imagination and language of 
vision, "the heart o f the mind” (Anonymous, cited in Mead, 1989, p. 129).
This dire possibility is that which my soul has heard, an actuality practically, in 
fact, in the Western world, to which my soul has been summoned to respond. By 
whatever description—"the disenchantment o f the world," in the words o f Max Weber; 
the "despiritualization" o f the life-world and of human existence, in the thought of Joel 
Kovel—the consciousness which pervades and prevails in the West today is secular 
consciousness—our knowledge of ourselves, o f the world, o f life and human existence 
nearly void of any notions o f the sacred or transcendent. While this situation may be 
viewed as admirable in these post-Nietzschean times, and a mark o f human progress,
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enlightenment and liberation, it seems that, in our attempts to gain this world, we have, 
in the process, lost our souls.
Tillich (1988b) describes our world situation, our historically constitutive 
interpretation o f existence, as one o f crisis, marked by this loss o f "soul." The relation of 
the human subject and o f human society to a transcendent reality, which historically has 
served as the center o f meaning for humanity, is gone or no longer has power. In 
addition, reason, believed in as humanity's guiding principle, has become sacrificed as 
"the power o f truth and justice embodied in man as man" (p. 4) for "technical reason," a 
tool in the service o f technical society, usually at the expense o f the common good, or of 
personal good. The "soul" o f reason has been lost, as well, one could say. He goes on 
to say that in our attempts to control nature, a "second nature" has arisen, born of 
humankind, but not subject to humankind—a Leviathan, a Frankenstein, threatening to 
swallow or strangle us whole. In effect, "the decisive feature o f the period ... is the loss 
of control by human reason over man's historical existence" (p. 7, emphasis in original). 
Thus, this crisis ensues: o f faith, of reason, o f human existence and subjectivity in the 
world.
The psychoanalytic scholar Robert Romanyshyn (1989) states it in these terms:
Having dominated the earth out o f our increasing distance’ from it, we 
have come to believe that we are masters, and even creators. And in so 
doing we have lost the sense that we are sponsored, which means 
supported, upheld, and already sent on the way. hi this respect, we have 
lost something o f the religious sense o f human life, in the root meaning of 
that term, the sense that we are already bound, and connected to, and 
limited by something beyond ourselves, h i breaking the bond o f gravity 
[via space technology] we have broken more than a physical restraint.
We have broken the spiritual condition o f humanity, (p. 25)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The resultant loss is the dismissal o f the spiritual, the absence o f depth. For Tillich 
(1988a), the loss o f the dimension o f depth is, in fact, the loss o f the religious. Depth is 
religion itsel£ and religion is the substance o f culture. It is the passionate search for the 
meaning o f existence and "the state o f being concerned about one's being and about 
being universally" ( p. 42), the call o f faith. This depth from which we have departed can 
be described, then, as the ability to answer for ourselves the crucial and pressing 
question: "What is the meaning o f life?" Through this loss o f depth, not only can we not 
answer the question, but we also lack the courage or consciousness, the ability to even 
ask the serious questions life poses us. We neither hear nor receive, as well, the answers. 
I might add that without this dimension, without this search, without this call, humanity 
is without vision, without soul;1 humanity is neither free nor full humanity.
I am in agreement, too, with Harvey Cox (1984) that while secularization, the 
heir of the prophets who have preached against the injustices sanctioned in the name of 
religion, has been a strong force in the history of human freedom and a "legitimate 
response to the illegitimate use of the sacred" (p. 170), it has pushed itself to excess, 
manufacturing its own "pseudosacral devices" like the "goddess o f Reason" and the
^ e  word "soul" has an unclear etymology, and its definitions vary greatly with 
use. However, the term is ever referential o f that which is vital, cojoined with life. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, "soul" signifies "the principle of life. . .; the 
principle of thought and action...; the spiritual part...; the seat o f the emotions...; the 
vital, sensitive, or rational principle; the inspirer or leader...; the active agent, prime 
mover...; and the essential, fundamental, or animating part, element or feature of 
something" (1989, Vol. XVI, pp. 40-41). Joel Kovel (1991) describes "soul" simply as 
"the spiritual form taken by the se lf (p. 33), in relation to humanity in particular. The 
loss o f soul o f which I am speaking in this case connotes, then, the deprivation of the 
self s spiritual principle.
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"tomb of Lenin," and created its own illegitimate sanctions against freedom and justice. 
"If freedom once required a secular critique o f religion, it can also require a religious 
critique of the secular" (p. 171). I construe this present work as a part o f such a critique, 
although I prefer to consider it something o f a deconstruction o f the secular which makes 
manifest its internal relationship with the sacred and elucidates the possibility o f a kinship 
between a hermeneutics o f suspicion and a hermeneutics o f restoration (reason and faith, 
knowledge and value, secular and sacred, the critical and the creative). This work 
suggests the possibility o f legitimate transcendence—the path o f depth, o f affirmation in 
the light of negation and critique, o f a liberatory hermeneutics o f redemption.2 In the 
words of Theodor Adorno (1974/1978), "The only philosophy which can be responsibly 
practiced in the face o f despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would 
present themselves from the standpoint o f redemption. Knowledge has no light but that 
shed on the world by redemption" (p. 247).
The form o f this inquiry may best be described, then, as a philosophical history, in 
the words o f Hegel, which is the prerequisite for all historical writing, according to R. G. 
Collingwood (MacIntyre, 1984): a narrative o f fall or decline, marked by order and 
disorder, achievement and failure, and o f recovery. Richard Bernstein (1991b) speaks 
similarly of the centrality o f narratives in philosophy, and this "common rhetorical
Redemption is, o f course, usually perceived as a religious term, and well it is, 
particularly here in the interest o f recalling "spirit” or "soul” in the contemporary world, 
in the human realm, o f nurturing hope on the other side o f modern darkness and despair. 
The origins o f the word, however, introduce a much broader meaning, found in the Latin 
infinitive redimSre. meaning: to buy back, to regain, to recover, to reclaim, to restore, to 
make good, to free, and to fulfill fOED. 1989, Vol. Xm , pp. 410,412).
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pattern" o f "anticipations, setbacks, and trials” which "culminate with the progressive 
realization o f truth and reason” (p. 31), particularly some truth not seen before yet 
revealed as in a glass darkly to the philosopher telling the tale. However, he speaks also 
of the dramatic reversal of this pattern, begun with Nietzsche in his genealogical 
exposure o f the history of reason concluding in nihilism: the narrative o f "relentless 
decline, degeneration, catastrophe, and forgetfulness" (p. 32). In this work, I am clearly 
seeking to reckon with and take up both o f these genres of philosophical narrative, which 
obviously necessitates the need for something along the order o f redemptive hope, 
perhaps in the dialectical manner posited by Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1972). Even 
still, within Nietzsche's philosophy can be gleaned the structure and trace o f the common 
rhetorical pattern, nihilism the truth seen by him through a glass darkly and restorative 
speculations brought forth.
I am struggling here to make my aim and my approach to that aim explicit for 
and transparent to the reader, which is not without its irony. I have begun this endeavor 
with the quandary o f Abraham, for this reason, because I am faced with the problem of a 
thesis and o f prefacing, in the words o f Jacques Derrida (1972/1981), the problem of 
seeking to reduce thought, to constrain meaning, to tie the text down to the graspable 
and known, which is also the problem o f not trusting in the power o f language—o f the 
logos, the word—to speak meaningfully in manifold ways, nor in the efficacy o f the 
reader's experience o f interacting with the text, o f textual encounter. Yet, at the heart of 
the hermeneutical position is that understanding "happens" only in the inter-"play" of 
dialogue, and I hope here for the happening o f understanding, and the experience of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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"inner infinity o f the dialogue" and also o f the "infinity o f the unsaid" (Gadamer, 
1960/1992). hi many ways, such a requirement is bom from a kind o f faithless faith, in 
which the ultimate concern is for control, for certainty, the possession o f the unknown; 
it operates by the assumption (or should I say delusion?) that humanity can wholly 
master knowledge, language, reality, the entire realm o f meaning: that humanity can gain 
the whole world. I am writing about faith, about our cultural crisis o f frith, and yet I am 
asked in the writing to go out, knowing quite well whither, and to send my readers on 
their way, giving them as well, the knowledge o f the precise path and destination. I am 
seeking to address the issue o f this loss o f depth or soul in our society: the denial of the 
mysterious, o f that beyond us and beyond all our knowing, of the "moreness" (Huebner, 
1995, in press) felt but to which we can never truly arrive; or in that impulse to connect 
with the sacred, to experience the transcendent, its reduction. Yet, I am asked to reduce 
this address to an explanation, a thesis, and a methodology—to create in an introduction 
this elaborate imitation o f control, a kind o f performance which is the mark o f modem 
practice in the West, and what I see to be a harmful compulsion from which we need 
deliverance.
Says Kenneth Wilber (1995):
We might have lost the Light and the Height, but more frightening, we 
have lost the Mystery and the Deep, the Emptiness and the Abyss, and 
lost it in a world dedicated to surfaces and shadows, exteriors and shells, 
whose prophets lovingly exhort us to dive into the shallow end o f the 
pool head first, (p. xi)
I am frightened of these shallow waters, and while I am here compelled to draw from the
depths in the making o f some shallow pool for its presentation, I do it under protest,
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calling attention to the very act and subverting it, and I would not dream o f recruiting 
any divers. For this reason, I have crafted the substance o f this work in a very particular 
way, written it intentionally in a different or non-conventional manner through the use 
of story, and through the non-use o f the proverbial "I." Both "techniques" work in 
concert with the aim o f reconciliation, o f reviving depth, o f pointing to the universal, to 
that beyond the self and beyond telling. The assertion o f the "I" risks the separation o f 
the writer from the reader, and the suggestion that the author autonomously wields the 
text. The stories are ours as much as mine. Stories, as well, tending to show rather than 
tell, exceed explanation-theoretical postulations, thesis statements (Trousdale, 
Woestehoff & Schwartz, 1994).
A story is synthetical or analogical, able to articulate similarity-in-difference 
(Tracy, 1981), rather than analytical; thus, in relation to story we speak of the notion o f 
narrative unity, and coherence. Stories bring together, rather than break down. In 
addition, as Thomas Berry (199S, January) has said, the parts are exalted in the whole 
beyond themselves, and the whole shows forth the divine in more beauty than do the 
parts. If the crisis o f our day can be described as a crisis o f faith, which is also a 
breakdown o f meaning and o f intelligibility productive of alienation, then it can also be 
characterized as a crisis o f story and o f understanding and of the imagination and o f 
language. Understanding is primarily narrative. It is not only a historical legacy to 
conceive of the self o f life, in some narrative form, but it is also the natural mode o f self­
perception (MacIntyre, 1984). In this way, I agree with Fredric Jameson that narrative is 
an essential epistemological category: "Reality presents itself to the human mind ... in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the form of stories" (Selden, 1989, p. 47), which are aesthetic creations o f the human
imagination (Chase, 1960).
Clearly, story and imagination are integrally related. Story is, perhaps,
imagination's performance. Whatever the case, it seems clear that without story, no
imagination is manifested, and without imagination, no stories could exist.
Without imagination, nothing in the world could be meaningful. Without 
imagination, we could never reason toward knowledge of reality....
Imagination is our capacity to organize mental representations... into 
meaningful coherent unities,... our capacity to mold experience, to bring 
something new out o f the old, or to sympathetically project [ourselves] 
into the position o f another. (Johnson, 1987, pp. ix, 140,141, emphasis 
mine)
A crisis o f meaning, o f coherence, then, is a crisis o f the imagination, o f understanding, 
and of story. Such, as I have said, is also a crisis o f language. In the prosaic 
contemporary West, lost somehow is the poetic, story's language and source and style 
(Pellowslti, 1977), the language o f the imagination, o f vision, of faith. Thus, I have 
attempted in this work to revive the poetic, to include story, because we are poetic by 
nature and because we are our stories.
Narratives comprise, then, the basic structure o f existence, or at least that 
structure by which existence is interpreted, understood, given value. Each o f us, in the 
course of living, participate in narratives o f one sort or another, and comprehend our 
existence in terms o f the narratives we have lived out. Self and world coherence depends 
on a sight of these larger contexts within which we all dwell, the narratives which have 
made us, the histories into which we have been born. We come to understand the lives 
of others, as well, both past and present actions, and their aspirations for the future, in
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terms o f a narrative context and o f narrative histories. Our own utterances and actions 
are only meaningful as they find their place within some narrative. We are held 
accountable for them, as well, and for the narratives o f which we are authors, or 
subjects, and those within which we participate; we must answer for them in some 
intelligible and responsible manner. O f course, we are never the sole authors o f these 
stories, perhaps not even lead ones; thus, there is this element o f unpredictability or 
mystery within a partially teleological structure. There are constraints, then, to their 
intelligible continuance; our narratives can lapse into unintelligibility, which seems to be 
a part o f the crisis. Before we know what we should do, we must have a sense o f what 
story or stories in which we find ourselves. Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) goes on to say 
further and as well that "there is no way to give us an understanding of any society, 
including our own, except through the stock o f stories which constitute its initial 
dramatic resources. Mythology, in its original sense, is at the heart of things" (p. 216).
I, therefore, draw explicitly on certain myths I feel to be influential in Western 
thought or particularly helpful in giving us insight into the development of thought in the 
West. I am asserting, then, as well, the indelible connection and virtual inseparability of 
story, myth and imagination. Myth literally means "story." Ortega y Gasset (1957/1961) 
has described myth as the "leaven o f history" and traces the distinction we make between 
myth and story as involving a development in human thought, akin to Weber’s notion of 
disenchantment and Kovel's idea of despiritualization, in which we could no longer 
believe in the historical and cosmogonic reality o f our own narratives. However, he 
maintains that "even deprived of all religious significance, the epic themes, the mythical
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seeds not only endure as splendid irreplaceable phantoms, but they gain in liveliness;... 
hoarded in literary memory, they constitute a poetic leaven o f incalculable energy" (p. 
128). I might add, as well, that this energy is not without religious significance, though 
its influence may be denied, unexamined, wholly unthought.
Richard Chase (I960), in fact, situating the power o f myth as in its function of 
mediating dualisms, claims that humanity lives in two worlds, essentially, the mundane 
world of the everyday and the "magico-religious" world. In accordance with his theory, 
we, as humans, employ both psychic and social means to keep these two worlds 
separate. It could be said that we know two principles o f causation; the natural and the 
supernatural. Chase prefers to use the word preternatural rather than supernatural, 
which implies a distinction between the objective world and "supersensuous" experience 
which ought not to be made. The preternatural is the extraordinary, the uncanny, the 
mysterious, the powerful or numinous, that which has "mana." While the preternatural is 
set off from the world as ordinarily experienced, it is not because the preternatural is less 
than real as commonly known, but because it is more than ordinarily real. The mythic 
within any narrative—and I would add, constitutive o f narrative, or story—is that which 
unites the real and ideal (the imagination). Chase speaks o f it as that which "suffuses the 
natural with preternatural efficacy (mana)" (p. 135).
The mythic power o f story lies, then, in its "resurrection of a primeval reality, 
told in satisfaction o f deep religious wants, moral cravings, social submissions and even 
practical requirements" (Malinowski, cited in Chase, 1960, p. 135). I concur with Chase 
that story, as a Promethean force, somehow acts as a mediator between God and
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humankind, and as such, is crowned with life-giving potential. Chase describes its action 
well:
Story dramatizes in poetic form the disharmonies, the deep neurotic 
disturbances which may be occasioned by this clash o f inward and 
outward forces, and that by reconciling the opposing forces, by making 
them interact... toward a common end ,... [it] performs a profoundly 
beneficial life-giving act. (I960, p. 143)
Thus, story seems, to me, to be the perfect medium through which to revive the 
question of faith, a main interest in this work. Faith, too, is a  mediator between the 
human and the divine, between the eternal and the temporal, between the preternatural 
and the mundane, between the ideal and the actual. In acts o f reconciliation, faith, too, 
"makes the discords o f the present the harmonies o f the future" (Coliyer, cited in Mead, 
1989). Faith is often also expressed in terms o f its object, most often in the West 
expressed in the idea o f God, an idea which obviously ever needs unpacking 
symbolically, one which has even been declared "dead" in the world of Western 
modernity. John Dewey (1934), wrestling with this symbology o f God in human 
consciousness, defines the concept in this way. "It is this active relation between ideal 
and actual to which I would give the name 'God'" (p. 51, emphasis in original). In like 
manner, Alfred North Whitehead (1978), discusses the primordial conceptual nature o f 
God and the consequent derivative nature o f God, the tension between permanence and 
flux. He identifies God as "the unlimited conceptual realization o f the absolute wealth o f 
potentiality," and "the eternal urge o f desire," "the initial object o f desire," establishing 
the beginning of every subjective aim (p. 343). The crux o f the matter, he suggests, is
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"everlastingness," "the content of that vision upon which the finer religions are built—the
'many1 absorbed everlastingly in the final unity" (p. 347). Whitehead concludes:
The concept o f God is the way in which we understand this incredible fact 
[that which is beyond understanding]—that which cannot be, yet is.... In 
this way, the insistent craving is justified—the insistent craving that zest 
for existence be refreshed by the ever-present unfading importance, o f our 
immediate actions, which perish and yet live forevermore. (pp. 3S0,351)
My interest in this sort o f inquiry has been a consequence, in part, o f my own
personal crisis o f faith, and o f the "death o f God” in my own consciousness, and,
therefore, o f my need to interrogate my own education: that which I had been taught
and the way in which I had been taught it, that which I had learned and how I had
learned it—the development o f my mind, the movements o f my soul, which had brought
me to this state o f crisis, and to this "deadly" culmination. Such would mean a
reflection, as well, upon the nature of education itself—what it is, what it purports itself
to be, what it claims to effect, its aims and ends. My purpose, then, is not to address
faith and God solely or explicitly, but rather to consider them in the context o f and as
they are brought to bear on (as they operate within) the West's great and enduring
project of faith, the project o f education, reason's guardian, the frith o f reason. O f
course, such is a project and a frith in crisis also in our day—"the sweet dreams o f reason
dying," as has been said.
Clearly, my notion o f education encompasses a great deal more than the content 
of schooling as it presently stands, although schools, in some senses, have taken the 
place formerly occupied by church and family in the education o f the young. What I 
mean is that it seems great expectations are being placed increasingly on schools by
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parents and educators, by society, in terms o f our ultimate concerns involving not only 
economic and material security and global competitiveness, but also cultural preservation 
and transformation, individual actualization and fulfillment, the plight o f the oppressed, 
and the promotion o f values and recovery o f some normative ethics. A part o f the crisis 
of contemporary experience, in fact, rests within this frame. Ever becoming more 
apparent is that the "good life” cannot be reduced to the mere acquisition o f material 
goods, o f economic success, o f material well-being, nor the comfortable life o f leisure 
these possessions afford. The politically powerful, the wealthy, and the famous— 
generally via the possession o f knowledge or money or skill, seen as the fruits o f reason— 
are not necessarily the free or blessed.
The education o f which I am speaking, then, is something more and other than 
the accumulation o f knowledge or transmission and acquisition o f competencies and 
skills, though these are important and not unrelated to its spiritual and religious function 
or grounding, which is where my interest lies because it is a grounding which, with this 
loss of depth o f which I have been speaking, has also been lost. Dewey has said that 
education is concerned with what does not yet exist (Noddings, 1993); as such, it is 
humanity's attempt to negotiate paths between the actual and the ideal—in this sense, 
related to and not at all unconcerned with the idea o f God, at least as Dewey and 
Whitehead have characterized this idea, symbolically. Education is a project o f faith, in 
this way, referential o f the spiritual journey o f humanity—o f society, o f culture, of 
civilization, o f self. Such is also education in its classical sense, the upward journey of 
the soul, in the words o f Plato, concerning freedom and transcendence. This journey is
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built on the assertion o f Socrates that the unexamined life is not worth living, which 
implies a faith that the examination o f life might assist us in living lives o f worth and 
meaning, in creating such lives, which implies a passion for the possible beyond what is. 
The primary impulse behind the project o f education is, as it were, related to that impulse 
behind religion which Tillich has described as the search for depth, the question o f life's 
meaning. It is an existential enterprise which concerns the art o f living, involving an 
inquiry into being in the world and an examination o f the life-world, in relation to the 
question of human existence and agency, to the possibility o f living in a worthwhile way.
In Chapter One, "Dying Idols, Difficult Commandments and the Call o f Faith," I 
tell the story in Western Civilization o f humanity's relationship to the sacred. Such 
involves an inquiry into our changing perspectives on the divine, on that which claims 
ultimacy in human consciousness. Inclusive therein are also changes with respect to our 
view of ourselves, each other, the life-world, and even the stories we tell about human 
existence through time. I draw primarily upon such stories as they are told by three 
European scholars: Frederick Nietzsche (1883/1982a), Paul Ricoeur (1969/1974) and 
Jacques Derrida (1992/1995). These men address our culture's most fundamental 
problems with boldness, insight, critique and vision. At their core, the crises o f our times 
are crises concerning our own consciousness o f ourselves, the cosmos and our place in 
it, and of what constitutes the good in human life. My aim is to provide a background 
for grasping more frilly the troublesome and enigmatic nature o f the present, to set up a 
broad framework for inquiry into its historical origins, for understanding better the 
changes through which Western culture has passed, culminating in the current historical
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moment. Implicit is the assertion that the problems we face must be seen in terms o f 
their historical genealogies and investigated in such a way that they are not addressed 
superficially in terms o f present symptomology, but rather probed into regarding their 
origins and roots, by digging up, raising and attending to  the foundational questions at 
their very core.
The chapter opens with and is framed by Nietzsche's (1883/I982a) narrative, "On 
The Three Metamorphoses," which presents us with three transformations o f the spirit 
and three images—a camel, a lion and a child—considered as they stand metaphorically in 
relation to human life, through which I illumine humanity's history with the sacred in the 
West, and trace the evolution o f spirit wrought in its people and culture. Beneath this 
genealogy, and upholding it, is the affirmation o f the primacy o f spirit and transformation 
in human life. Each metamorphosis can be seen as a pivotal moment in the human 
history and consciousness o f Western civilization, each image a representation o f the 
tenor and spirit o f the times, o f the dominant human stance taken in and toward life.
The metamorphoses parallel the movements o f humankind upon which Ricoeur 
(1969/1974) looks in "Religion, Atheism, Faith." He seeks to inquire into frith, which I 
liken to Nietzsche's spirit o f the child, as a movement and future hope through which we 
might traverse the dialectical relationship between religion, or camel-spirit, and atheism, 
the spirit as lion. In this way, faith is not seen as a linear conclusion following on the 
heels of the human evolution from religion, in its primitive sense, to atheism, which for 
Ricoeur is inclusive of more than its literal sense. It is, however, forward-looking, a kind 
of synthesis involving religion and atheism, and yet also a metamorphosis moving
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humanity beyond them. Clearly seen are the idols of religion, hidden and dying, and 
keenly felt, the difficulty o f the commandments once presumed to give life. The people 
of the West, for the most part, no longer revel in carrying burdens into the desert like the 
camel; the burden o f "Thou Shalt” is no longer a weight wholly welcome. Rather, we 
are brought to a new appreciation o f atheism through this awareness it announces. 
Paradoxically, like one crying out a "sacred 'No'" in the wilderness, analogous to the 
message o f repentance, the beauty o f atheism is in the roar o f the lion who awakens its 
jungle inhabitants to the sound o f freedom. Yet atheism, too, is insufficient, unable to 
enter the game of creation, to begin anew, or utter a "sacred Yes'" to life. We are left, 
then, with the spirit o f the child as that transformation, desirable, longed-for, but not yet 
present, the yet-to-come promise o f faith.
The work o f Derrida (1992/1995) is introduced to inquire further into this 
history--to illumine the continuities and disruptions extant in these human 
metamorphoses, to shed light on the tensions formed between sacred and secular, as well 
as to elucidate the concepts in question, and the relationships among them: religion, 
atheism, faith, the sacred, the eternal, the temporal, the death o f God, the birth o f the 
human subject, freedom, responsibility, and history. Derrida's history is what he calls a 
"crypto- or mysta-genealogy o f responsibility," in which he claims that history (European 
history, the history o f Western civilization) finds its meaning or function in this 
movement o f humanity toward responsibility, and posits history itself as responsibility. 
Religion here is considered in a different sense from the way in which Ricoeur considers 
it (though they are related), synonymous with responsibility in Derrida's formulation,
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primarily because in looking at the West he must center his discussion of religion in 
Christianity. Christianity, as a religion, carries within it the call by grace to transcend 
primitive religion grounded in commandment, obedience, duty and fear. Responsibility 
in Derrida is linked not only with religion, and with freedom and frith, but also with the 
birth o f the human subject, which corresponds to the rise o f reason and initiates the 
critique o f religion, culminating in "the death o f God," and atheism, secular history.
This genealogy, beginning before and lying beneath religion, begins with the 
"daimonic" self o f humanity enmeshed in the "orgiastic sacred" and traces its 
metamorphoses through the Platonic self, which has denied and yet retained the sacred 
mystery, to the responsible self or the fully differentiated human subject, which has o f 
course incorporated the former and is expressed via religion in terms of the unfathomable 
depth of the human soul, compelled to respond in its singularity before the ultimate 
Other, God. While Riceour traces for us a historical process involving the 
demythification, demystification or demytholigization o f human consciousness in relation 
to itself the cosmos, the sacred, Derrida unmasks the repressed yet incorporated and 
constitutive sacred mystery at the core o f human consciousness and metamorphosis. His 
is a process o f remythification, remystification, remythologization: the revelation o f 
history's intra-mythology, the religious or sacred which lies at the very heart of history.
Recognizing this, history's secret, also critical to understanding the crises of our 
times is the moment in human thought, or history, when the declaration is made that 
"God is dead," and the aftermath o f such a conclusion. Ricoeur suggests that we in the 
West dwell still in this aftermath, a time of confusion, mourning, even anger—violent
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reaction to  this loss. Raised, then, is the primacy o f the question o f faith, for herein 
human faith is sorely tried, perhaps even overthrown. Yet faith, like the sacred mystery, 
ever is, however repressed, denied, forgotten or misdirected, hi this sense, though gods 
may die, divinity lives on; and humankind is condemned to faith, to some ultimate care 
and concern. Both Ricoeur and Derrida are thus drawn to faith's call, in response to 
contemporary straits, and Nietzsche to this metamorphosis o f the spirit as child—an 
image o f faith: fulfillment o f the past, blessing of the present, hope o f the future. At the 
chapter's end, I leave the reader with the promise o f faith, but the task remains to 
uncover the effects of God's death upon us and our world.
Yet, can God ever in truth be dead? We kill one god, and raise ourselves up 
another, whether it be in the fashioning of a golden calf or o f ourselves as sovereign—or 
some other object of faith. Yet die, gods do, or we kill them. It is in Chapter Two, 
"Curse, Crisis and the Reign of Death," that I invite the reader to look into the aftermath 
o f this burial o f God in the West. Such an inquiry is not simply an avenue through which 
I can establish the crisis of the present day, explicating it and tracing some of its sources, 
and posit it as a crisis o f faith, the crux o f which is ultimately spiritual—ontological or 
soul sickness at the heart of humanity. The endeavor also provides a means through 
which I might seek to elucidate this state of things in our times, that we may glean 
insight into it and hopefully better understand or know how to find our way in it and 
through it redemptively.
Admittedly, in describing the nature o f this crisis—its extensiveness, its severity, 
its all-encompassing scope, I attempt, in fact, to "prove" its existence, and begin laying a
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groundwork toward providing a rationale for looking anew at human faith, for insisting 
upon its import in our constitution o f the sel£ o f society, o f the world, and all their 
destinies. These dark days are presented, then, in terms of the human crisis o f faith in 
Western civilization, and as the manifestation o f a spiritual crisis—in the presence o f my 
interest in exhorting the reader to a renewed concern with the spiritual matters of 
existence, and in reviving a language that can speak spirit and grant it breathing room. 
Through such, we might think more deeply upon the source and summit o f our present 
plights and most pressing cares, and perhaps respond more wisely in and to them.
Picking up from Chapter One, I proceed with this large, overarching history of 
where we are ontologically and spiritually, from whence we've come—more specifically, 
where we Westerners are and where we have led and are continuing to lead the world. 
From Nietzsche's "God is dead” proclamation, I am seeking to further escalate the 
urgency o f things globally, and suggest, that where God is dead—as the author and 
source and breath o f life—so begins the languishing of all things: for banished, as well, is 
life, and spirit, the animating principle o f life. The death of God, in this sense, intimates 
the Reign o f Death in human consciousness. God is not only dead, then, and we have 
not only killed him ourselves, but with our posture, we are also effecting the death o f the 
world, o f humankind itsel£ of ourselves, as well. Tracing this fatal process, my aim is 
basically to discuss and cite the "death" o f the world and of humanity through modem 
thought, the seeds o f which are found much earlier in Western history and thought, to 
explicate what I call this "Logic of Death" and illustrate its historical operation.
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The discussion is framed by the Judeo-Christian story o f Creation and of the "Fall 
o f Man" (The Holy Bible. 1985, Genesis 1-3) because it is a  foundational myth o f origins 
concerning the creation o f the world and humankind and human knowledge, regarding 
humanity's relationship to the world, the divine, itself and this thing we call death. 
Moreover, it is not merely a story but one o f mythic proportions within a tradition which 
has a profound influence on Western consciousness. Herein, again, is affirmed the 
primacy o f the imagination in human thought and action, the images we set before us 
defining the world, human existence in the world, and what is sacred to such existence. 
This story is really about the death o f "man," however, not the death o f God. The 
proclamation o f the sentence o f death is made against humanity. In this light, Nietzsche's 
declaration that God is dead might be seen as another one o f those great reversals for 
which he is so famous. Yet, the two pronouncements are related, a connection I strive 
to show.
I rely upon a number o f thinkers to document this domination and development 
o f death-each Weberian, or "very dark," in their presentation o f the progress of 
humankind and human reason in the West, and in their critique o f its primary worldview. 
These scholars, four in number, are: 1) Morris Berman (1981), with his discussion from 
Max Weber on the modem "disenchantment o f the world"; 2) Joel Kovel (1991), with 
his explication o f the "despiritualization o f the world" and its relationship to advanced 
capitalism; 3) Douglas Sloan (1983), with his critique o f Western ways o f knowing via 
science and its quantitative emphasis; and 4) Martin Heidegger (1950/1971a,
1952/I977a, 1952/I977b, 1954/I977c, and 1962/1977d), with his examination of the
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impact o f our stance toward and in the world, our present way of being in it, in the 
technological age—world violence, dehumanization, and the antithesis o f freedom.
What is at issue, then, I am suggesting, is how we are in the world, how we 
know the world, ourselves and the divine—and how we relate to these and to all things. 
Death is separation, and the history of the West, in this sense, has been the separation o f 
all things: subject, object, God, "man," mind, body—and spirit has been 
excommunicated. Heidegger calls our position in the world one of "enframing" in which 
we challenge nature, and all the world, to reveal its treasures; and grab them up, store 
them and use them up at our own will. In this way, we have not only killed God, but 
have initiated as well the systematic killing o f the world which we have objectified. 
Humanity, the human subject, the homeless, languishes too while slaying the earth, its 
home. Heidegger describes how we ourselves are sucked up into this clutching grasp, 
and objectified, freedom become an illusion. Distorted images of the divine, o f humanity 
and of the world reign. From the "Ye shall be as gods" promise in our Genesis story, I 
identify "enframing" with the quest for godhood, the will-to-power gone awry in an 
incessant plucking and consumption of forbidden fruit. We are left with the bleak picture 
these statistics paint: Cain slays Abel, and Holocaust and Hiroshima ensue. God has 
perished, and we shall not only surely die, but also be the instruments o f death.
Chapters Three and Four may be read together, as they are parts one and two 
respectively o f the same general theme: "Education, The Upward Journey and the Faith 
of Reason." Certainly, by Chapter Two, I have left the reader with a very dark picture of 
our present plight, and o f the journey and destiny o f Western civilization. Yet, as ancient
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
wisdom is fond o f reporting, where there is great darkness, great light also shall be.
Thus, I frame these chapters with a story o f light, one prophetic of progress, goodness, 
truth, and beauty—as opposed to curse, crisis and the reign o f death, hi truth, however, 
in the biblical story o f the creation o f the world and the fall o f humanity, lies also the 
seed o f redemption, the foreshadowing of the great light o f salvation. Yet, with the 
mythology o f Judeo-Christianity is another equally powerful influence in Western 
thought and development: the Socratic tradition, Greek philosophy, Greco-Roman 
thought, the vision o f Plato. Plato's "Allegory of the Cave" (c.a. 380 b.c./1992) not only 
construes human existence and the evolution o f humanity in terms of light, but also as 
constitutive o f an upward journey of light and to light. The human soul is liberated from 
the dark confines o f the cave to make its way upward to the brilliant light o f the sun and 
the wide world warmed and lit up by such light.
The question is, again, one of reconciliation: How might we reconcile this story 
of the human attempt to make the godward ascent via the consumption of the fruit of 
knowledge, resulting in destruction, and this similar one o f ascension, resulting in 
blessedness and the sight o f the good? More to the point, how has this sojourn o f light, 
explicated by Plato in such glowing colors, turned so easily to darkness in the West, 
especially since the presence o f any light at all is known to dispel darkness? In these 
chapters, I explore these questions, explicating Plato's image here of the education of the 
human soul and establishing its significance in the Western imagination, in the course of 
human progress. The inquiry, pursued in the light o f the crises in which we now find 
ourselves, ultimately aims at opening up our understanding, uncovering not only the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
24
dregs o f the past but also its forgotten treasures, toward some redemptive path and 
avenue o f hope; yet, it is undertaken, Plato's (subsequently, the West's) journey o f light 
is considered, in regard to its relationship to the journey o f darkness traced in Chapter 
Two involving the dis-integration and de-spiritualization o f the world, supplementing and 
continuing this history.
For, following the death o f God, the world, etc., comes this reign of death: the 
impending "death" o f the subject, and the "death" o f reason-biting questions regarding 
human agency and efficacy in knowing and promoting the good, the true and the 
beautiful in the life-world. Reason, subjectivity, the self and the notion o f life even 
construed as a journey o f some narrative unity are under scrutiny. As Viktor Shklovsky 
(1929/1990) has put it, "the prosaic universe [the modem world] is just one damn thing 
after another” ( p. ix). Traumas of meaning, value, significance, faith, in the presence of 
great darkness and in the absence of the light o f the good. Fundamental, then, to what is 
currently at issue in our culture is this crisis o f reason, doubts regarding its import, 
function, place and centrality. Richard Bernstein (1991b), in his analysis o f the situation, 
calls it the "rage against reason." Once our most prominent and revered possession, 
reason has now been found seriously wanting, and in many cases is indicted as the cause 
o f all the world's present woes.
Yet the kernel o f Western civilization can be most accurately depicted, in fact, as 
the relentless pursuit o f reason and an unwavering faith in it as humanity’s hope for 
achieving the knowledge o f the good, and the good itself. Plato is, as well, the man we 
regard as the father o f reason in the great Western tradition, or at least the representative
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of its father Socrates; and his "Allegory o f the Cave” is the expression of not only the 
"glory” of reason, but the faith o f reason wherein education is set forth as the avenue 
through which this faith is manifested and practiced—through which reason is aspired to, 
discovered, acted upon and actualized-toward the realization o f human good. Because 
o f the pervasive logic o f death and o f severing—the de-spiritualized world, according to 
Kovel—in which we live and move, it is at first difficult for us to ascertain the 
relationships between some o f these concerns, particularly here for us to hold together 
the notions o f faith and reason, usually construed as unrelated and more often as 
antagonists. Thus, in discussing Plato's image o f education as the transcendent journey 
of the soul to spirit, and the guardian, midwife and path o f reason, conceived by him as 
divine, I do so with an eye toward elucidating this idea o f reason's faith, of reason's 
grounding in faith, the ultimate concerns o f humanity, and toward investigating the 
historical dissociation o f faith and reason in Western consciousness. Highlighting this 
"original'' unity (between faith and reason, knowledge and value, etc.) also sheds light 
once again on the communion o f the secular and sacred, the sacred at the heart o f the 
secular, the "religious meaning," in the words o f Ricoeur, or underpinnings, to history, 
human subjectivity, reason, etc.—the omnipresence and omnipotence of mystery, despite 
Western attempts at certainty, mastery, control, comprehensive knowledge and power.
Plato's portrait o f education is viewed, then, as a metaphor for the journey o f 
humanity in the Western world, involving ascending climbs from the cave to the light o f 
the sun, the intelligible realm, and descending returns to its dark confines, the visible 
realm o f the senses. Just as Derrida identifies the Platonic self with the beginnings o f the
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birth o f the human subject, a "heightened" consciousness which has differentiated itself 
from the "cave" o f the earth in some measure, Kenneth Wilber (1995) presents an 
evolutionary history o f the Kosmos. a history o f  spirit and humanity and human 
consciousness in relation to the world and to spirit, that is consistent with Plato's 
allegorical journey o f the soul. I draw upon his work to consider through time the 
progressive reduction o f the Kosmos—in the Greek sense o f the full-bodied whole, the 
"All" (physiosphere, biosphere, noosphere and theosphere) and that which can only be 
symbolized yet never fully come to, or apprehended—to the cosmos, the totality o f which 
we speak today which primarily rests upon the physical aspects of the universe alone. 
From this perspective, the death of the world through the logic of severing is achieved 
and viewed as evolutionary differentiation gone too far, into dissociation, subsequent 
integration in a higher embrace involving the negation and preservation o f the former 
denied—pathology. In the language of Plato, the transcendent journey upward to the 
intelligible realm o f the one (noospheric awareness, depth, inferiority, universality) is cut 
off from the descending journey of return to the sensible realm of the world's eminent 
manyness (physiospheric and biospheric embodiment, exteriority, particularity)— 
pathology, and mis-education.
The sundering o f faith from reason, the movement o f reason from that treasured 
in the West to that deconstructed, doubted and despised, and the renunciation and denial 
of the faith which is its ground and guide, are traced in the context of the wars fought 
between these two journeys (faiths, gods, teleologies) espoused in the West—o f ascent 
and descent, having been separated, each truncated and having repressed the other. In
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Part 2, or Chapter 4 ,1 look specifically into the history o f education in regard to these 
issues, as an institution, and as institutionalized, explicitly concerned with the education 
of the human "soul," and implicitly, with the advancement o f reason in humanity as a 
whole. I draw predominantly on three different works in curriculum through which to 
tell this story of education: Curriculum History by David Hamilton (1990), which begins 
with the "birth" o f education tracing it through to its mutation into "curriculum" with an 
added emphasis on the tensions therein between absolutist/methodistic and enlightenment 
thought; Understanding Curriculum by William Pinar, William Reynolds, Patrick 
Slattery and Peter Taubman (1995), a historical piece investigating curriculum in terms 
of these tensions as well with a focus on the movement in the field from an interest in 
development and procedure to an attempt at understanding; and The Moral and 
Spiritual Crisis in Education: A Curriculum for Justice and Compassion in Education bv 
David Purpel (1989), which posits and explicates the state o f education as one of moral 
and spiritual crisis, seeking to address such by looking again at the traditions which have 
formed Western education, particularly that o f prophetic Judeo-Christianity, in addition 
to Socratic rationalism. A discussion o f education as a project o f faith, o f frith in reason 
as the avenue through which humanity might address its deepest care and attain its 
highest good, is inclusive herein. In tracing broadly this history—exemplary o f the splits, 
wars, pathologies, documented in Chapter 3 (Part 1), the narrowing and trivialization of 
the very notion of education itself is clearly evidenced and seen. We are brought indeed 
to the "death" of reason, at least in the "original" or Platonic sense, inclusive o f the 
notions of attunement with the Kosmos, blessedness, and friendship with all that is
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human and divine. Begun with Plato as the spiritual pilgrimage o f the soul upward, the 
faith o f reason to actualize goodness, truth and beauty, and a foundational unifying 
construct through which to consider humanity's ultimate happiness and concern, 
education becomes and is reduced to little more than the business o f schooling, an 
academic area of research, an economic insurance policy, a  material possession for 
soul-less human societies and selves.
This work I present in an effort toward redemption. For, the thesis turns on the 
primacy of education, its historical import in the aspirations o f humanity in Western 
civilization and in our constitution of life and knowledge and human existence in the life- 
world—that deemed sacred or o f ultimate concern; and the present need to address its 
abnegation and trivialization, its "death" via dissociation, repression, reduction—faithless 
reason or reasonless faith, the loss o f a prior and primary grasp o f the Kosmic whole 
(Sloan, 1983), a ground o f value and meaning. I am advocating a redemption of sorts, a 
revival or restoration o f that foundational insight o f the fathers o f education (of Socrates, 
to be exact), seemingly forgotten or lost: the unexamined life is not worth living: of 
education, the faith o f reason, as the faithful examination o f  the life-world, involving our 
posture before and participation in the essential ambiguity o f life and mystery o f spirit, 
toward this end of living that is worthy, toward apprehending and actualizing the good, 
the true and the beautiful in human life.
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CHAPTER 1
DYING IDOLS, DIFFICULT COMMANDMENTS AND THE CALL OF FAITH
I tell you o f three metamorphoses o f the spirit: how the spirit 
becomes a camel; and how the camel becomes a lion; and how the lion, 
finally, becomes a child.
I tell you o f the spirit first that would bear much, whose way is 
hard, for this spirit is strong and reverent, and its strength requires the 
difficult and the most difficult. "O heroes, what is difficult, and most 
difficult?” the spirit that would take all upon itself asks, kneeling to the 
ground like a camel ready to be fully loaded. "I shall take such upon 
myself that I may exult in my strength," it declares.
"Is it 'feeding on the acorns and grass o f knowledge and, for the 
sake o f truth, suffering hunger in one's soul?*" (Nietzsche, 1883/1982a, p. 
138).
"Or is it dwelling in rancid waters if they be the waters o f truth, 
and not flinching in the face o f seething snakes or icy toads?"
Like a camel well burdened, the spirit that would bear much and 
the most difficult things speeds into its desert.
In the desert most lonely occurs the second metamorphosis: a 
lion, who would master his own freedom and overcome his own desert, 
the spirit becomes. Here he searches out his last lord and god with whom 
he wishes to fight to the death. The ultimate triumph for which he longs 
is in the battle with the great dragon.
This dragon, no longer to be known as master and king, who is 
he? '"Thou shalt' is the name o f the great dragon" (p. 138). But "I will" 
is the spirit o f the lion. "Thou shalt" stands before him as an immoveable 
obstacle; it is a beast o f gold, with scales all over its body. Values they 
are which shine from these scales: upon each scale shines a "golden 
Thou shalt'” (p. 140).
The lion, though he cannot himself create, with the "I will" o f his 
spirit prepares the way for invention, for new values. For without for 
oneself the creation o f freedom, new creation is not possible. Thus, the 
lion is the spirit o f a sacred "No," that realizes illusion and caprice in 
"Thou shalt."
The spirit moves once again, and the preying lion becomes finally 
a child. With the child comes the game o f creation. The child, a new 
beginning, innocence and forgetting, utters now a sacred "Yes." The 
spirit wills its own will, and having been lost to the world, now triumphs 
over its own world.
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I have told you of three metamorphoses o f the spirit: how the 
spirit became a  camel, and how the camel became a lion, and the lion at 
last a  child.
A  retelling o f Nietzsche's "On The Three Metamorphoses," from 
Zarathustra's Speeches in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883/1982a)
We do not readily speak o f Frederick Nietzsche (1883/I982a) as a man o f frith.
Yet, here is Zarathustra, his wise prophet, speaking o f spirit and transformation. Here is
the crowning metamorphosis of spirit as child.1 What is the child but an image o f frith?
'Nietzsche does not expound on the signification o f this image of the child, nor 
does he develop any mythology of the child as such; we are merely left with the image, 
and the few words recounted in the story. However, the symbol o f the child figures 
prominently in Western and non-Westem cultures from ancient times, powerfully central 
in mythology, religion and folklore. The child is often divine and typically endangered, 
orphaned, hidden in obscurity and enduring trials o f all sorts, later to rise up as a great 
leader or savior. In Greek mythology, the great god Zeus as a child lives under the 
devouring threat o f his father Chronos, and his son Dionysus, a messianic figure, is in 
danger o f being ripped to pieces by the Titans in his absence. The Roman twins 
Romulus and Remus are abandoned as infonts, set adrift on the river Tiber. The mighty 
deliverer o f the Jewish people, and chosen o f Yahweh, Moses is hidden as an infant in a 
basket on the river among the bulrushes for fear o f death at the hands of Pharaoh. The 
Christian child divine, Jesus, enters the world with a similar plight, and "wise men" come 
to worship him. Krishna's birth, as well, is threatened by another ruler, King Kansa, who 
decrees the slaying o f all newborns (Capacchione, 1991). Folklore is full o f child heroes 
who overcome, for example: Hansel and Gretel, Little Red Ridinghood, Rapunzel, 
Cinderella, and Jack and the Beanstalk, in the fairytales o f Europe.
Some scholars, particularly Carl Jung and Joseph Campbell, have suggested that 
myths and the symbols with which they are imbued live on because they speak to 
universal human experience that transcends culture and history. The image of the child 
throughout history has been associated with the prophetic message of hope, liberty, and 
empowerment. In the Old Testament scriptures a vision is told of the lion dwelling 
peaceably beside the lamb, and of a child which leads them (The Holy Bible. 1985, Isaiah 
11.6). In the New Testament scriptures, Jesus is credited on several occasions with 
saying that one must become as a little child to inherit the Kingdom of God (Matthew 
11:25,18:3; Luke 18:16-17)—the child as a way to serenity, joy, peace, salvation, 
divinity. The child is said to represent the core o f human being, full humanness, 
aliveness, openness, wonder, play, enthusiasm—which means literally "in God."
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The child is the hope o f  the future, the fulfillment of the past, and the blessing o f the 
present. The child, as innocence and forgetting and a new beginning, adopts in the 
movement o f creation a  "sacred 'Yes.'" The child responds to the world, to being-in-the- 
world,2 with a grand "Amen." The child is the pure affirmation o f existence, the 
utterance o f a "sacred Yes'" to life, which is the substance o f faith.
Paul Ricoeur (1969/1974), in an essay entitled "Religion, Atheism, and Faith," 
presents something o f an ontological history of humanity's relation to the sacred, or at 
least a sketch of a history o f faith, as it were, in Western civilization. Ricoeufs scheme, 
interestingly enough, is well-suited to the images o f Zarathustra's transformations of 
spirit. A response to the Nietzschean critique of religion and the hermeneutics of
Contemporary psychology has picked up on this image to help hurting individuals 
toward healing and wholeness through "Inner Child" work (Capacchione, 1991; 
Whitfield, 1987; Whitfield, in Capacchione, 1991). Alice Miller (1983,1984) claims 
that humanity manifests authenticity and creativity only through listening to and making a 
dwelling for this voice o f  the Child within, through the social and personal respect for the 
preciousness of the child.
Jung (1949/1989) identifies the image of the child as an archetype, a symbol in 
the collective unconscious o f the human race. The child announces a path for feture 
change; it signifies transformation, and synthesis, particularly o f unconscious and 
conscious elements held before at odds. It is the archetype bearing the power of 
regeneration, a symbol o f wholeness and of being in its totality. The child reveals to us 
our journey as a whole, where we have strayed and the treasured aspirations we have 
lost or forgotten along the way (Fontana, 1994). Jung (1949/1989) says of the child: "It 
is ... a symbol which unites the opposites; a mediator, bringer o f healing, that is, one 
who makes whole" (p. 83).
The notion o f "being-in-the-world" is drawn from Heidegger (1927/1962) in 
Being and Time, referential to an understanding of subjectivity which is inseparable from 
objectivity, to his identification o f human being as "Dasein," or being-there, the world 
always and ever constitutive o f the being that is human.
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suspicion, Ricoeur boldly advocates a path, or eschatological metamorphosis, from 
religion through atheism on the way to what he calls "faith." Clearly, aware o f the 
dangers o f such a formulation, Ricoeur is careful to posit a frith distinct from religion; 
his endeavor—though a personal radical challenge to accept the critique o f religion and 
still remain a Christian—is not a deceptive and hypocritical method aimed at preserving 
the "frith o f our fathers," snatching back with one hand what the insights of atheism have 
compelled him to yield with the other. Ricoeur claims, "Atheism is not limited to the 
mere negation and destruction of religion b u t... rather, it opens up the horizon for 
something else, for a type o f frith that might be called... a postreligious frith or a frith 
for a postreligious age" (p. 440). Ricoeur looks forward to, grasps after, the spirit o f the 
child.
Ricoeur begins with the spirit o f religion—the spirit as camel in Zarathustra's 
parable. The camel, a beast o f burden, goes about bearing happily the loads placed upon 
it in the fulfillment o f duty. The camel, reverent and submissive, exults in such exhibition 
of virtue as it serves to assuage guilt and deliver comfort. Religion, in this sense, is a 
primitive form o f life rooted in the fear o f punishment and the desire for protection.
These two drives correspond to the two main facets o f religion, taboo and refuge, as 
well as to the two central countenances o f religious feeling, accusation and consolation. 
This primordial structure, says Ricoeur, is one that must always be overcome by faith. 
However, he is quick to admit that, perhaps, it is the case that these features represent
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the corrupt parts o f religion, in the same way that Marx viewed theology as the corrupt 
part o f philosophy.
Nevertheless, the God o f religion is here one who both threatens and protects. 
He3 is the ultimate danger and the ultimate protection. He is the God o f morality
3 A word should be said about the gender o f God here. From Ricoeur, I am using 
the pronoun "he" to refer to God, which Ricoeur has taken undoubtedly from Nietzsche 
and Freud. In Nietzsche's famous pronouncement that God is dead, accounting this God 
male, Nietzsche (1882/1974) goes on to say that we—you and I—have killed him. The 
murder o f God, as well, in Freud's line o f thought, is akin psychologically to the murder 
o f the Father figure, obviously masculine. This is neither to establish "the reality we call 
'God' [which] exceeds all human expression” (Armstrong, 1994, p. xxi), an indescribable 
reality we can only humanly symbolize, as male, nor to accuse Freud or Nietzsche or 
Ricoeur o f sexist conceptions o f God, though they may, in fact, hold them. It is to posit, 
rather, that "the human idea of God has a history" (p. xx), and that in tracing the history 
of this idea in the West, the development o f the sacred in Western thought, we are 
primarily inquiring into a masculine idea, emerging from a patriarchal worldview. Says 
Karen Armstrong (19941 in A History o f God: "Because this God [the Judeo-Christian 
God, and the Muslim God, as well] began as a specifically male deity, monotheists have 
usually referred to it as lie'" (p. xxii). Since I am here investigating the history o f the 
human stance toward this God, in the West, and presenting the ideas o f thinkers who 
refer to God as "he," in the Western tradition, I am maintaining the "conventional 
masculine terminology," the use o f "he" in reference to this God—too, for the sake of 
historical accuracy. The God who has died, in the West, is a male God.
Clearly, in contemporary times, with good reason, feminist scholars have called 
into question this gendered, masculine conception o f God. Some feminist theologians 
have even adopted what has been called a "hermeneutics o f rejection," dismissing the Old 
Testament even, as an embodied testament o f a patriarchal society. Feminist thinkers 
have also keenly brought to light how the subjugation o f women is inscribed in our 
language, in our very definitions and "conceptualizations o f God, whose omniscience and 
omnipotence are thought to be the religious pattern o f human rationality and freedom" 
f Companion Encyclopedia o f Theology. 1995, p. 491). Other theologians have drawn 
attention to the actual double-gendered nature o f the Judeo-Christian God of the Old 
Testament and to "his" problematic representation in the West, particularly as construed 
in English translations. In the Hebrew and in Arabic, certain references to God are 
grammatically feminine (Armstrong, 1994). In the Book o f Psalms (Psalms 22:9), God 
is likened to a midwife, having brought David forth from the womb, a female image
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operating by the law o f retribution. Religion is set up as the foundation o f morality, and 
through this rational scheme o f the law, also a moral vision o f the world: the God o f 
Providence rules the world by this law o f retribution. Human response to the sacred is in 
heeding prohibitions and following commandments—the edicts o f "Thou Shalt," 
commandments eventually found too difficult to bear.
Ricoeur’s aim is not formally a history or genealogy or evolutionary trace.
Rather, he seeks to examine atheism as a spiritual passageway from religion to faith. 
Atheism is seen as a link between religion and frith which looks back at what it denies 
and forward toward what it makes possible. For this reason, Ricoeur does not discuss 
religion in great length, as such, but religion as it has been laid bare and exposed by the 
work o f atheism. The spirit o f atheism comes on the scene, like the image o f the lion, 
roaring a "sacred ’No.'" If the camel is subjection, the lion is rebellion. The lion is the 
spirit o f "I will" who slays the great dragon "Thou Shalt," having discovered illusion 
therein. Atheism—ferocious, majestic, free, in the spirit o f critique, dismantles and rips 
away at the foundations o f religion.
ascribed to the divine deity (Companion Encyclopedia o f Theology. 199S). Even in the 
English translations o f the Old Testament, the womb and breasts o f God are mentioned 
on several occasions (The Holy Bible. 1985, Genesis 50:8, Job 21:24, and 38:39, for 
example). Certainly, the conception of God in the West, however, has been principally a 
male conception. This fret, as well, seems to support the feminist claim "that all human 
knowledge is shaped by the perspective of the knower, and that as knowledge has been 
constructed in the Western world, those knowers have largely been the dominant males" 
(Companion Encyclopedia o f Theology. 1995, p. 492).
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The focus in Ricoeur is on the atheism o f Nietzsche (1883/I982a, 1886/1966, 
1887/1967a and I898/1967b)~and Freud (1925/1958), as well—because it represents a 
different kind o f criticism unlike that o f empiricism or positivism Rather than fussing 
over the proof o f the existence o f God or the meaning or meaninglessness o f the concept 
of God, this atheism uncovers the disguised symptoms o f fear and desire at the heart of 
religion. In an assessment o f religion as refuge, the critique of the God o f morality is 
fully accomplished. Atheism, then, lays bare a bidden meaning to religion that is 
concealed from the believer through an "act o f dissimulation" which blocks any 
investigation o f consciousness into its true origins. Religion is seen as a part o f the 
cultural dimension o f experience, and the cultural function of illusion is manifested. This 
illusion is not along the order of error or the ethics o f the lie, but rather o f a hidden 
meaning that requires the stripping away o f masks, the deconstruction of the camel's 
burden. Ricoeur (1969/1974) situates atheism within this enlightenment: "The public 
meanings of our consciousness conceal true meanings, which can be brought to light 
only by adopting the attitude of suspicion and cautious critical scrutiny" (p. 442).
Atheism is justified.
In the Nietzschean critique, the ideal realm o f being of the absolute good and the 
intelligible—o f metaphysics—is interrogated; and this invisible source o f all values is 
found to be empty, in so far as it is ideal, outside and above humanity, and a projection 
into the heavens of human frailty. This realm is akin to the superego, the seat o f moral 
conscience, in the language of Freud. The God of prohibition does not exist and yet is
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the author, or father o f all prohibitions. Obligation is shown to be grounded in this 
secret process referring back to an original act o f accusation, rooted in the will. 
Accusation is, then, at the center o f duty. Thus, the consolation provided by this God is, 
first, founded on fear, and second, on an infantile desire for protection. The instincts o f 
fear and desire are discovered behind religion.
The figure o f God becomes, in many ways, ambiguous because he is not only the 
one who condemns and punishes, but also the "Father" who comforts and protects.
Such relates to Freud's insight that religion is the highest function o f culture in that it 
does not primarily set up an absolute authority to guide moral consciousness, but rather 
attempts to address and ease the severity o f life. Here is Freud's "nostalgia for the 
father," and religion becomes a covert operation o f the "pleasure principle." For 
Nietzsche, it is weakness o f will.
The nature o f this God is revealed: He is the God of prohibition and accusation, 
o f refuge, of morality, and o f metaphysics. Metaphysics here represents that tightly-knit 
system of philosophy and theology in the form of theodicy that attempts in the face of 
evil to justify and defend the absolute goodness and power o f God. The atheistic 
critique exposes some o f the underlying motives behind theodicy, but also behind those 
philosophies-like those o f Kant and Hegel, for instance—which claim to go beyond 
theodicy and still seek to reconcile rationally natural law with human freedom. Thus 
comes the proclamation that must come through critique and the spirit o f a "sacred 'No'": 
"God is dead." Metaphysics, too, is fatally wounded.
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As atheism, then, announces the death o f god and draws attention to the 
emptiness at the source from which ethics and values spring (Derrida 1990; Nietzsche 
1886/1966,1887/1967a and 1898/I967b), nihilism is not far behind. Nihilism, as such, is 
not the creation o f atheism, or Nietzsche, but only that historical process to which both 
bear witness.4 It is the historical manifestation o f the nothingness at the heart o f the 
illusory origin, the ideal realm. It is the soul o f metaphysics borne, and an agonizing
4Nihilism, from nihil meaning "nothing," is generally defined as a loss o f values: 
ethical, political, religious, social—the death o f "God." It involves a skepticism which 
rejects all that is designated as real/unreal, or being/nonbeing, etc.; it denies the value of 
all distinctions; the conclusion drawn is that there is no objective, actual foundation o f 
truth, that nothing is knowable, and that all human knowledge is illusory, relative, and 
meaningless. Ultimately, there is found no justification for moral values esteemed and 
posited. The universe knows no aim or purpose either, no meaning (Angeles, 1981). It 
is the manifestation of nothingness.
Nietzsche (1887/1967a) calls nihilism a European Buddhism, the "sinister 
symptom" o f a morality gone sinister, the morality o f pity, in which the human will in fact 
turns itself against life. Nihilism is this weariness, wherein humanity is sorely tired of 
humanity itself lost are the hopes for the human family, the love o f it, humanity's will to 
itself. The human being, diminished and levelled, gives way to the "Great Nausea," this 
will to nothingness spawned from the tyrannical ideal, against the earth and life and 
humanity ; nihilism is the consummation o f fear and nausea, or pity: terrified o f the 
vacuous, of the void, humanity must choose to will nothingness than not will at all. It is 
the process in which the will to truth has gained self-consciousness, has overcome itself, 
a process Nietzsche identifies as not only the most awful and dubious o f phenomena, but 
also possibly the most hopeful.
Heidegger (1952/1977b) interprets nihilism, in the Nietzschean sense, as a 
movement in history, the inner logic o f the West, that which has always reigned but is 
manifest and determining in modem times. The word that "God is dead," then, has 
already been uttered, insinuated in the very history o f the West as decided by 
metaphysics. God is the ideal realm, the suprasensory, as understood by late Greek and 
Christian appropriations of Platonic philosophy: opposed to the sensory, visible world, 
and that alone which is real. Yet, Nietzsche's affirmative stand remains: nihilism and its 
consequential loss of faith calls for not only the devaluation o f man's highest values, but 
also the endeavor of revaluing.
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cultural challenge. In Freudian terms, this process involves a personal renunciation of 
the "father," which is a process o f mourning. One realizes the relative nature o f the 
superego. Ricoeur suggests that these are the two ways in which the origin o f values is 
restored to itself—via nihilism and mourning. The god who has perished is the god o f 
morality and accusation; the murderer, not atheism but this cultural process called 
nihilism, and the personal one o f mourning in relation to the father figure.
Yet is God really dead? Perhaps, we peruse the landscape, and find him still alive 
and well. Some o f us might even respond with relief; should the god o f morality die, we 
would resuscitate him. Others o f us may wish he would just go on and finally die 
already. Yet, it seems clear that historically something dramatic, however slowly, has 
taken place—a "metamorphosis” such as this. Ricoeur says that, in regard to this god, we 
think we know also what is the cause of death: metaphysics' self-destruction via nihilism. 
Who, however, has made this pronouncement o f death? All is called into question, for 
it is the madman (from The Gay Science. 1882/1974), or Zarathustra, or Nietzsche 
himself who we all know lost his mind as well. Or the ferocious lion who is utterly free 
and wild, measuring the world by himself alone, by the strength of his will. O f this 
pronouncement, Ricoeur concludes: "Nothing is capable o f proving it [the death o f this 
god], unless it be the new form o f life that this message makes possible, or the 
affirmation" (1969/1974, p. 460).
The affirmation must come on the heels o f critique; the "sacred 'No'" must be 
followed with the "sacred 'Yes.'" The aftermath of this critique-the impact o f the
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arrival of this spirit o f atheism and the "sacred "No”*—is the destruction o f the god of 
morality as not only the source of accusation but also o f protection. Ricoeur asserts that 
if atheism has a religious meaning, and he believes that it does, that meaning is found in 
its movement toward faith o f a new and different kind. It is a faith that positions itself in 
relation to classical metaphysics in the same way as the character o f Job in the Old 
Testament stood in relation to his friends. Contrary to his friends, Job's God is not the 
god o f morality ruling the world under the auspices o f commandment, duty and the law
linearity of this formulation, that there have always been people of faith who rejected this 
God of retribution, though few—whom we identify as saints, prophets, master teachers, 
great souls. Theirs was the tragic faith o f Job, beyond assurance and protection. 
Through atheism, the cultural burial of the God of providence, and nihilism, points to the 
possibility of this new kind of faith, for many—a democracy o f great souls.
Nietzsche himself, despite himself seems to believe in this opening to faith, as 
evidenced in the story o f Zarathustra, as well as in other shimmerings of a positive 
philosophy found in his works: like the affirmation o f Dionysus, the amorfati (the love 
of fate), the eternal return o f the same, and even the yearning for the overman5—one
The Dionysus affirmed by Nietzsche changes from his earlier to later works. 
While Dionysus is ever passion, in The Birth o f Tragedy f l 872/19571 he is passion 
unbridled and intoxicated, and in Twilight of the Idols (1889/1982b) he is passion 
mastered and creatively engaged. The figure exuberantly, however, in all cases, 
positively affirms this world, and human passion (Kaufinann, 1967). The eternal return 
of the same is that doctrine to which Nietzsche (1886/1966) is brought in plumbing the
1985, Job). Ricoeur admits, renouncing something o f the
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could argue. After Nietzsche—atheism, the lion—the question is left open; nothing is as 
yet decided. The way ahead is fraught with danger and uncertainty. However, the way 
to faith is ahead, asserts Ricoeun "I believe we are henceforth incapable o f returning to 
an order o f moral life which would take the form of a simple submission to 
commandments or to an alien or supreme will, even if this will were represented as 
divine. We must accept as a positive good the critique o f ethics and religion that has 
been undertaken by the school of suspicion. From it we have learned to understand that 
the commandment that gives death, not life, is a product and projection of our own 
weakness" (1969/1974, p. 447).
Yet we have also learned o f the insufficiency o f atheism, that the lion's reign, too, 
is an unsatisfactory conclusion. Though Nietzsche has these sprinkles o f the "sacred 
'Yes'” throughout his work, it is dominated by rebellion and critique. Ricoeur states: 
"This positive Nietzschean philosophy, which alone is capable o f conferring authority on 
his negative hermeneutics, remains buried under the ruins that Nietzsche has 
accumulated around him.... His aggression against Christianity remains caught up in the 
attitude o f resentment; the rebel is not, and cannot be, at the same level as the prophet.
depths o f pessimism through thought. He claims that doing so has freed him from the 
simple-mindedness and reduction of this century’s world-denying thought, and has 
opened his eyes to a new and opposite ideal winch is aliveness itself high-spiritedness, 
and world advocacy. Such is akin to the amor fati. his love o f fate, an "amen" to the 
infinite occurrence o f what is. For Nietzsche's (1883/I982a) discussion of the overman, 
man's positive triumph o f himself and "the meaning of the earth," see section 3 in the 
"Prologue" o f Thus Spoke Zarathustra f!883/1982al.
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Nietzsche's work remains an accusation o f accusation and hence fells short o f a pure 
affirmation o f life" (p. 446-447).
We must find our way, then, to this "sacred 'Yes'" to life, to the affirmation of the 
child, to faith. For Ricoeur, the work o f the philosopher toward this end lies in exploring 
what he sees as something o f a dialectic between religion and atheism, in digging beneath 
the present antinomy and reviving the question. The task is opening up a measure of 
inquiry which could conceivably accomplish a negotiation by way of atheism toward feith 
for a postreligious age. O f course, such a negotiation could not be a meager 
reconciliation o f a hermeneutics o f suspicion, that seeks to slay generations o f idols, and 
a restorative hermeneutics, that works to resurrect the original living symbols behind 
those idols. Yet, according to Ricoeur, the philosopher can only think and question in 
this interim time—this period o f mourning, nihilism, instability, before the emergence o f a 
new spirit, the recognizable metamorphosis from lion to child, atheism to feith. The rest 
is the job of the prophet, perhaps.
Nevertheless, the challenge is posed: "We must now go further. Our critique of 
metaphysics and its search for rational reconciliation must give way to a positive 
ontology, beyond resentment and accusation. Such a  positive ontology consists in an 
entirely nonethical vision, or what Nietzsche described as the innocence of becoming'"
(p. 457). Such a vision is, as such, beyond good and evil. Moreover, it must remain 
open, having overcome dogmatism, lest it fell under the accusation o f its own critique. It 
is a vision without certainty, then, having given up the fear and also the protection
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through its "becoming innocence." For Ricoeur, it involves the prophetic preaching o f a 
freedom free from condemnation, and also consolation—at least o f the former kind. He 
says: "An heir to the tragic faith o f Job,... it would be a faith that moves forward 
through the shadows, in a new 'night o f the soul'—to adopt the language o f the mystics— 
before a God who would not have the attributes o f Providence,' a God who would not 
protect me but would surrender me to the dangers o f a life worthy o f being called 
human" (p. 460).
Jacques Derrida (1992/1995), in The Gift o f Death, has taken up in part, albeit 
not explicitly, the challenge o f Ricoeur, the task o f the philosopher in response to this 
interim period o f loss. In addition, he has both supplemented and complicated this 
formulation o f humanity's history with the divine which we have been investigating. He 
has gone on to dig deeper than Ricoeur, perhaps, before religion and further beneath it, 
uncovering more that is not only hidden, but also secretly retained in subsequent stages 
or changes beyond. Within this frame, he elucidates what we might call the "religious 
meaning"—for lack o f a better word—at the heart o f the secular, indeed at the heart o f 
history itself. O f course, this religious meaning, we may more appropriately speak o f as 
the esoteric or the sacred, perhaps even demonic meaning—the mystery, the inaccessible, 
the Cloud o f Unknowing (Anonymous, ca. 1300/1957). Following Jan Patocka 
(1975/1981), Derrida focuses on Western religion and philosophy, specifically 
Christianity and Platonism, as the birthright o f responsibility, integrally linked to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
freedom, faith, history and the human subject.6 His central interest is in the growth or 
development o f the notion o f responsibility in European history out o f humanity’s 
relation to the sacred, and the moral and ethical meaning o f such a notion.
In Heretical Essays on the History o f Philosophy.7 Patodka discusses the 
relationship between responsibility and secrecy or the mystery of the sacred, highlighting 
what Derrida calls their heterogeneity, or connection in opposition. "He warns against 
an experience of the sacred as an enthusiasm or fervor for fusion, cautioning in particular 
against a form of demonic rapture that has as its effect, and often as its first intention, the 
removal of responsibility, the loss o f a sense o f consciousness of responsibility" (Derrida, 
1992/1995, p. I). Religion represents a break with this demonic secrecy in that it 
appeals to a free and responsible self. Derrida, grounding his inquiry in the work of 
Patocka, does not fault him for reference only to the Christian religion, for the omission 
o f some sort o f comparative analysis. He asserts: "It seems necessary to reinforce the 
coherence of a way o f thinking that takes into account the event of Christian mystery as 
an absolute singularity, a religion par excellence and an irreducible condition for a joint
‘For an in-depth look at the kinship of Derrida's work as a whole with the 
question of responsibility, see Denise Egea-Kuehne's "Deconstruction Revisited and 
Derrida's Call for Academic Responsibility" (1995, Summer), in Educational Theory. 
45(3), pp. 293-309. According to Egea-Kuehne, Derrida considers identity itself to be 
constituted by the response, responsibility to comprise identity.
7An English translation made by Wills, D., Trans., in Derrida's (1992/1995) Gift 
of Death, from the French translation of Patocka's (1975/1981) Essais heretiques sur la 
philosophic de l'histoire.
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history of the subject, responsibility, and Europe" (p. 2). We might say this 
"Eurocentric" view is justified given the uniquely European legacy that this history is, 
and also given the crisis in which this history seems to culminate.
Derrida, thus, reaches before religion to the "orgiastic sacred." Religion only 
arrives once this demonic secret is surpassed or outstripped. Here, we refer to the 
concept o f daimon* in which the boundaries between the divine, the human, and the beast 
are blurred, crossed, lost. This daimon is the mystery o f desire, prior to any form of 
responsibility, as such, it is irresponsibility, or non-responsibility. It is that place before 
which any call to respond has arrived, any injunction to explain oneself before the other 
has been issued. It is before the complete formation o f the subject, the "I." We do not 
say that it has been destroyed in religion, but rather integrated or in some way subjected 
to the domain o f responsibility. Derrida explains that religion, if it is anything at all, is 
responsibility, at least in the Christian sense. Moreover, he claims that history obtains its
*The word daimon comes to us in the English as a transliteration from the 
Greek, indicative o f a spirit, or spirit itself which may be benevolent or evil: in the 
Greek, it is frequently a tutor-deity—in some measure in the service o f humankind; in the 
Latin, it is often an evil spirit. The meaning o f daimon is not just the notion of divinity, 
or the spiritual, intangible and invisible force animating all o f life, but also is seen as the 
source of inspiration in a human being, its genius and most influential life force. Though 
the term demonic is drawn as well from this root, it does not signify spiritual darkness, 
although it might. The universe itself is daimonic, the daimonic being central to the 
affairs o f the cosmos as well as those of humanity. Desire, the flesh, the earth, the 
heavens-all are expressions o f the daimonic. Wild forces they are that when too 
powerful, might drive one to madness, a condition through the daimonic felt to be very 
near genius-inspirational powers gone awry (Oxford English Dictionary. 1989, Vol. IV, 
pp. 217,445).
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meaning or function from this "metamorphosis" or journey to responsibility, this 
deliverance from the esoteric: a movement to the history o f responsibility and to history 
as responsibility. What Nietzsche calls "the stroke of genius called Christianity," Derrida 
identifies as the history of Europe.
"The history of the responsible self is built upon the heritage and patrimony of 
secrecy, through a chain reaction of ruptures and repressions that assume the very 
tradition they punctuate with their interruptions" (p. 7). Derrida links the responsible self 
with the birth of religion, specifically Christianity, and with the present moment that has 
endured in the history of the sacred, however secular. He traces this heritage of secrecy, 
beginning with the demonic sacred and passing through Platonism to Christianity, and 
Europe. Derrida coins this history as the "crypto- or mysta-genealogy of responsibility" 
(p. 33).
Platonism represents the initial break with the demonic mystery, the initial 
experience o f the notion of responsibility. The orgiastic sacred is retained in part, the 
secret is incorporated. Complete differentiation is not accomplished. Responsibility 
extends only to the political dimension o f life almost exclusively. The self o f Platonism is 
the ethico-political self. Plato's anabasis, or upward journey from the cave of darkness to 
the light o f the sun, does not signify the death o f the mystery, yet perhaps its denial. It is 
one mystery come to dominate or suppress or envelop another. This Platonic conversion 
is one of turning away from or forsaking the cave—what one scholar calls "earth- 
mother," and seeking to extricate oneself from it, in order to move toward the sun with
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fixed eye upon the light o f the good and intelligible. It is the ascending path o f the soul 
to eternity, and the fountain o f eternity. Thus begins the subordination o f the orgiastic 
mystery to responsibility. Patocka (1975/1981) considers this a conversion toward 
inferiority, the constitution o f a "new mystery o f the soul," that is the quest for the 
"good," the genesis of the internal dialogue. Hannah Arendt (1978) attributes the birth 
o f the will as a faculty o f the soul, as well, to the internalization the Christian stance 
achieves, bound up in the notion o f responsibility.
What Derrida (1992/1995) describes as becoming responsible or becoming 
historical is intrinsically bound to the mysterium tremendum.9 or the Christian event o f
^Mysterium tremendum is a term coined by Rudolph Otto (1917/1950/1960) in 
his classic study on "The Idea o f the Holy." For Otto, the expression signifies the most 
profound and foundational element in true religious experience. The modern or 
contemporary idea of the holy, according to Otto, is derivative, having been reduced to a 
moral signification. While such is inclusive in the concept, it signifies first and foremost, 
eminently, what he calls "this unnamed Something" (p. 199), this overplus and excess o f 
meaning, evading signification even. Further, all genuine religion has such as its 
sanctuary, center or innermost essence. The mysterium tremendum—the tremendous 
mystery, or mysterious trembling—is, for him, the only adequate expression o f this 
experience o f the holy, before its schematization, "a unique original feeling-response" (p. 
199). It is the experience o f the numinous, irreducible to any other experience, 
penetrating the inexpressible surplus, beyond goodness. He goes on to call it "creature- 
consciousness" or "creature-feeling"—the overwhelming sight o f the numinous or "The 
Wholly Other." Defining elements include feelings o f awfulness, overpoweringness, 
energy or urgency, and fascination.
The OED defines mysterium tremendum as "a term used to express the 
overwhelming awe and sense o f unknowable mystery felt by those to whom this aspect 
o f God or o f being is revealed" (1989, Vol. X, p. 173). In this sense, the mysterium 
tremendum does not denote that which is hidden per se, for it involves a revelation, one, 
however, which even upon and after delivery remains inexplicable, beyond expression, 
mysterious, in a way which may simultaneously evoke a sense o f ecstasy or rapture and 
o f fear or dread. There exists, then, in this moment something o f a confrontation with
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mystery. The moment o f becoming a person is one o f fear and trembling, o f being 
paralyzed before the fixed stare o f God in one's irreplaceable uniqueness. The good and 
intelligible sun becomes this ever-eyeing God and the one taking the ascending path, the 
"I" in naked singularity. The advent o f the Christian mystery accomplishes the process 
begun in Platonism from exteriority to inferiority, and also from the accessible to the 
inaccessible.10 The mysterium tremendum of Christianity finally, reports Derrida, 
entreats and enables me to respond, stirs and awakens me to responsibility. Against the 
Platonic mystery, which has itself incorporated the demonic, the Christian mystery arises; 
yet, it arrives upon that mystery, in the same instance repressing it, the mystery that is in 
fact its foundation.
the unity in difference, and the difference in unity—the universal power of God in all 
things, and the singular responsibility and particular agency o f every human creature. As 
it is written in the Christian scriptures: "Work out your own salvation with fear and 
trembling, for God worketh in you ..." (The Holv Bible. 1985, Philippians 2:12)-you, 
you and God, God in you, the mysterium tremendum. While Derrida does not draw 
from Otto, he includes in the Gift of Death an exegesis o f Soren Kierkegaard on faith, his 
Fear and Trembling (1843/1983). The term turns to be a twentieth-century coinage o f a 
very old idea—rather, experience.
“There is the possibility that the question of "access” is that which has not even 
been considered before, the question itself requiring a certain measure of interiority and 
self-consciousness. In this sense, perhaps Christianity is inclusive o f a turn back toward 
orgiastic mystery, at least in an acknowledgement and awareness of inexpressible, 
inexplicable mystery, a  kind o f disciplined admission o f something heretofore repressed. 
However, we may also distinguish between the thought o f Plato and Platonism, for Plato 
admits to the inaccessible, to the mystery, involving the sight o f the good and the 
"mystical" experience o f the One, o f the One in the Many.
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Thus, we have in humanity’s relation to the sacred a complicated history, full of 
repressions, ruptures, envelopments, and abysses upon abysses—at least in the West. It is 
not then a matter o f a clear and straight progression from the demonic to the Platonic to 
the Christian, nor from religion to atheism to faith.11 Rather, Derrida calls attention to 
the "logic o f the conservative rupture" o f each advance, which like his economy o f the 
trace12 keeps what it gives up, retains something o f what it has surpassed, subordinated, 
denied, and buried. O f course, such still involves mourning and a sense of loss, as if 
nothing were retained, as if all were relinquished. Always at play is "the burning memory
“The development seems rather to center in a kind o f tension between absolute 
objectivity and absolute subjectivity as the ground o f authority or justification.
Moreover, the movement, while along a continuum, becomes strangely circular, wherein 
the one absolute turns easily into the other, even though the two are progressively 
differentiated, separated and polarized. The gaze o f God in one instance becomes 
absolute objectivity in the moment it is felt by human subjectivity at its height, though in 
the person o f God it is absolute subjectivity. The orgiastic can be construed as absolute 
objectivity in the unquestioned experience and acceptance o f what is, as absolute 
subjectivity in terms o f the center of value and the lack o f a felt need to respond to the 
other.
‘The concept o f the trace is central in Derrida's thought, particularly in his earlier 
works. In the French, the word connotes powerfully notions of a track or imprint. In 
this sense, it attests to the absence of presence, the infinitely referential. The trace 
records the mark o f a former origin or presence, the residue; it testifies to the necessity 
of an origin and to its erasure, as ever receding, evasive, illusory. Derrida says: "The 
trace is not only the disappearance of origin—within the disclosure that we sustain and 
according to the path that we follow it means that the origin did not even disappear, that 
it was never constituted except reciprocally by a nonorigin, the trace, which thus 
becomes the origin o f the origin" (1967/1974, p 61). The trace is akin to his notions of 
"arche-writing," and "difference." For more on the concept, see Derrida's Q f 
Grammatology (1967/1974), although the term is found and discussed in a number o f his 
works.
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or crypt of a more ancient secret" (p. 9). Derrida refers to this as an enveloping of 
immortality by immortality—eternity within eternity.
The incorporation undergone in Platonism whereby responsibility begins to 
overcome this orgiastic mystery is the gesture whereby the immortality o f the soul is 
established. It is an immortality o f the individual in search o f the good, an endeavor 
requiring discipline. Discipline is the work, the exercise, the training needed to keep the 
secret o f the demonic mystery, and to keep the secret at the service o f the Platonic 
sacred. This discipline is philosophy, as well, and the dialectic—secret and yet revealed. 
Mortal and yet immortal, we are taught by it how to die in order to gain eternity.
Derrida here evokes the image o f philosophy given in the Phaedo (Plato, c.a. 395 
b.c./1951) by Socrates: philosophy is "the attentive anticipation o f death,... the 
experience o f a vigil over the possibility o f death, and over the possibility of death as 
impossibility" (Derrida, 1992/1995, pp. 12,13).
We see the mystery, the secrecy at the heart o f the individual responsible self s 
constitution. This care over death is inseparable from an authentic concern for the soul 
and for life. In fact, says Derrida, "this awakening that keeps vigil over death, this 
conscience that looks death in the face is another name for freedom" (p. 15). Thus, the 
administration o f responsibility—including freedom and faith with it13—involves a triumph
“Paul Tillich (1957) defines faith in terms of the action o f the total personality, 
at the heart o f the personal life, involving all o f its elements, the participation of 
conscious and unconscious aspects o f the personality. In fact, he asserts that the act of 
faith is "the most personal of all personal acts” (p. 4) and "the most centered act of the
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over death, which is also a triumph o f life. Always too, vestiges o f struggle persist in 
any triumph. We find here a genealogy consistent with and resonant o f Martin 
Heidegger's (1927/1962) analysis o f Dasein,14 being-in-the-world,15 being-towards- 
death,16 and the meaning o f human being as care17 in one's temporality.11 There is, as
human mind" (p. 4). He goes on to equate, in this, sense, freedom and frith: 'Tor frith 
is a matter o f freedom. Freedom is nothing more than the possibility o f centered 
personal acts. The frequent discussion in which faith and freedom are contrasted could 
be helped by the insight that frith is a free, namely, centered act o f the personality. In 
this respect freedom and faith are identical" (p. 5).
“Dasein, literally "There-Being," is a term coined by Heidegger to discuss the 
Being that is human, principally pointing to the insufficiency o f the segregated notions o f 
the subject and the object (subjectivity and objectivity). Constitutive o f human being is 
its "there,” the world in which it finds itself with things and others.
“Heidegger identifies "Being-in-the-world" (Ger. fn-der-Welt-seinf as a 
fundamental structure o f the Being that is human. For him, it is a  unitary phenomenon 
that must be seen as a whole. We, as humans, are never without a world within which 
we always are and from out o f which we can never be taken for analysis. One cannot 
consider human existence apart from this world. For more on Heidegger's explication o f 
this concept, see: pp. 78-90 o f his Being and Time. (1962). (J. Macquarrie & E. 
Robinson, Trans.). San Francisco: Harper. (Original work published 1927).
“Heidegger's term to connote the nature and end, the directedness and projective 
quality, o f the being that is human. We are always "more" than we factually are, always 
our "not yet." Furthermore, our very being is teleological, directed toward an end.
Death is that end, our utmost and ownmost possibility, inescapable, not to be out­
stripped. The coinage denotes, as well, the singularity and irreplaceability of each human 
life. No one can represent or stand for another in this case, the meaning of such ever our 
own alone. As the being whose very being is at issue, this end as well is ever at issue for 
each person, whether evaded, denied, repressed or openly faced.
l7Care, for Heidegger, is a primordial totality. It is a concept referring to the 
ontological structure of Dasein. Heidegger makes clear that it does not have anything to 
do with trials or the cares o f life, per se. Melancholic, happy, and carefree designations 
are only ontically (factually, existentially) possible, he says, because our being is care. It
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well, a striving o f being regarding truth, authenticity, and resoluteness conjuring up the 
Heraclitian image o f being as war itself.
With Christianity, the ultimate triumph o f death, there is hidden from oneself and 
others more than the secret o f the orgiastic mystery but also of one's own mortality, 
which is both refused and denied in the experience o f victory. It is what Patocka 
(1975/1981) calls a "new mythology" which makes the genealogy of responsibility, the 
birth o f absolute freedom, ambiguous and disquieting. It is founded on a duality which 
positions the authentic and responsible over against the sacred and extraordinary. It is 
also a politics, a war, and the ground of Western politics.
History does not annul that which it secretly bears. Thus, the return o f the 
orgiastic mystery, even in the place of secularization, is found indefinitely. Such is 
especially true in the space of change or unrest, o f metamorphosis. Derrida, with 
Patocka, sees in this insight contemporary political significance as well. He says, "Every 
revolution, whether atheistic or religious, bears witness to a return of the sacred in the
is concern and solicitude in a world of and with things and others. The being that is 
human is Being-in-the-world, it is Being-toward the world, toward entities in the world, 
toward others. Care is our very Being, and we are emersed in it; it includes our 
everyday attitude o f concern toward other things and living beings around us, and our 
deepest existential longings.
"Heidegger asserts that whenever we interpret or seek to understand the being of 
a thing, we must do so with time as our standpoint. Time, then, must be illumined and 
conceived as "the horizon for all understanding o f Being and for any way of interpreting 
it" (1927/1962, p. 39). The closest Heidegger comes to a definition of temporality is the 
following: "This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the 
process o f having been" (p. 374).
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form of an enthusiasm or fervor, otherwise known as the presence o f the gods within us" 
(1992/1995, p 21). Durkheim (1915/1968) also, he notes, emphasizes the propensity, 
perhaps inevitability, o f society to fashion its own gods or even raise itself up as a god. 
Patocka, referring to the fervor or god-making o f the French Revolution, says: "This is 
of course an enthusiasm that, in spite o f the cult o f reason, retains its orgiastic character, 
one which is undisciplined or insufficiently disciplined by the personal relation to 
responsibility. The danger o f a new fall into the orgiastic is imminent” (cited in Derrida, 
1992/1995, p. 22). Patocka says, "in spite o f the cult o f reason," the demonic endures, 
whereas we might argue it is at least also because o f reason's reign. The esoteric is, in 
fact, embedded therein.
Further complications and dangers follow the metamorphosis from Platonism to 
Christianity. "Platonic rationalism, the Platonic desire to subordinate responsibility itself 
to the objectivity o f knowledge, continues to secretly influence Christian conceptions" 
(Patocka, cited in Derrida, p. 24). Yet herein lies the aporia o f responsibility: to 
subordinate it to such objectivity would be, in fact, irresponsible, what Derrida describes 
as a "technical deployment of a cognitive apparatus, the simple mechanistic deployment 
of a theorem" (p. 24). The consensus and complaint o f the two thinkers seems to be that 
Christianity has failed to fully repress its covert Platonism Moreover, their feeling is 
that to the extent that the politics o f the Platonic tradition continues to hold sway in 
Europe and the Western world-even beyond Christian influence—the less the capacity 
for responsibility, and the greater the opportunity o f totalitarianism o f one kind or
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another. Derrida informs that politics excludes the mystical, denies the mystery essential 
to responsible living.
The assertion, then, is that there is much that remains unthought in Christianity, 
but yet cannot truly be thought within it. For, having repressed the Platonic as well as 
the demonic sacred incorporated therein, Christianity cannot reflect wholly upon itself 
namely upon the Platonic thinking and demonic mystery which it retains. Such amounts 
to an inadequate thematization o f responsibility, which is also an irresponsible 
thematization. Herein, as well, is the irreducible complexity original to responsibility as 
aporia. "The secret of responsibility would consist o f keeping secret, or incorporated, 
the secret o f the demonic and thus o f preserving within itself a nucleus o f irresponsibility 
or of absolute unconsciousness ... 'orgiastic irresponsibility"' (p 20). In order to act in 
the world responsibly, it is essential that one know what being responsible means, and 
yet, it seems, this knowledge is not possible. The notion o f responsibility intimates 
praxis; responsibility is activated in a conscious decision, a response. The decision, the 
act, is always before and beyond theoretical or thematic determination; it is independent 
of knowledge. Thus, any thematization o f responsibility is always inadequate and must 
be, according to the notion o f freedom itself in practice. To follow the edicts of 
objective knowledge, the commandments derived from them, is to be neither free nor 
responsible.
In this way, Derrida explains that because of this idea o f freedom, heresy and 
heterogeneity are inherent to responsibility. Responsibility is condemned to resistance
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and dissent. In the exercise o f responsibility, there is simply no choice but paradox, 
heresy, and secrecy. Without heresy—some creative break from rule, authority, tradition, 
orthodoxy, there is no responsibility. Ever-present, as well, is the risk o f apostasy or 
renaissance.
Yet, Christianity is not fully inadequate, not hilly Platonic, especially in relation 
to responsibility in all its complexity. The mysterium tremendum o f Christianity includes 
a terror unknown in the transcendent experience o f Platonic responsibility associated 
with the city. This terror involves, in the words o f Derrida, "the abyssal dissymmetry 
that occurs when one is exposed to the gaze of the other" (p. 28). It is a frightening 
secret that comes before and surpasses the assuming relation between subject and object. 
Awareness is given to the absolute disproportion that brings me, and mine, together 
with the unseen eye o f another, secret and yet commanding. Because of Christianity’s 
grounding in the unfathomable chasm and depth o f the soul, the assertion is made that it 
endures as the most compelling way to traverse the reaches of this abyss of 
responsibility.
Derrida, in fact, maintains that Christianity has not yet come to Christianity. The 
new responsibility declared through the mysterium tremendum has not yet reached its 
fulfillment. The future o f Europe, and modern civilization as such, is then found in the 
promise. The call is, in part, to a more extreme break with Greco-Roman Platonic 
politics. The promise is the location or scene of the most consummate enigma, the gift 
of what is still impenetrable, unrepresentable, secret. Christianity, retaining a certain
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Platonism, conceives o f the responsible life as a gift, along the order o f the good, and yet
it is a gift neither present nor accessible, but one to which humanity is forever bound. In
this sense, the gift is a mystery to which belongs the final word.
Derrida brings the question before us, as well as a response:
What is it that ails 'modern civilization' inasmuch as it is European?...
Why does it suffer from ignorance of its history, from a failure to assume 
its responsibility, that is the memory o f its history as responsibility?... At 
the heart o f this history there is something o f an abyss, an abyss that 
resists totalizing summary. Separating orgiastic mystery from Christian 
mystery, this abyss also announces the origin o f responsibility, (pp. 3 ,4 )
Historicity itself, then, is a secret that keeps. Perhaps, Patocka (1975/1981) suggests, it
is not a question so much of the decline o f civilization in our day but whether or not
historical humans can acknowledge history—the abyss that undermines what we think we
know. The danger is an excess o f knowledge along the order of detail that assists us in
forgetting not only the fundamental questions but also the grounds that have given rise to
such questions and problems. This saturated objective knowledge does not ensure or
even advance necessarily responsible thought and action.
"History can be neither a decidable object nor a totality capable of being
mastered, precisely because it is tied to responsibility, to faith and to the gift" (Derrida,
1992/1995, p. 5). Derrida describes responsibility as that which is made outside
knowledge, lest it be mere calculation or the technical application of reason to a
particular situation. As such, responsibility involves, in the moment of absolute decision,
going through "the ordeal o f the undecidable" (1990, 1992/1995). Faith precedes
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responsibility or is borne with it, by this venture into absolute risk which is involvement 
with the other, beyond knowledge and certainty. This engagement with the other, this 
care for the other, summons a response. The gift Derrida speaks of is more specifically 
the gift o f death, an ambiguous concept he describes as a marriage o f responsibility and 
faith, and the excessive beginning o f history. By the gift, one is confronted with the 
transcendence and infinite alterity o f the other, with one's relation to this other, God and 
selfless goodness. Such amounts to a new experience of death. Thus, says Derrida: 
"Responsibility and faith go together however paradoxical that might seem to some, and 
both should, in the same movement, exceed mastery and knowledge” (1992/1995, p. 6).
In his exploration o f the history o f responsibility, in his tracing o f humanity's 
relationship with the sacred, Derrida too comes to faith. Derrida attends to the cry of a 
waning historical moment, a time o f distress and decline, and to the call o f responsibility, 
the plea to respond in such a time. Questioning responsibility, he finds aporia, paradox, 
an abyss at the heart. Yet, he also finds faith, responsibility's other half. Perhaps it is 
that faith itself acts as a mediator of sorts which, acknowledging the abyss at the core of 
responsibility, returns responsibility to its origins in the sacred, in demonic desire, in 
mystery. Perhaps, faith is the mystery, the paradox, the abyss. Certainly, faith is a 
difficult concept, burdened down with connotations of every variety, yet powerful, 
enduring, expressing a reality we cannot continue to ignore.
Faith, either explicitly or implicitly, bears this relationship to the mystery of 
historicity. It is a being-towards-death; it involves care and concern, this vigil over
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
death. The theologian Paul Tillich (1957) defines faith as "the state of being ultimately 
concerned" (p. 1). As concern with the ultimate, faith reaches beyond historicity in 
passion for the infinite, embraces infinite passion. Faith admits humanity's yearning for 
eternity and immortality; it suggests the need o f the historical for the eternal, and o f the 
eternal for the historical. Faith, in this way, also mediates in the space o f an abyss 
separating impossibility from possibility, mortality from immortality. The finite and 
infinite, the historical and the eternal, find each other in faith. Faith too, owning human 
finitude and longing, confesses the repressed marrow o f responsibility. We do not mean 
here to explicate the nature, essence or substance of faith—though such is important, 
necessary and even perhaps pressing, only to acknowledge its importance and its 
aporetic complexity. Heidegger has explicated the very meaning o f human being to be 
its temporality, made visible or evidenced as care. This care is unique to humanity for 
whom at issue is our own being. In this way, we might postulate that frith, as a 
condition o f care toward the ultimate, is, in fact, central to the meaning o f human being 
in Heidegger's sense, and constitutive o f it, at least in the moment o f becoming a person, 
a subject—as Derrida puts it, in becoming historical, responsible. Faith is then integral, 
perhaps foundational, to existential and ontological meaning and value. Here is 
Ricoeur's "life worthy of being called human."
Derrida's contemplation upon these sacral metamorphoses in human history, in 
Western human history, has not only served to compliment but also to complicate 
Ricoeur's formulation, and the images of Zarathustra. Ricoeur, we might say, proceeds
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to unfold a historical process o f demythification, demythologization, the death o f the 
gods as it were, and posits a movement toward faith. Derrida, however, uncovers the 
repressed mythology operating at the heart o f this disenchantment; his accomplishment 
is, in this sense, the re-mythification and mystification o f history, or the manifestation of 
history’s "intra-mythology"~the mystery, the enchantment internal, original to history, 
and yet hidden therein. Faith is already and ever present. Such a discovery works to 
confirm Ricoeur’s belief in a religious meaning to atheism, and the need for a new kind of 
feith. Nietzsche, along with many a scholar, has postulated, in feet, atheism as 
Christianity's logical end, or at least consequential o f its internal logic. If, as Derrida 
asserts, religion is responsibility, atheism identifies the operation o f the repressed 
irresponsible at religion's core. The camel in feet abdicates responsibility in dutifully 
carrying out injunctions given; in the guise o f responsibility, the spirit denies its fear and 
need for protection—its own desires.
The limits o f the rational and the responsible are clearly outlined as well. Even 
within atheism, and not simply beyond it, endures the sacred. "To destroy idols causes 
one to enter into the sacred" (Serres, 1986/1989, p. 78). Moreover, the rational, the 
critical, cannot reach the aporia, the paradox, the mystery that life is. Both Ricoeur 
(1969/1974) and Derrida (1992/1995) respond to these limits and return to a look at the 
sacred. Although presenting different formulations and different insights, both arrive at 
this enigma o f human historicity, this abyss, this emptiness at the heart. Both put forth 
this promise, as well, the hope o f a feith beyond what we have known or know; both
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realize a certain historical moment in need o f metamorphosis, a moment on the verge o f 
dying or being bom anew.
It is not, then, a matter o f gaining faith in our time or regaining it, but o f coming 
to a new land o f faith, perhaps. As Tillich (1957) asserts, faith always is; the issue is the 
ultimacy of the concern, that within which faith is placed, or misplaced as atheism has 
found the case to be. "The danger o f faith," says Tillich, "is idolatry and the ambiguity o f 
the holy its demonic possibility. Our ultimate concern can destroy us as it can heal us.
But we can never be without it" (p. 16). This new kind o f faith, Ricoeur’s postreligious 
faith, is conceivably a knowing and yet unknowing faith that exceeds knowledge and 
stands beyond reflection and critique, coming after it, on its heels, in response to it. It is 
a faith that speaks a sacred "Yes," a grand "Amen;" a faith that consists in a pure 
affirmation o f life, despite and in the midst o f sacred "No's," dying idols and difficult 
commandments. "A god disappears, divinity remains" (p. 18).
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CHAPTER 2
CURSE, CRISIS AND THE REIGN OF DEATH
In the beginning, God made the world, man and woman, and all 
that is therein. Heaven and earth, sun and moon and stars, light and 
darkness, sea and firmament, grass and herb, seed and fruit and tree, 
winged fowl and great whales, cattle and creeping things—all o f these did 
the Lord God speak into being. Lights there were summoned for signs 
and seasons, for days and years—greater lights and lesser lights to rule 
over day and night. Moving creatures o f every kind did the Lord God 
also shape: beasts o f the earth, fish o f the sea, and fowl o f the air. God 
commanded the man and the woman, whom he had fashioned in his own 
image, that they be fruitful and multiply, that they replenish and govern 
the earth over which they were granted authority.
The Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden in which from 
the fertile soil, he made trees to grow. One was called the tree of life, and 
the other, the tree o f the knowledge o f good and evil. He made also a 
river running out o f Eden to water his garden. From the dust of the earth, 
the Lord God fashioned man, and quickened him by his very breath. He 
placed the man in the garden to dress and keep it. The man named the 
creatures o f the earth; among them, however, no companion was found. 
Then did the Lord God put the man into a deep sleep and took from him 
a rib out of which he fashioned a woman. Both the man and the woman 
lived peacefully with God in the garden, naked and unashamed. Now, the 
Lord God also commanded the man, saying: "Of every tree o f the garden 
thou mayest eat freely, but of the tree o f the knowledge of good and evil, 
o f it thou shalt not eat: For in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt 
surely die."
In the midst o f the garden dwelt the most subtle and cunning o f all 
the beasts o f the field, the serpent, who one day spoke to the woman, 
saying: "Yea, hath God said that ye shall not eat of every tree of the 
garden?"
The woman answered: "The fruit o f the trees o f the garden we 
may eat, but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, 
God has said to us, 'O f it ye shall not eat, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye 
die."'
But the serpent answered back to her "Surely ye shall not die:
For God knows that in the day ye eat thereof then your eyes will be 
opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.”
The woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that to the 
eyes it was most pleasant. A tree desired to make one wise, she took o f
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its fruit and did eat, and gave also to her husband with her, and he did eat.
Then they knew that they were naked, for their eyes were opened, and 
they made aprons for themselves out o f fig leaves.
In the cool of the evening, they heard the voice o f  the Lord God 
walking through the garden. Among the trees, they hid from his 
presence. Still the Lord called to them. When he found them, the man 
said: "We heard Thy call and were afraid because o f our nakedness."
Then did the Lord God know that they had eaten from the fruit forbidden 
to them. "The woman you gave me, she brought to me the fruit and I did 
eat," replied the man. The woman likewise reported o f the serpent's 
cunning.
Then did the Lord God curse the serpent to crawl upon his belly 
and to eat o f the dust of the earth. He did also put enmity between the 
serpent and the woman, between his seed and hers, declaring: "Though 
ye shall bruise his heel, he shall bruise thy head." And to the woman the 
Lord God delivered sorrow in childbirth, sealing also her desire for her 
husband and his rule over her. And he cursed the ground for man's sake, 
that in grief he should eat o f it. He made it to bring forth thorns and 
thistles, that by toil and sweat only should the earth yield her fruit.
"From dust were ye made and to it shall ye return," said the Lord 
God at last to the creatures he had made in his own image. Then he made 
coats o f skin to clothe them. He likewise drove them out o f the garden, 
away from his presence, and set cherubim and a flaming sword at the 
garden's entrance to prevent their return and to guard the tree o f life.
A retelling o f the Judeo-Christian "Story o f Creation" and o f the "Fall of 
Man," from the Old Testament scriptures, ("The Holy Bible. 1985, Genesis 1-3)
In the beginning: God, creation and the breath that is life. Shortly thereafter,
however, follows the "fall” into death—humanity excommunicated, the earth cursed. In
contrast to the Nietzschean prerogative that "God is dead” and long before it, we have
here God pronouncing the sentence of death upon humanity. Yet, can we establish some
coherent relationship between these two epitaphs? Some pathway from this ancient tale
of curse and condemnation to the perpetuated crisis o f the modern age, with Nietzsche's
confirmation o f the death o f the divine? To attempt such a journey may not be
necessary, and we may in part have already accomplished it with Ricoeur in looking at
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humanity’s movement from religion to atheism and with Derrida in tracing the birth o f 
the human subject.
Again, too, the contrast might not be as great as it seems; perhaps it is primarily 
a matter o f perspective. In the beginning, God is the author o f death. In the beginning, 
God declares his1 human creatures guilty and banishes them from his garden paradise. 
From that point on, however, they, and we, are in the middle o f things—in medias res, in 
some measure separated from the divine, expunged from his presence. God might as 
well be dead. It is now left to humanity alone to read and to understand these things. 
Possibly, by asserting the death o f God in our imagination, we cunningly permit the 
denial o f our own death, pronounced and eminent.2 Perhaps, we have been so long out
‘In order to be true to the Biblical account of the story, or at least consistent with 
it, God is referred to throughout my exposition as a male deity, with the use o f the 
pronoun "he." Genesis 1:27 reads: "God created man in His own image; in the image 
o f God He created him; male and female He created them" (The Holv Bible. 1985, 
emphasis mine). The dominant view o f God in the history o f the West, as well, has been 
a male-oriented one. For more on this topic, and for a brief discussion concerning the 
question o f God's gender, the gender issues around the concept of God, see Chapter 1, 
Footnote 3. The serpent, in addition, having been identified with Satan, the Devil, in 
other parts o f the scriptures, is identified therein as male (The Holy Bible. 1985, 
Revelation 12:9, for example), thus the use of "he” in reference to this figure also 
throughout the chapter.
T he anthropologist Ernest Becker, in his Pulitzer-prize-winning book The Denial 
of Death (1973), claims that all humans are born with a fear, innate and borne 
throughout life: this ever-present haunting terror o f death. His contention is that in 
order to  live, humanity deludes itself—we deceive ourselves—with a "vital lie" in which 
repressed is the knowledge o f human mortality—more specifically, of our own mortality, 
i.e., the denial o f death. This repression, he argues, is evidenced in human thought, the 
way we think about and know the world and ourselves, as well as human behavior, the 
way we act and the way we are in the world; it also lies at the core of anxiety and 
mental illness. In like manner, Martin Heidegger (1927/1962), in Being and Time. 
describes "being-towards-death" as constitutive of our very being as humans. He posits 
that this, our ownmost possibility which is death—inescapable, unable to be undertaken
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of Eden that we have altogether forgotten the experience o f the divine and our own 
eviction, and assume rather that it is God who has taken the last breath. Yet, we might 
be concerned by the haunting question that follows: Can God, the breath or spirit—the 
author o f life, be dead and his creatures, his creation, endure, live on, and sustain life?
Surely, the story holds much for us to ponder. For it is not merely a story, but 
one o f mythic proportions, within a tradition (though borrowed from the East) which 
bears a profound impact upon Western consciousness. This story o f beginnings, this 
foundational Western myth o f origins, concerning the creation o f the world and 
humankind and human knowledge, though ancient, abides with us; we might even 
suggest that it still very much resonates within us, shaping particularly our present 
conceptions o f knowledge and of human knowing—what we think we know o f ourselves 
and o f the world and o f the divine, and how we think we know these things.3 Here, the 
myth will serve to illumine for us the state o f things as we have been considering them, in 
a sense as a prophetic point o f departure, from which we may finally address and attend 
to the call of faith in our own times—and understand and feel more fully the urgency and 
import o f such a call. For, from our perspective, God is dead, as Nietzsche first
by another in our stead, is known, and yet fled from. This constitutive human state o f 
"falling" is the abnegation o f our own mortality, a fleeing in the face of death and of 
ourselves and our own non-relational possibility, the possibility o f non-being.
’Martin Heidegger (1954/1977c) claims that "the distinctive character o f modem 
knowing... consists in the decisive working out o f a tendency that still remains 
concealed in the essence o f knowing as the Greeks experienced it" (p. 157), tracing our 
own thought back to classical thought. In like manner, it is here suggested that the 
character of modem knowing might be traced back even further to pre-classical times, 
seeds o f it found in myths regarding human knowledge such as those of "The Creation" 
and "The Fall."
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observed, but there is more, it would seem. Humanity, as well, is in the grip o f death's 
messenger. Moreover, the world too, with humanity, is hurtling toward its grave. 
Everywhere and in all places death appears to reign. And our Genesis story has 
foreshadowed and prophesied this destiny which we know to be our own.
The progress o f history, particularly the birth o f the responsible subject, it seems, 
is essentially characterized by death. As God dies or the gods die, so too begins the 
languishing of humanity and the natural world from which the divine has fled. Death is a 
symbol of alienation (New Bible Dictionary. 1982), the cessation o f wholeness, the 
departure o f the life or spirit. To die means to separate or to be separated (Vine's 
Expository Dictionary. n.d.). In the story o f "The Fall of Man," upon taking of the 
forbidden fruit, the man and woman do not then physically die—though o f course later 
they do. Theirs is, in a sense, a slow and painful death, or deaths upon deaths. They are 
tom asunder, separated from their God and maker and friend, and from their garden 
home. Humanity, fashioned by the hand o f the divine, no longer lives with God in 
harmony and communion in the living paradise o f his earthly garden. Rather, 
excommunication, curse, condemnation. And humanity exists not only at enmity with 
God and the spiritual world (including the serpent), but also at enmity with the earth: the 
earth no longer gives o f itself freely; a rift4 is bora between human creatures and other
4Martin Heidegger (1959/197lb) gives an interesting explication o f the "rift" in 
his essay on "Language" in Poetry. Language Thought Hopefiil in a way, the rift is 
pain which tears asunder, but not wholly apart; thus, not only in the rift is there a 
separating that divides but also a separating that gathers, like the horizon where what is 
held apart in separation is also drawn and brought together. This site o f pain may be that 
place where that which is sundered is healed and made whole.
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created things—the world, and all o f creation. Moreover, bloodshed shortly follows.
Man against man, brother against brother, Cain slays Abel in the next generation. 
Humanity surely now possesses the knowledge o f evil. The separation that is death 
prevails, long before Adam and Eve find bodily burial in earthly graves. It has been 
postulated that for the ancients death signified primarily the separation o f the spirit from 
the corporeal body. Later in the development o f this philosophy o f death, and also 
theologically, there emerge further differentiations involved in this splitting which is 
death: both mind and spirit, o r heart and soul, are severed from the body, or the flesh. 
We know that to dissect something—to cut or separate the whole of it into parts—is to 
kill it, if it is living.
"Not only have the gods and the god fled, but the divine radiance has been 
extinguished in the world's history," says Martin Heidegger (1950/1971a, p. 91), in a 
commentary on modem times. In the words o f Max Weber, in the aftermath o f divine 
departure, "the disenchantment o f the world" begins. Joel Kovel (1991), in History and 
Spirit, calls it the "despiritualization” o f the world, man, and human existence.
Spirit,5 as the animating principle and the force o f life, once exiled, gives way to death.
5Spirit comes from the Latin spiritus. meaning breathing or breath, as in the 
breath o f God, that which in our creation story gave Adam, the image o f humanity, life— 
the breath of life. The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) records the numerous and 
expansive meanings o f spirit in five frill three-column pages of fine prim. Spirit is "the 
animating or vital principle in man; that which gives life;... immaterial being..., 
intelligence; the soul of a person;... the active essence or essential power of the Deity, 
conceived as a creative, animating or inspiring influence; the Holy Spirit;... the essential 
character, nature, or qualities o f something; that which constitutes the pervading or 
tempering principle o f anything;... the immaterial intelligent or sentient element or part 
of a person;... ardour, courage;... a subtle or intangible element or principle in material 
things" (Vol. XVI, pp. 251-253); and the "breath" o f its meanings go on.
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This despirituaiizing process also initiates the pulling asunder of all things. What has 
begun, in Derrida's composite (see Chapter I), with Plato as the upward journey from 
the cave, the ascending path o f the soul to eternity, culminates in the complete separation 
of the soul from the cave, the earth, the world and its inhabitants—or the birth o f the 
subject. Kenneth Wilber (1995), using a developmental approach, traces the direction 
of the "spirit o f evolution" as a movement toward differentiation and then integration. 
What has gone awry, in his estimation, is this differentiation. What naturally ought to 
strive toward integration has degenerated into dissociation. The result is a broken world 
and broken spirit, fragmented thinking, and a fractured worldview (Wilber, 1995; Sloan, 
1983)—the reign o f death.
God has been dead a long time, though. It is that genius Nietzsche who, as early 
as 1882 in The Gav Science, pronounced his death. Even earlier, Hegel, in Faith and 
Knowledge (1802/1977), noticed a certain unacknowledged or unrecognized feeling 
among the religious o f his day that God himself was dead. Perhaps, however, "genius is 
prophetic; it does not so much re-present as pre-figure" (Kovel, 1991, p. 12). Ours has 
been described as the "God-forsaken and Goddess-forsaken world o f modernity” in
In his book History and Spirit (1991), Joel Kovel discusses spirit and its 
immensity—its vast, excessive significations—through the use o f six separate chapters, 
covering: "Spirit as Vital Force," "Spirit as Occult Being," "Authentic Spirit," "Spirit 
and Desire,” "Divine Spirit," and spirit as related to the "Paths o f Soul.” In addition, he 
devotes the entire prelude to the definition o f spirit. While Kovel spins out the "varieties 
of spirit" and its various definitions, he summarizes succinctly a central core o f its 
meaning: "From the breath o f a god, to an animating principle, to the real significance of 
something, to an unseen other, to what is immaterial and opposed to flesh, to the divine 
itself—the term spirit seems at first to have as its only coherent meaning, that which is 
vitally important, endowed with power, yet beyond immediate sense perception. It is not 
present—yet powerfully present. It belongs to what is 'other1 to us" (p. 18).
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which in our attempts to better our condition, we are destroying the earth-bent on 
saving ourselves through suicide (Wilber, 1995, p. x ). Our Genesis story, too, 
foreshadows the death o f God in human consciousness, along with the decline of 
humanity and the life o f the cosmos. Ricoeur (1969/1974) calls ours an age of 
confusion: the impact o f the death o f religion has not yet been revealed. As such, ours 
is a parched time; as if waiting in a desert, we remain thirsty, in search of cool waters; it 
is an agonizing slow period o f struggle, and of preparation. "The period of mourning for 
the gods who have died is not yet over" (p. 448).
O f course, according to Nietzsche, God has not merely died—we have killed him. 
If Nietzsche has prophesied, we might add, it has been in seeing the inevitable 
consequence o f a logic begun centuries ago in the history o f human thought (Berman, 
1981), what we might call the "Logic of Death," of separation and o f severing. In the 
aftermath o f divine death begins the systematic killing of the world, humanity’s home.
Set in place in the seventeenth century with the rise and advancement o f science and the 
birth o f modem philosophy, this logic has been identified generally as the logic of 
modernity or the modem paradigm—though one finds clearly the seeds of it much earlier, 
even—as we can see—in this creation myth o f antiquity. It is characterized by this 
process o f extreme differentiation and dichotomization; i.e., despiritualization, 
disenchantment, death: the separation of the human and the divine, of the mind and the 
body, o f the subject and the object. Following the excommunication of God—o f Spirit,
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the Enlightenment, modernity's usher,6 seeks to address a plethora o f crises, and yet also
further propels them: o f tradition, o f religion, o f metaphysical reason, o f faith. A loss o f
authority accompanies these attempts to free humanity through reason and knowledge
(of the subject) from the constraints o f tradition (Metz, 1977/1980) rooted in the
precepts o f a divine sovereign. Poignantly expressed in An Anatomie o f the World by
John Donne (1621/1927, pp. 20-21) is this sense o f crisis (central to the work of the
Enlightenment):
And the new Philosophy cals all in doubt,
The Element o f fire is quite put out;
The Sun is lost, and th' earth and no man's wit 
Can well direct him, where to look for it.
...'Tis all in peeces, all cohaerance gone, (lines 205-213)
Therefore, to recover a sense o f control and stability becomes a central aim o f the 
modem project (Habermas, 1989), including the quest for certainty (Dewey, 1929) and 
the establishment of new authority. The historical making o f the human subject,7 
Heidegger (1952/1977a) suggests, places humanity at the center, as the rational core, as 
that form of life upon which all that is, concerning its nature and its truth, is grounded.
‘O f course, we are only sketching the historical manifestations o f this logic in 
Western civilization and its impact, jumping around and skipping vast periods of human 
history-not even calling into question the traditional "periods" as they have been laid out 
and perpetuated by Western scholars, the legitimacy and unity o f such constructions, as 
well we might. Thus, ours is not a formal or chronological tracing of this history; and if 
the Enlightenment is modernity's usher, escorting this "Logic of Death” to its impending 
consummation, then we might likewise liken the Scientific Revolution to its host, the 
Reformation to its doorman, the Renaissance to its coach, ad infinitum.
7Again, the origins o f the historical making o f the human subject are slippery, 
identified by Derrida (1992/1995) with Plato's anabasis and the Christian notion of the 
soul, and as central in the workings of Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment 
thought, as well as in the logic o f Modernity.
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It is as if Durkheim is right: we have no more gods, thus eventually, we ourselves 
become as gods and attempt our own salvation. The echo o f the serpent sounds 
through the corridors o f history: "Ye shall be as gods.” O f course, such an ascent means 
that humanity, that we, must pluck the forbidden fruit o f knowledge-found in nature, 
separate from and outside o f us, yet within our grasp. We might say, in addition, that 
this grasping or taking of the fruit signifies a particular stance toward the world—the 
human quest for godhood.
To attain the similitude o f gods, it is required o f humanity to fully separate from 
the world as nature, to see ourselves no more as creatures but as world creators 
(Romanyshyn, 1989). With the stolen good o f knowledge, we are indeed creators— 
subjects, but forget, though, that we are creatures too. The new certainty obtains in the 
subject making truth sure as "the known o f his own knowing" (Heidegger, 1952/1977a, 
p. 148), and humanity establishes and strengthens the self as the measure and ground o f 
authority—i.e., god. The freedom bought, Heidegger adds, is freedom o f the subjectum.
The coming of this subject position, distant and distancing itself from the world 
as object, marks also the coming o f science, the dominant way o f knowing o f modernity. 
Heidegger has called modernity the age o f the world picture: the world via science 
becomes humanity's representation. Science requires o f us that what is must be at the 
disposal o f representation, a representation that explains. Truth*—originally signifying
'Heidegger (1927/1962), in Being and Time, as well as in many subsequent 
works, returns to the Greek origins o f the word "truth," aletheia. which means not to 
escape notice, not to be concealed. "The truth may thus be looked upon as that which is 
un-concealed, that which gets discovered or uncovered" (p. 57). Truth is "Being- 
uncovering” or uncoveredness, unconcealment. Truth happens in the unveiling, the
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unconcealment, the revealing and manifestation and coming-to-presence of what is—has 
become the certainty o f representation. "Certainty is the modem form o f truth" 
(1952/1977b, p. 83), and the ambition o f Western civilization.
The quest for certainty necessitates control through objectification, reification, 
representation, manipulation. To know something certainly, one must kill it. A small 
thing like breathing, like the butterfly effect, changes everything. Representation itself 
becomes assault and murder. Having set ourselves apart from the world, from nature, in 
order to know it, we "pluck" it and take it in hand. Then, we set out to rule. The quest 
for godhood, o f course, bringing with it the need for certainty, calls for order and 
hierarchy. To conquer, we must divide, classify, authoritatively represent. Moreover, if 
we represent nature simply, we will easily master it. Descartes refutes Bacon's 
assumption that to command nature, we must first obey it (Serres, 1977/1982);
Cartesian knowledge, scientific knowledge, the knowledge o f modernity gives us a well- 
polished, fixed model o f the world with which to work—self-enclosed, self-sufficient, 
complete with identifiable numerical parts (Doll, 1993, Markley, 1991)—not breathing, 
not living, i.e., dead. To know is to know without a doubt. And there is certainty only 
in death, if then.
This human stance in and toward the world is not then a living stance, not one of 
wonder or engagement or participation. Rather, it is one o f alienation. Scientific 
consciousness is alienated consciousness (Berman, 1981). Devoid of mystery and o f 
spirit, the breath o f life, the organic unity that is life is banished; the separation,
showing forth, the manifestation of what is, its coming-to-presence.
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alienation and isolation that is death reigns. As an object o f knowledge, the cosmos is no 
longer a place o f belonging, and eventually loses meaning altogether. It is as if all the 
world were Eden from which humanity has been evicted. Incidentally, banishing the 
world or being banished from it, it is not long before we become even banished from 
ourselves, as we shall see. O f course, Descartes, it might be said, has already 
accomplished the severing of our minds from our bodies. No longer is it, "I breathe—in 
the sense of spirit, filled with the breath o f God; therefore I am"; but rather. "I think; 
therefore I am"; and the earthly body does not enter into the equation, or only 
peripherally.
Through the progressive disenchantment o f the world via science—what Berman 
(1981) calls an alienating and severing consciousness, psychic wholeness too is cut up, 
and lost is a "participatory consciousness" that is generative of life and meaning. The 
extremes of human subjectivity create the absolute reification o f all things through 
objectification; all that is, even the human subject, is object, a thing among other things 
without value, deprived of life and rendered meaningless. The connectedness and 
interdependence o f all things in the cosmos go unrecognized. Wholeness becomes 
perverted in the modern mindset into either a collection o f separate entities or a singular 
uniformity in which all exists to merely serve the whole. A living, creating, integrated 
unity which sustains diversity cannot be thought. For, such an image o f life, reality, the 
world, "calls for a thinking, a way o f knowing, that is itself alive, creative, and 
integrating—a living thinking" (Sloan, 1983, p. 38). Yet the thinking that dominates 
resists the living; denying the complexity and ambiguity inherent to life and the cosmos,
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humanity opts for death—separation, simplicity, certainty, control. And wholeness 
cannot endure within this logic o f severing, the Logic o f Death.
Heidegger (1962/I977d, e) describes this severing through which we not only 
distance ourselves from the world as nature, but set upon nature, challenge nature, to 
reveal its truth. Adam and Eve no longer enjoy divine life in a garden paradise; rather, 
they, humanity, we are after something; for the knowledge o f good and evil, we set 
upon nature, pluck its fruit and consume it. Commanding nature, as gods, we seek to 
master it, rule over it, control it. Even Bacon himself declares that the aim of science is 
to place nature on the rack, to torture her secrets from her (Sloan, 1983).
The knowledge o f innocence, perhaps a human reality before the fall, is a 
knowledge of which we know nothing. Rather, death has come, the knowledge o f evil 
and the technology of shame. Adam and Eve make aprons to cover themselves. The 
woman labors in birth with a husband who rules over her. The ground is cursed, 
bringing forth thorns and thistles unto the man. Nature conceals, she hides her treasures 
from human eyes. Yet, the promise of the forbidden fruit seems always greater than the 
sentence of death. It is ours simply to reach out and grab it; thus, we wrest nature's 
treasures from her. Torture, the rack, violence. "To know is to kill, to rely on death" 
(Serres, 1977/1982, p. 28). Michel Serres (1977/1982,1986/1989) devotes much o f his 
writing to this issue of violence, the tragic reality that knowing in the West, that our 
knowledge, is violent. Our knowledge, he claims, presupposes a "king"—a sovereign, a 
god, as we have said, one in command of it. The king is clearly the man who killed the 
former king, yet also the person who is awaiting death at the hands of his heir. While we
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may say we "fight" for knowledge and truth, Serres asserts that we really fight to fight, 
that for us, life's secret wisdom is war. Presented is the image o f a "ravenous owl," the 
"priest o f knowledge." The owl hovers about the "tree o f science." It is his tree, since 
he has killed his predecessor, "who supported another theory" (1986/1989, p. 47). We 
kill over theories. We know too well the knowledge o f evil, but somehow the 
knowledge o f good evades us, and the tree of life is dying. We ravenously devour it.
This violence is the essence o f modern technology, in the service o f science. It is 
what Heidegger (1962/I977d) calls a "challenging revealing," whose chief features are 
regulating and securing: "The challenging happens in that the energy concealed in 
nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, 
what is stored up is, in turn, distributed and what is distributed is switched about ever 
anew" (p. 16)—regulation is secured. Put forth, in the name o f reason, is the 
unreasonable demand that nature supply for us what can be extracted and stored; we 
challenge nature to reveal and then gather her up as fuel. Nature, devoid o f spirit, 
reduced and deadened, becomes not only an object for human consumption, but also 
humanity's storehouse, in Heidegger's words—our "standing reserve."
This standing reserve consists not simply of stock or o f a store or supply that 
endures, but encompasses the way in which all things are known through this stance of 
challenging toward all that is; what is stressed is the substitutability and orderability of 
all things, to ensure the unthreatened reign of humanity. "Everywhere everything is 
ordered to  stand by" (p. 17), to stand on call for future ordering. Ours is the task of 
setting in order, which can no longer mean to take care o f or maintain as it may have in
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Eden before "the fall," but rather this challenging, this grasping. In this sense, even 
objects actually lose their character as objects; their objectness is obscured, as 
everything is converted at the hands o f humanity into and organized as nothing but 
standing reserve. The fruit is no longer fruit, nor the tree a tree, but that which is 
"desired to make one wise" (The Holy Bible. 1985, Genesis 3:6). Humanity does not 
reign over, cannot control knowledge, unconcealment, or truth (i.e., nature revealing 
itself the manifestation or coming to presence o f nature's living energies), but attempts 
to in this subject-position god-striving: truth, again, is certainty through ordering. This 
is the history of science, o f Western civilization, and the reign of death. Knowledge is 
power, to know is to dominate; to know is, again, to kill (Serres, 1977/1982). The 
world, in order to be known, falls beneath the dissecting knife o f humanity, denied o f its 
life-breathing power.
Alfred North Whitehead (1925) has described poignantly the impact of this Logic 
of Death upon the world: "Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; 
merely the hurrying o f material, endlessly, meaninglessly" (p. 80). Life itself has been 
extricated from the world, from our world—and with it, value, worth, quality and 
purpose. As such, it is what Wilber (1995) calls a "cardboard cosmos," one "gone 
slightly mad" (p. 523); the cosmos—having been reduced, disenchanted, disqualified—is 
only a shadow o f what it once was in "the nightmare known as modernity" (p. 415).
Thus, the world is not simply dying but is dying at the hands o f humanity. Yet, 
we must also note, the person with the knife is caught too in the web o f death, perhaps 
more profoundly even than his or her victim-world. Humanity, as god o f the cosmos and
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lord of knowledge, is the orderer o f this standing-reserve; therefore, the human subject— 
says Heidegger (1962/1977d)—stands even more originally within the standing reserve; 
the human subject is, in fact, challenged and ordered to exploit the energies o f the world. 
In this way, the subject itself is on the brink of the place where the self too is standing 
reserve. The greater this threat, the greater the need for certainty, for lordship o f the 
human subject over the object-ive "other” world. This drive, further driven, endangers 
the subject in relation to itself and to all that is. All truth, all knowing in and o f the 
world, is banished to ordering, this form o f knowing which is the knowledge o f death— 
separation, grasping, challenging, severing, consuming, etc. Soon all that is is standing 
reserve, and any other possibility is effectively blocked: to know the world is to know it 
this way; truth, revelation, knowledge, is the domain o f science alone, via technology— 
at least truth that is certain, and real.
Without question, human reality, in the West at least, is now in profound ways 
determined by Western European Science, and increasingly so through its vehicle o f 
technological advance. The knowing of science impacts humanity and the world perhaps 
primarily through the vehicle o f modem technology. Humanity itself is consumed in and 
by this way o f being in and toward the world-this grasping, plucking, devouring, striving 
quest incessantly engaged; this "entrapping securing procedure" in which humanity itself 
is entrapped is a key element in the maintenance and employment of the Logic o f Death. 
The realm within which we live and move and sustain ourselves is fundamentally directed 
by this logic, by science, as a theory of the world, as a primary avenue through which 
what is presents itself to us. As such a theory, science is also an epistemology o f the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
76
real, which has become the certain, economized into cause and effect, consequence, 
that which is ordered linearly and can be grasped and determined in advance.
According to Heidegger, only since the seventeenth century, the birth o f the 
modem epoch, has the real come to mean that which is certain. Being obtained and 
secured by the human subject in objectness, precedence is then given to method, i.e., 
dissection. What is real can be measured, that is real which can be measured. Life is 
uncertain and changing, that which is living is uncertain and changing, thus, the world, 
to be known, is objectified, entrapped in objectness, and calculated in advance; nature is 
muted and diminished to the inanimate, that humanity might achieve its desperately 
sought-after certainty. Yet, humanity—we—cannot escape the effects o f this Iife-grip, 
this calculation o f all that is. If we hope to be "real," we, too, must eventually fall 
beneath this measuring imperative.
Douglas Sloan (1983) describes the development as one in which science has 
become the only valid way of knowing anything, the only legitimate source of 
knowledge. Moreover, it is not science, essentially, that is the problem, but rather the 
distortion o f science—what we may call a misplaced faith, and scientism (Doll, 1993), 
through the Logic o f Death. This distortion involves grandiose claims about science as a 
method and as a worldview, including its intrusion into domains in which it does not 
belong. "The heart o f the problem, as Michael Polanyi has striven repeatedly to 
demonstrate, lies not in science and technology but in the distorted images o f the world 
that have come to supply the context within which they are pursued and employed" 
(Sloan, 1983, p. 25). All problems are not answerable, scientifically or technologically.
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To believe they are, to live and proceed as though they are, is "technolatry," in the words 
of Frederick Ferre (1976). Pre-eminence is given to methodology, technique and means. 
Of course, the West maintains, perhaps beside itself, this almost religious attitude toward 
technology equivalent to dogmatism. It is the instrument o f our ascension to the throne 
of the gods.
Such is the Western mindset o f modernity, says Sloan (1983), constitutive of a 
number o f scientistic notions that have gone unquestioned, productive o f a tunnel vision 
that fixates upon one aspect of reality which is taken to be all o f reality—the quantitative 
one highlighted by the methodology o f modem science. The resulting worldview—which 
if not omitting, certainly inadequately addressing questions fundamental to human 
experience9—essentially makes no room for human existence, for what it means to be 
human.
The view o f reality that dominates is materialist, reductionist, quantitative. As 
such, it is indeed a reality that humans can easily control. Yet, the qualitative nature of 
the cosmos, o f existence, is eliminated or excessively undermined. "The unwarranted 
extension o f the purely quantitative to encompass the whole o f experience is eventually 
to create a dead universe in which quality, meaning, and life have no place. The
’While modem science has proved itself amazingly efficacious in addressing 
many aspects o f human life in the world, its power is limited—modem science unable to 
answer to our ultimate questions and concerns. Huston Smith (1982) in Beyond the 
Post-Modem Mind identifies some o f those extremely important aspects o f human 
experience, essential to human experience, before which science stands ineffectual: 
value, which is internal and normative rather than instrumental o r explanatory; purpose 
(and intentionality), a response to the question "Why?"; meaning (significance), 
involving issues that are existential and universal in scope; and quality, drawn from life 
experience and feeling and varying levels o f consciousness.
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exclusive preoccupation with quantity,' Lewis Mumford has written, has 'disqualified the 
real world o f experience,' eliminating all that makes human life worthwhile and driving 
the human being 'out o f living nature into a cosmic desert'" (p. 11).
Sloan calls it a "disqualified universe," where all that matters is quantity, where 
the impersonal presides. It is a universe marked by the conquest, the surrender o f the 
person. Humanity is reduced to a machine-mechanistic metaphors pervade even in the 
realm of human aflairs, with all their complexities and idiosyncrasies. Like Adam and 
Eve, we clothe ourselves in the aprons o f a scanty, shallow rationality: the narrow 
technist reason o f instrumentality has been equated with the whole o f human thought and 
being in the world. Though Einstein, scientist par excellence, does not make an explicit 
indictment against modem science or the modem world, and though he does not lay the 
charge of this Logic o f Death upon humanity, he states the case, perhaps unwittingly, o f 
that to which humanity has been brought, and calls it by its rightful name; he says: 
"Whoever remains unmoved, whoever cannot contemplate or know the deep shudder o f 
the soul in enchantment, might just as well be dead for he has already closed his eyes 
upon life" (cited in Stassinopoulos, 1978, p. 137). In despiritualizing the world, in 
effecting its disenchantment, we ourselves have turned our backs upon life, invoking 
suicidally the death o f humanity.
The philosopher Hans Jonas (1979), discussing contemporary ethical quandaries 
in relation to the joint advancements o f technology and biology, calls it the "metaphysical 
neutralizing o f man" in which we have deprived ourselves o f any valid image of 
humanity, lost any understanding o f what it means to be human. Made in the image of
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the divine, we have killed that image, marred the face of the earth, and inadvertently lost 
any mirror with which to reflect upon ourselves. Our modem notions o f reality omit the 
significance of persons, o f the human being. Thus, Jonas warns that we are not ready to 
responsibly handle the possibilities o f genetic technology, dangerously capable of, in fact, 
altering beyond comprehension the nature, mind and body of humankind.
Yet, humanity has already been altered, we might observe. For the cosmos—and 
with it, the real—has been altered. The real is not only certain but that which can be 
broken down into separable parts and ordered—organized logically and manipulated 
technologically. Guiding principles, integrating purposes (i.e., faith) are irrational, not 
exactly "real." Effected is the principle o f non-restraint. If we can invent it, we must 
implement it. Progress is the standard by which all is measured. Values, too, become 
objects, for in the modem interpretation o f things anything that is must be represented, 
and made certain. Wrought through human subjectivity by the establishment o f the self 
within the world as picture, values become human needs objectified as goals (Heidegger, 
1952/1977b). The overriding need for absolute control, for godhood through certainty, 
achieves pre-eminence; the ultimate aim is progress and the ascending path; value, too, 
is sucked up as well into the standing reserve; and "life [itself is] judged by the extent to 
which it minister[s] to progress, progress [is] not judged by the extent to which it 
ministers] to life" (Mumford, 1934, p. 185).
Value is removed from humanity, from human activity. Kovel (1991) asserts that 
it is instead placed in the object, but not merely the object: the object o f progress, the 
marketable object—of which Marx's "fetishism o f commodities" is descriptive. Thus for
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Kovel, capitalism is the culprit-fueled by the driving forces o f scientism and 
individualism. It is not simply an economic mode, but a way o f being in the world, 
describing a particular stance toward the self, toward others, toward nature and all the 
world. It is the "will-to-power," as it were; the desire for power is pre-eminent, perhaps 
all-eminent—omnipresent: humanity is motivated by power, driven by and toward 
power, compelled to grasp after and establish it. Capitalism is, perhaps, the material and 
economic manifestation of this incessant pursuit for divine elevation.
The theologian Paul Tillich (1957) has further suggested that modem society has 
at least as one o f its deities, particularly heightened in the competitive and capitalistic 
West, this god of Success. "It does," he says, "what every ultimate concern must do: it 
demands unconditional surrender to its laws even if the price is the sacrifice of genuine 
human relations, personal conviction, and creative eros. Its threat is social and economic 
defeat, and its promise—indefinite as all such promises—the fulfillment o f one's being”
(p. 3). He adds that much of modem literature is made religiously important, as it were, 
because it is descriptive o f the wreckage and collapse of this order o f faith. The 
pervading metaphor of consumption crops up over and over again in modem novels, 
reflecting the modem malaise effected by capitalism's "manipulative mode of moral 
instrumentalism" (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 24). The promises o f this god o f Success, when 
met, are found wanting: "Not false calculations, but a misplaced faith is
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revealed" (Tillich, 1957, p. 3). "In the midst o f all that is correct, the tru e ... 
withdrawal" (Heidegger, 1962/1977d, p. 26).10
Yet, Kovel (1991) might protest that we cling still to  the promises of this god, 
that this order o f faith is, unfortunately, not utterly wrecked. His thought is consistent, 
however, with Tillich's in concurring that as the essence o f capitalism, this adoration o f 
material wealth, revenue and acquisition wages war against spirit—and thus, against life: 
at issue is something spiritual in this sense. He asserts that, in fact, the modem tradition 
consists in a repression o f spirit where ever present is "the pressure or tendency in social 
institutions to devalue the spiritual dimension, render it irrational, or even suppress it 
altogether" (p. 6). We dwell in the thick of a "profound spiritual crisis." There is a 
living wholeness to spirit that the logic of severing cannot endure. The deadness of 
despiritualization ever threatens humanity in modem circumstances. Establishing the rule 
of a science that is against all that is spiritual and repressing fundamentally what it means
"Heidegger (1962/I977d) explicates this difference between the correct and the 
true in his essay on "The Question Concerning Technology." The correct is the truth (in 
terms of unconcealment) that is revealed in the mode o f a challenging-revealing, in 
ordering. In this mode, other possibilities of unconcealment are blocked, and there 
stands a heightened danger o f humanity misinterpreting what is shown to it. For 
example, Heidegger suggests that even God in this case threatens becoming the god of 
philosophers, represented in a cause-effect understanding; the divine then loses its 
distantial mysteriousness, its exalted and holy character. "In a similar way the 
unconcealment in accordance with which nature presents itself as a calculable complex of 
the effects o f forces can indeed permit correct determinations" (p. 27), but the truth of it 
is not reached. For an in-depth critique of Heidegger on the ethos o f the true versus the 
correct, and his perspective on the modem subject in its relationship to modem 
knowledge as the science o f technology, see Richard Bernstein's (1991a) "Heidegger's 
Silence? Ethos and Technology" in The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political 
Horizons of Modenuty/Postmodernity
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to be human, it "displaces the core o f human activity from human beings to things"
(P- 11).
Not only, then, has God been lost in this Logic o f Death that reigns, and the 
world fallen prey to its violence, and human frith and value and action been distorted out 
o f measure by it, but so too has humanity itself succumbed to its effects. With all the 
world, humanity has, in short, already undergone a kind o f alteration. We may call it the 
impact of human objectification, reduction, quantification, disqualification, or 
despiritualization. Heidegger (1962/I977d) goes on to explain it in terms o f his concept 
o f the standing reserve. Maintaining that the "unity o f objectness" is preserved but also 
transformed in the continuity o f the standing reserve, he says again that the object itself 
also vanishes into humanity's storehouse. The pure relational character o f subject and 
object is seen as all is ordered, fixed, commanded, stored and regulated in the standing 
reserve. With the disappearance o f the object into standing reserve, it is not long before 
the subject is sucked up with it as standing reserve—which does not mean that the duality 
o f the subject/object relationship vanishes but rather—claims Heidegger—that it reaches 
extreme dominance. Beyond the godward advance o f humanity via this knowing which 
separates from and sets upon nature to reveal its truth, this challenging act comes back 
to us; it sets upon us: We too are challenged forth, compelled to become standing 
reserve—human resources. Rather than achieving the liberation and wisdom promised in 
clutching the fiuit o f the knowledge of good and evil, we ourselves are brought into the 
clutch's grip and dominated by it. This is why Heidegger can call our way o f knowing, 
our ever-striving after this knowledge-grasp, and the essence of modem technology,
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"enframing" and a means o f "enframing," which ironically entraps us, humanity, in its 
regime.
Enframing is the "challenging claim” that calls upon humanity to order, to 
control the happening o f truth and fix and establish it as standing reserve. The real 
becomes the standing reserve. In the modem age and in contemporary times, with the 
growing pervasiveness o f technology, humanity is challenged forth in this way strikingly 
so, and ever more extremely. Heidegger defines enframing as "the gathering together o f 
that setting-upon which sets upon man; i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in 
the mode o f ordering, as standing-reserve” (p. 20). Humanity M s in the very act o f 
striving for freedom to achieve it, set upon and challenged and compelled to clutch and 
control truth and knowledge, to reign in the world as gods. God, tradition, and the 
forces o f nature may have been overthrown, but something other still rules: humanity is 
constrained to obey this "challenge"—perhaps the inordinate need, the secret desire for 
certainty and perfection, to reign as god; perhaps the incessant drive to know 
completely and to infinitely progress, this constant plucking and grasping and ordering; 
perhaps the tyranny o f reason's call; perhaps the enduring power of the serpent's defiant 
claim, his offer and his challenge. Human freedom, the freedom of the subjectum, in this 
sense, is an illusion, profoundly and ironically related to the antithesis o f freedom, in fact. 
The freedom o f the modem subject is lost in the objectivity commensurate with 
subjectivity, in the creation o f the standing reserve. With the birth of the human subject 
in the world—as constructed by the Logic o f Death through science and technology, 
freedom, we see then, is ever at issue.
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Related to Heidegger's notion o f humanity as standing reserve, is Herbert 
Marcuse's (1964) identification o f the human laborer (or "human resource") as "one­
dimensional." In this sense, where preeminence is given to the ordering o f reserve, to 
progress and production, work is paramount but meaningless and the human is reduced 
to mere "economic man." Moreover, when technology "becomes the universal form of 
material production, it circumscribes an entire culture; it projects a historical totality—a 
world" (p. 9). The human subject is drawn into this totality as well, so much so that 
Marcuse goes on to claim that alienation and freedom themselves may not be at issue— 
there is perhaps no longer a subject to be alienated or free. The "System"—i.e., the 
maintenance and regulation o f the standing reserve—has won; humanity has been bought 
off to it, as it were, and identifies with it completely. "People recognize themselves in 
their commodities; they have become what they own" (p. 154). Perhaps, meaning no 
longer even matters. Humanity is lost to itself and to its own meaning. As Heidegger 
puts it in Language. Poetry. Thought (1950/197la), the time is destitute because God is 
not only dead, but mortals are as yet unaware o f their own mortality, are not capable o f 
taking ownership o f their own nature: pain is a mystery still concealed; death endures as 
at issue and dubious; love has yet to be learned. No longer discernable is the trace of 
the fugitive gods, o f the holy. At question is whether mortals can still know the holy.
"The destitution is itself destitute” (p. 97), because mortals no longer even experience it.
Yet, we know that they must experience it, and that meaning matters still. While 
it is true that the time may be destitute, contemporary times do not entirely reflect 
Heidegger's account of oblivious mortals completely out o f touch with the sacred or
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Marcuse's description o f the "Happy Consciousness" o f those who have become one 
with the production o f technology, with their own commodities. We somehow resist in 
some corner o f our souls materialization, objectification, complete absorption into 
standing reserve. Thus, we are not at peace, we are not oblivious, we are not happy. 
Study after study and statistic after statistic attest to the fact that all is not well with us: 
suicide rates soar, divorces mount in number, mental hospitals expand; and millions 
upon millions from all walks o f life testify to a general malaise, the experience o f 
meaninglessness and emptiness in their own vocations and lives (Berman, 1981; Kovel, 
1991; Sloan, 1983). Consumerism, it seems, is merely a form o f anesthetization, an 
anxious compulsion enacted paradoxically in the desire for freedom and meaning.
Robert Bellah's (1985) study o f middle-class America testifies to the fact that the 
most advanced society, an exemplar o f modem progress (via science and technology) 
and consumerism, while achieving a good measure o f freedom and comfort for a great 
number o f its people, has done so at enormous costs: individuals largely experience a 
pervasive sense o f meaninglessness in their everyday lives, o f alienation from others in 
the absence o f collective commitment and conscious engagement with the concerns o f a 
larger community—a result o f the Logic o f Death, and severing.
According to Berman (1981), life in the West today is best characterized by its 
increasing entropy, where the death that reigns, as it were, has taken on an alarming 
"life" o f its own. All about us we find economic and technological chaos; we dwell in 
the midst o f ecological disaster and fight against psychic disintegration. The 
contemporary landscape is bleak. What is fundamental to human existence—sadly
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lacking and therefore at issue—is meaning. In the absence o f meaning and wholeness- 
stripped from the cosmos through our prevailing logic—which is expressed humanly most 
often in community, comes the collapse o f traditional values and the ensuing void; 
revivals follow, fueled by hysteria, or many retreat into a sort o f catatonic state, 
anesthetizing themselves through drugs, television, entertainment, tranquilizers.
Therapy is a national obsession in the United States, pinnacle o f the West. It represents 
in singular fashion the human search for life in a milieu o f death, a desperate attempt to 
ward off the alienation and the "pervasive feeling of anomie and cultural disintegration" 
(p. 17) that threatens to overwhelm the human soul. Depression, perhaps, can no longer 
be maintained as an illness, as it is the norm for our age. Walker Percy (1983) in Lost in 
the Cosmos is so bold as to assert that it is in fact insane to not be depressed in the world 
in which we find ourselves. The only people not depressed—and thus the only 
alternatives to depression—are fundamentalists and surfing dudes, i.e., the anesthetized.11
The problems that threaten to engulf us on every side actually 
seem to multiply and grow worse with every new advance in knowledge 
and its applications. The spoilation o f nature; the continuing suicidal 
buildup o f nuclear weapons; a spreading illiteracy, apathy, incivility, and 
violence among the citizenry; the breakdown o f personal relations; a
"Maxine Greene, in a lecture at the April 1996 American Educational Research 
Association (AERA) conference in New York on "Imagination, Possibility and 
Curriculum," discusses the import o f the imagination as a mode of cognition left out o f 
modem discourse on the nature o f human knowing. She speaks of ours as a time of 
darkness and enormous desperation, a time in need o f social transformation possible only 
through love, a love o f the world, and o f life itself. For Greene, an engagement with the 
arts is central to nurturing this love, even in the bleakest o f times. She highlights the 
aesthetic as that which arouses, that which deepens our awareness and heightens our 
consciousness o f qualities that give life meaning, o f open possibilities that give us hope. 
She contrasts the aesthetic with its opposite, the anaesthetic; the aesthetic counteracts 
this deadness.
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miasma o f low-level depression; a haunting sense o f futility in all that we 
do; signs o f a deepening cynicism in individuals and society—the 
problems range from the global to the excruciatingly personal, and we 
become more daily familiar with them. (Sloan, 1983, pp. xi-x)
In addition, as problems escalate, the solutions offered amount to two equally
dangerous, unsatisfactory and ineffectual choices: to press on more urgently in what
appears to be an ungrounded faith that we will stumble upon some new technology that
will fix all our problems, or to relinquish our search for knowledge completely and focus
wholly upon the concerns o f human existence through an emphasis on values,
commitments, and relationships. For Sloan, the rift—in these proposed remedies,
unacknowledged and unwittingly perpetuated—between human knowledge and human
value is foundational to the problems o f modernity. He says: "One o f the chief problems
of the modem world is that our conceptions of knowledge frequently give rise to views
of reality that provide little place and support for the values and personal-social
commitments necessary for a rich, whole, and life-enhancing existence" (p. x). It is
rather the case where shared loyalties inspiring sacrifice and the feeling of awe or wonder
are lost, where indifference reigns. Moreover, with the disappearance of a public world,
the retreat into the private world has intensified; yet, it is a world lacking substance.
Kovel (1991) traces this development via capitalism, in which simple
participation with the production o f life has been surpassed and life is essentially
experienced non-spiritually, a great part of existence is spent in estranged labor, or
empty leisure to combat the ill-effects o f life devoid o f spirit. It is a view of reality
which—since it works to alienate spirit vital to human existence and also to promote this
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strong sense o f individualism—compels individuals to withdraw and to dissect 
themselves, desperate to preserve spirit in some part o f their souls. This stunted 
spirituality is then wholly privatized and purely internalized, the soul having retreated 
from a despiritualized world in complete inwardness; spirit is relegated exclusively to 
the personal, dissociated from that which is social or political, from the external, public 
world. Reason itself becomes narrow, technical, despiritualized and cut off from the 
whole o f human experience and knowing—a reason that is dead and deadening. Spirit- 
split and reason-reduced are hazardous and homicidal. Kovel describes the key contours 
o f our social world, surrendered to absolute increase and instrumentalism, and "the 
heritage o f an enlightened reason split from spirit" (p. 12): poverty, pollution, waste, 
war, Hiroshima, and Holocaust. To keep at bay the horror that pervades, human 
existence in a deadened world is something bland, blunted, an innocuous numbness. 
"Faced with the holocausts regularly prescribed in the name of efficiency, order, and 
profit, the soul takes refuge in inwardness, or is simply turned off' (p. 13)—cut off slain. 
In the course o f historical progress, our consciousness o f our own identity has become 
more and more weak, and damaged, the experience o f a fragile identity in a culture of 
apathy, at the mercy o f indifference (Metz, 1977/1980).
Individual choice has become the only authority and yet the ideal o f 
individualism, o f freedom and equality, has in the pervasive, mechanistic worldview 
become little more than a controlling cultural uniformity. Brought to fruition through 
the rise o f the modern subject is "the sterility and danger of a quantitative, anonymous 
mass culture" (Anshen, 19S7, p. 135). Human equality is levelled to interchangeability,
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that which is numerical. Such conceptions o f freedom deny humanity o f personhood, 
and eradicate the irreplaceabilty and dignity o f the human person. Specialization, 
bureaucratic organization and the establishment o f hierarchies based on societal function 
effect "the sacrifice o f independent intelligence, the sweeping away of individual 
differences, local customs, local diversity, and all the infinite branchings o f humanity that 
enrich life" (Nicoll, cited in Sloan, 1983, p. 37).
Heidegger's standing reserve. He makes this bold, frightening statement and 
prediction: "Subjective egoism, for which mostly without its knowing it the I is 
determined beforehand as subject, can be canceled out through the insertion o f the I into 
the we. Through this, subjectivity only gains in power. In the planetary imperialism of 
technologically organized man [sic], the subjectivism of man attains its acme, from which 
point it will descend to the level o f organized uniformity and there firmly establish itself. 
This uniformity becomes the surest instrument o f total, i.e., technological, rule over the 
earth" (1962/1977a, p. 152).
We continue to play the gods; we see our treasures grow, our power, our 
importance, or so we think, and "the shadow o f Hiroshima stretches over the world" 
(Serres, 1986/1989, p. 77). The gods author not only life, but death as well. In the 
knowing that dominates, propagated technologically, irreversible changes are exacted 
upon the cosmos, nature is methodically broken down and with it, the human 
community, and the human soul. C. S. Lewis (1947) is said to have predicted this 
perversion o f human freedom as power is increasingly exerted over nature and humanity :
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unrestrained scientific power gives those in control o f science and technology license to 
exert this power over other fellow beings.
The black ash-cloud o f Hiroshima looms above our heads. The blood-cty o f 
Auschwitz rumbles beneath our feet from graves that will not be silenced. Yet, we are 
perhaps not only like S.S. men, camp wardens, ordering and effecting death, but like the 
Capos, prisoners ourselves, though with special privileges: living under a grandiose 
image o f our own power, we are crueller in the exertion of that power, and more 
hardened—looking only at the numbers we've inscribed upon human limbs, upon life, 
while the dark deafening void within echoes images of our own death. The German 
theologian Dorothee Soelle (1971/1974) evokes a similar image in her exhortation that 
we must account for and address this internalized operation in our critique o f modem 
society, "the capitalist or the concentration camp guard that is in each of us" (p. 92). 
Kovel (1991) describes that to which humanity has brought itself and been brought in 
this manner: "a world order that commits planetary suicide in the search for profit while 
driving the majority o f human beings into despair and poverty,... a killing/producing 
machine without a spiritual center" (p. 12).12 Indeed, the fruit is plucked and consumed;
“Humanity needs a spiritual center, for we are spiritual beings. Spirituality is a 
cosmic affair, a matter of life and death, as Kovel (1991) says, "the mythopoetic 
framework [which makes] existence intelligible" (p. 8). History is seen to bear out this 
fact, recording innumerable fights to the death o f spiritual systems at odds. Wherever 
human existence is, there also shall be spirituality, for it is the very stuff o f which 
humanity, human life in the world consists. Perhaps, the unintelligibility and 
senselessness o f life felt by so many today is a result o f the systematic war humanity has 
launched against spirit, the logic and reign o f death—first God, then the world, and in its 
turn, humanity. Cut off spirit, separate and banish it from all that is, soon all that is is 
lifeless, meaningless, without sense or significance, dead.
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separation from (the "death" of) God, the spirit (of life), the world and all o f creation 
effected, or being effected. Curse, crisis and the reign o f death. Enter Cain and Abel 
and bloodshed. We shall not only surely die but also be the instruments o f death.
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CHAPTER 3
EDUCATION, THE UPWARD JOURNEY AND THE FAITH OF REASON (1)
I present to you the story o f the education o f a human soul. Give 
a listen; look and discern the gift o f education upon our nature, in 
contrast to the lack thereof.
It is likened to an experience such as this: Imagine the family of 
humanity dwelling underground in a cave-like abode where there is little 
light. Yea, there would be no light at all were it not for a fire burning, 
and for an opening equal in breadth to the cave itself though it be a long 
way up—far above reach, beyond which great light shines. From a child 
has lived there every one, secured in place and position unchanged, bound 
at the neck and legs. As the fetters prevent any movement o f the head, 
turns either to the right or to the left, the field o f vision is limited to only 
that which lies ahead and before. From a fire which bums behind and far 
above these human beings, light is afforded them. Behind them, as well, 
on higher ground, there stretches a path which leads up to the fire, and to 
the light. Observe also that a low wall has been erected along the path, 
akin to the screen o f the puppeteer above which he presents his puppets.
Then, see in your mind's eye that upon that wall, and projected 
above it, there are people, some talkative and some quiet, bearing 
artifacts o f every variety: human and animal relics o f all kinds of 
materials like wood and stone. Except for the shadows cast by the fire on 
the wall in front of them, do these prisoners see anything of themselves or 
o f each other? Can they even, with heads confined, immoveable, for the 
duration o f life? And of the things along the wall that are carried, the 
same: shadows only do they watch. We are as they. Should they per 
chance be capable o f conversation between themselves, they should think 
that the shadow-things they saw passing before them were the things 
themselves, and that the words and names they used addressed and 
pertained to them in actuality. Moreover, should the wall feeing them in 
the prison have an echo, would they not think that whenever the carriers 
o f the artifacts passed along the wall talking, they heard the voices of the 
shadows moving before them? Thus, the prisoners would know in all 
things the truth to be solely found in the shadows o f those trophies, 
nothing more.
Ponder, then, the event o f freedom, being loosed from their 
shackles and delivered from their ignorance, how it should be felt and
92
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received. One o f them, when set at liberty and obliged to rise to his1 feet, 
move about and turn his eyes up to the light, would at first suffer and be 
unable to see the things whose shadows he had viewed before, dazed and 
blinded by the brilliance o f the light. Would not this person be astonished 
and disbelieving when told that the things upon which he formerly cast his 
eyes were without substance and that now since turned toward the things 
that are, he sees more rightly? For he can still as yet make no sense o f the 
things which now pass before him. If, as well, he were constrained to set 
his gaze upon the light directly, it should pain him, and he must surely 
retreat to his former place, to the things able to be seen by him, believing 
the former things to  be truer than that presently being shown to him
Would not this person also if someone carried him away against 
his will from those things and up into the sunlight, be angry and distressed 
by such handling? Not one o f the matters said to  be true can he see, with 
the sun filling his eyes. Time is required before the world above can be 
ascertained. Shadows should be at first discerned most easily, followed 
by images o f humans and other creatures which the waters reflect, and 
then the things themselves. At night, study might be devoted to the sky 
itself and those items contained therein—by the light o f the moon and 
stars. By day, the light o f the sun sheds light on all things, and at some 
point, the man shall behold the sun itself; in its heaven, and learn o f it. 
Soon he comes to know that the sun reigns over all things in the visible 
world, and is the cause o f those things he formerly observed.
What o f his remembrance of former things? O f his first home and 
kindred inmates? O f that taken for wisdom there? O f a certainty, he 
should consider himself happy and grieve for the others. Nor would he 
esteem or covet the honors bestowed upon those prisoners who best and 
most brilliantly recognized or remembered and thus predicted the patterns 
o f shadows appearing on the cave wall in front o f  them. Indeed, would 
he not be like Homer and preference serfdom, poverty and suffering 
before again partaking o f their ideas and experiences?
Think on this as well. Should he descend again to his place of 
origin, his eyes would soon fill with darkness, having left the keen and 
acute light o f the sun. In a contest o f identifying shadows at the challenge
'Though a retelling o f Plato's "Allegory of the Cave," in an attempt to be as 
faithful to the original telling as possible, I am maintaining the prisoner as a male figure, 
with the understanding that, for Plato especially—who posited the intelligence of women 
and their ability to achieve, with men, the status o f philosopher-kings and to make the 
upward journey of the soul, the prisoner is representative o f all human persons, male and 
female. Thus, the reader will find, not only throughout the re-telling, but also in the 
presentation of Plato's explication o f his allegory, the prisoner made reference to through 
the use o f the pronoun "he."
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of the cave-dwellers, he would surely fail, for needed is some period of 
adjustment, and his sight would as yet still be dim. Might he not even 
elicit ridicule and evoke the belief that the upward journey is a most 
unworthy one, certain to ruin a man's eyesight? Might not the response 
be against him who attempted to free others and lead them to the light o f 
the sun, even perhaps violence and the sentence of death? Nevertheless, 
that soul shall ever press upward, for such is the path to truth, to 
understanding; it is that soul, then, who acts sensibly, who is most 
reasonable.
The whole picture can be fathomed, and what I hope to articulate, 
with the understanding that the upward path and the contemplation o f the 
things above is the ascending journey o f the soul, its education, unto the 
intelligible realm. "Whether it's true or not, only the god knows" (Plato, 
ca. 380 b.c./1992, p. 189).
A retelling o f Plato’s "Allegory o f the Cave," from 
the dialogues o f Socrates in Republic (c.a. 380 b.c./1992)
What a grand image2 Plato (ca. 380 b.c./1992) paints for us concerning humanity,
our divine journey and destiny and path to wisdom. It presents us with a journey—
though fraught with difficulty—o f ascent, in fact, akin in this sense to the journey we
have presently left off contemplating, the upward or godward quest o f Western
Civilization (see Chapter 2). Further, we might posit even the traces of an explication or
embodiment—an incarnation, a prototype, a concretization, a mirroring as it were—o f this
very story in the history of the Western world, or at least in the various tellings of this
history by Western scholars. Derrida (1992/1995), as we have seen, in attempting to
elucidate the historical emergence o f the person, the human subject, and the notion of
responsibility to which this emergence is indelibly connected, begins with the daimonic,
humanity’s original embeddedness in and lack o f dissociation from the earth—Plato's cave
dwellers (see Chapter 1). He follows the "evolutionary" route through and beyond, as he
2Although in retrospect, the image Plato here sets forth is, as well, perhaps 
inherently ambiguous or even grandly perilous, harrowing, horrific, alarming.
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sees it, Plato's realization o f the political self—perhaps now released from the "cave”- 
chains and yet immersed still in the dark earth of culture and society or bound in measure 
to its path—to the Christian actualization o f the soul alone, internalized, and utterly 
responsible before God as absolute Other—i.e., free, or open to the light of the sun. 
Derrida's formulation is especially intriguing in that he investigates and makes central to 
this development the repression and thus also envelopment o f former ways of being in 
the world at each new historical advance, hi similar fashion, Ricoeur (1969/1974) sees 
a type o f dialectical return as potentially constitutive of human advance, and yet it is still 
advance of which he speaks. His is a mediation via the arrival o f atheism on the 
historical scene which might assist religion, chronologically prior to atheism and 
critiqued effectively by it, in making its way to frith. For atheism has exposed the self- 
deceptions o f religion in taking shadows for substance; yet, freed from the shadows of 
unacknowledged desires projected as real, atheism fails to discern, embrace or realize 
what is, ever fixing its gaze upon shadows or statues of things, the cave, what is not and 
yet believed to be true. Its "No" in this sense is indeed sacred, and yet it can never come
’In contrast to Derrida's formulation o f Plato, Kenneth Wilber (1995) posits Plato 
as a mystic, along the order o f one who has achieved subjectivity, responsibility, yet 
without losing the sense o f the connection to all things, the interdependence constitutive 
of earthly life. Plato's political self then, along these lines, more fully represents one who 
has ascended to the fullness o f human subjectivity, and in so doing, makes a descending 
return to the world of the Many, finding oneself embedded in and devoted to 
participation in common life with others in a world. The earth, as well as the human 
being, is an embodiment of spirit, which is one. In this way, the birth o f the human 
subject as outlined by Derrida might more accurately signify the moment o f repression, 
and dissociation, the alienation o f humanity from the earth, from spirit, from the ties that 
bind, as it were—excessive subjectivity, pathological.
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to the articulation of a  "Yes,” as in Nietzsche's three metamorphoses o f the spirit: the 
lion is released from the chains by which the camel is bound, with some measure o f light 
renouncing them, but only the child seems to have reached the light o f the sun, in foil 
possession of a grand "Amen" to what is (see Chapter 1).
Kenneth Wilber (1995) in his "Kosmos trilogy”4 takes an explicitly developmental 
and evolutionary approach in tracing the history o f the Kosmos,5 which is a history o f 
spirit and of humanity and human consciousness in relation to the earth and to spirit. 
Including a critique and commendation o f the position o f Western Civilization within 
this evolution, he, in fact, alludes to Plato's image o f the "evolution" of the human soul, 
its educational journey upward, to support his explication and interpretation of 
humanity's ontological and cosmological history, hi addition, even concerning the 
mythic Adam and Eve and the story of their "foil" we see parallels with as well as 
departures from the Platonic soul and the allegory o f its "rise": Plato asserts that the
'Presently Wilber has published but one volume, Sex. Ecology, Spirituality: The 
Spirit o f Evolution (1995), o f a three-volume series on the "Kosmos," which he identifies 
as his "Kosmos Trilogy."
IWilber (1995) makes a distinction between the Kosmos and the cosmos. The 
cosmos is that totality o f which we speak today, conceived as the whole, and yet 
markedly reduced through modem thought, stripped o f its interiority, its depth, o f spirit. 
The Kosmos, o f Greek origin, refers to that universal total spoken o f not as the whole 
but rather as the "All," with the recognition that never do we fully arrive at that which 
we symbolize. It is what we know of the breadth and depth, encompassing the domains 
of the physiosphere, biosphere, noosphere, and theosphere: matter, life, mind, and spirit. 
While we get our term "cosmos" from the Pythagorean "Kosmos," Wilber contrasts their 
common understandings: "The original meaning o f the Kosmos was the patterned nature 
or process o f all domains o f existence, from matter to mind to theos, and not merely the 
physical universe, which is usually what both 'cosmos' and 'universe' mean today" (p. 38).
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human aim in the ascent is to see the good, to realize knowledge; and our garden 
representatives also seek, in having their eyes opened, to obtain knowledge, which 
definitively includes the knowledge of good. Yet, in this story the human attempt is 
forbidden and cursed, while the Platonic initiative is the human path to eternal bliss. The 
destiny carved out and prophesied in the creation myth, which we have traced through 
the history o f humankind in the West, is as well all the more tragic for its irony, though 
its conclusion is at least foreshadowed, foretold. No tragic premonition o f this sort 
taints the Platonic vision6 for humanity, except perhaps should one put weight upon the 
displeasure and hatred o f the cave dwellers toward those souls aspiring deliverance from 
the cave, to apprehend the knowledge o f the good. In any case, it seems we enter into 
this image of the education o f the human soul in darkness, finding in it a grave contrast 
from where we have come: while the project and journey of Western Civilization is in 
many ways congruent with this Platonic analogy o f light and ascension, Plato's is a 
pilgrimage in the direction o f the good, the true and the beautiful, and the journey we 
have heretofore gleaned turns rather to be a trek o f death, darkness, decline—o f
‘Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), in After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, suggests 
that Plato's condemnation of the poets lies in his opposition to their tragic view o f human 
life. Plato, in this sense, the father o f the Ideal realm, is viewed not only as an idealist 
but also a perpetual optimist. In line with Socratic thought, Plato seems to believe in the 
basic goodness o f the Kosmos and o f man, and conceives of the source o f evil along the 
order of ignorance, the result o f acts of the human will rooted in thoughtlessness, 
irrationality. O f course, while Plato emphasizes the import of human agency and 
freedom, his objection to the poets and their presentation of the tragic element in human 
existence might not exactly signify the denial o f such an element therein, only his distaste 
for the way in which it serves to undermine human power, the possibility of 
transformation and the realization of the good through human effort. Plato also, in some 
instances, correlates the work o f poets and storytellers with falsehood, opposed to truth.
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descension in that sense, in which perhaps most apparent is the realization of the evil, the 
false, and the base, vile, or repugnant (see Chapter 2).
Still, the sojourn o f the West has not been utter darkness, and even the T all o f 
Man" can be conceived as having been initiated by the human desire for light, as well as 
our present deposing or abandonment by sincere intentions to apprehend the good.
Plato's "Allegory o f the Cave" provides the West from early on, in fact, with a beacon o f 
light by which to tread its path, even a  vision o f the journey7 as a journey o f light, an 
effectual and sure ascension by which humanity lays hold o f knowledge, and attains to 
the good, the true and the beautiful. Plato's centrality to Western thought is generally
6Plato views human life as a journey o f the soul, a spiritual pilgrimage, if you will- 
-both individually and collectively. A journey is intelligible; it is a lived-out narrative 
along the order o f the quest. Seen in this way, narratives comprise the basic structure o f 
existence, or at least that structure by which existence is interpreted, understood, given 
value. Each o f us, in the course o f living, participate in narratives o f one sort or another, 
and comprehend our existence in terms o f the narratives we have lived out, as well as 
those o f others. Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), in After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 
looks at and discusses at length this classical perspective on human life as a sojourn, on 
what he calls the narrative unity o f human life, and its relationship to the virtues o f 
antiquity. "The unity of the human life is the unity o f a narrative quest” (p. 219). He 
further considers the breakdown o f the virtues in modernity, o f the very concept o f 
virtue and o f the narrative unity o f life, o f human life conceived o f as a soul-joumey.
The modem philosopher Jean Paul Sartre, for example, seeks, in feet, to expose the 
narrative assumption as false: to represent human life in narrative form is to 
misrepresent it; it is to impose a kind o f order upon human action which it does not in 
truth exhibit. MacIntyre goes on to interrogate and challenge Sartre: What would true 
human actions deprived of falsifying narrative look like? Sartre himself fails to answer 
the former question; moreover, to deconstruct and negate narrative, to prove it in every 
case inauthentic, he must in fact do so and does so with the use o f a narrative. Though 
the West has lost this sense of life as a journey, o f history as the collective spiritual 
travels/travails (story) of humanity, traces remain: the inheritance o f Plato. MacIntyre 
actually suggests that it is not only a historical legacy to conceive o f the self in some 
narrative form, but also the natural mode o f self-perception.
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unquestioned, although perhaps resented, forgotten or purposely ignored. Alfred North 
Whitehead has gone so for as to say that "the safest general characterization of the 
European [Western] philosophical tradition is that it consists o f a series o f footnotes to 
Plato" (1929/1978, p. 39); and Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) has reminded us further of 
the strong historical relationship between philosophy and the social, political, cultural 
context of which it is a  part.8 Plato is not what we imagine him to be: the first 
academician in his ivory tower, lost in thought, oblivious to and ineffectual in the real 
matters o f life.9 In a more general sense, as one of the great-souled ancients is reported 
to have said: 'Tor as he [a man] thinketh..., so is he" (The Holy Bible. 1985, Proverbs 
23:7). In like manner, as a people think, as a culture thinks, so is it, so shall it be.
Indeed, our thoughts have been formed historically by the thoughts o f Plato.
Yet to what importance may we give this particular portrait o f Plato regarding 
the education of the human soul and the upward path of light? In what way may we find 
its alliance with, its share in, and its elucidation of the question of faith we have brought 
to bear upon present times and turmoils in the West? We have already suggested and
'MacIntyre's thesis (1984) is that philosophy only loses its central position 
historically when it foils in its project to justify morality on the grounds of reason alone, a 
project brought about by the changes o f the Enlightenment; yet, such does not mean 
that the legacies o f philosophy are not strong, enduring, still operative in the ways we 
think and act in the world, the ways we view ourselves and the earth.
•John Dewey (1930/1960) suggests the importance o f looking at Plato, and 
criticizes those who promote a Plato o f the "Ivory Tower" variety: He speaks rather o f 
the "Plato of the Dialogues, trying one mode of attack after another to see what it might 
yield;... the Plato whose highest flight o f metaphysics always terminated with a social 
and practical turn, and n o t... the artificial Plato constructed by unimaginative 
commentators who treat him as the original university professor" (p. 13).
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hope to further develop that there are traces o f this image which throughout history have 
pervaded our conceptions o f human life, yet still, in this, we have not reached to our own 
troubled times, or to the thesis concerning faith we are putting forth. The importance of 
this portrait lies in its relation to a/the central crisis o f our time—a crisis which seems to 
be finding expression in a variety of domains o f existence from popular culture to 
political discourse to theological inquiry to philosophical and academic study: a crisis, 
for lack of a better word, a conundrum regarding the import, function, place, and 
centrality of reason.
Richard Bernstein (1991b) has called this contemporary crisis or phenomenon the 
"rage against reason." Reason, for one reason or other, has been found wanting, and a 
certain "retro-romanticism" saturates our present landscape (Wilber, 1995): a 
widespread, directed attention to non-Western cultures traditionally not subject to 
reason's reign, and an expectant reliance upon these cultures to provide us with answers 
to our present woes. Evidence of the case can be seen in the renewed interest in 
questions regarding the quality and meaning o f human existence; the rise o f religious 
concerns; the explosion of New Age spiritualities and alternative medicine perspectives; 
the poignancy and pervasiveness o f multicultural issues in educational, political, social, 
and cultural arenas and institutions; and the abundant problematizing, denigration, 
deconstruction, or outright attack of reason by the various eco, feminist, post-structural, 
and post-modern philosophies.10 And what is Plato but the father o f reason—or at least
‘Given the scope and focus of this work, it is not possible for me to present, 
explicate, or even introduce here these various critiques o f reason—vast in scope and 
number, originating in myriad milieus o f thought, and moving in different though similar
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the representative o f its father Socrates, and what is the kernel o f Western Civilization 
through him but the pursuit o f reason and an unwavering faith in reason as humanity's 
hope for achieving all that is good?
We have previously highlighted the all-pervasive, ever-present character o f faith 
in human life as ultimate concern or care in the context o f our finite world existence (see 
Chapters 1 and 2). It appears that before humankind is rational animal, or along with so 
being we could say, it (he/she) is faith-full animal: that creature who cares; conscious 
that its own being is at issue (Heidegger, 1927/1962), knowing its own mortality, it 
perpetually goes about making meaning, valuing and judging. Humankind is interested, 
involved, engaged, anticipating, venerating, transcending animal, in this sense. Yet, still, 
we are not comfortable speaking of faith and reason together; in fact, we are heirs to 
centuries of debates that have pitted one against the other with the decisive ultimatum: 
faith ql reason, one choice. Then, o f course, faith loses its standing even as a viable, 
serious opponent, eventually—or is separated from reason altogether and relegated to its 
own realm, one o f little consequence in the real world o f affairs or in the advancement o f 
humanity. Yet faith is, we have seen, not what it was, and neither is reason. One cannot 
speak o f reason, particularly with regard to its present demise and state o f disarray,
directions according to their own particular arguments, aims, and purposes—though 
these critiques are important. References to a few such critiques shall be made 
throughout the body o f this work, but I have chosen to rely primarily on the work of 
Richard Bernstein (1991b) here because he, quite "reason-ably" 1 believe, steps back to 
question, to inquire into and re-think this popular, contemporary "rage against reason"— 
rather than, with the academic "masses" as it were, take for granted reason's depravity 
and plunge directly into insuring its undoing, ironically ever using the very tool o f reason 
to effect such a negation, however unwittingly (something like the dog biting the hand 
that feeds it).
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without speaking also about faith. However, faith is a  language lost, denied, repressed, 
in many respects driven from human consciousness.
The problem can be stated and is perceived in varied and sundry ways: our faith 
in or exaltation o f reason is the problem and must be discarded; at issue is reason itself 
which, depreciating human concerns regarding quality and meaning and value, must be 
marginalized, decentered, at least—if not thoroughly denigrated or annihilated. Or 
perhaps the crisis centers more around the issue o f  pathological reason, reason gone 
mad, made unreasonable. One explanation arising within this line of thought addresses a 
reason reduced: victim o f the Logic of Death (see Chapter 2), and of severing, o f which 
we have spoken, reason opts for knowledge which has unfortunately been split from 
value (Sloan, 1983; Wilber, 1995). We might prefer to call it, in a variant o f the 
language o f Freud, the cultural "fixation" o f the West: stuck in reason and having 
repressed prior elements o f development fundamental to the full, healthy consummation 
and presentation o f reason, we cannot grow beyond reason and reason itself is expressed 
unreasonably, perversely, neurotically or psychotically. Reason in a rut—stagnated, and 
gone awry.
Whatever the case, whatever the cause, reason is under scrutiny; what we think 
o f it, what we do with it, is at issue in our day. It is clear, as well, that this trial involves 
more than reason as it is generally conceived; our perplexing situation consists in a 
complex nexus of questions and crises o f freedom, authority, meaning, and frith, among 
a plethora of others. It follows that even as reason is the problem, it is only a part o f it, 
and yet that part o f it which seems to have received the most attention, perhaps because
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
103
it is most apparent. For with the Platonic tradition and on up to and past the 
Enlightenment, reason is our most prominent and most admired legacy, if not also most 
ambiguous, paradoxical, distorted, dangerous. It only makes sense, then, to undertake 
an excavation o f sorts—to dig beneath as it were the perceived problem, to attempt an 
archeological expedition which begins at the tomb o f Plato. For reason is not only not 
what it once was, but we have lost too its grounding in faith; even the later historical 
vehemently-heated arguments over reason versus faith—the two having been 
antagonized, sides having been taken and those sides having battled it out-are practically 
utterly foreign to us.
In any sort o f genealogical endeavor, even in the one to follow—sketchy at best 
and necessarily selective, it is pertinent to remember that anything revisited is also 
transformed: thus, reason's and faith's interrogation and reconceptualization. The task 
we have carved out for ourselves is grand indeed, if not grandiose, and we find the need 
to set constraints upon ourselves, to pick our sites carefully, and proceed with our 
general aim in mind. It is with that frame o f mind, then, that we highlight this realization: 
Plato's expression o f reason is also the expression o f the faith o f reason, and education is 
conceived by him as the broad and central avenue through which this faith is manifested, 
acted upon—through which reason is aspired to, apprehended and practiced. It might at 
first appear strange to modem sensibilities to include education at all in such an inquiry, 
but of course, education, as well, is not what it once was. For Plato, education is 
nothing other than this pilgrimage upon this upward path; it is the ascending journey of 
the soul to the intelligible sun, the good, the true and the beautiful—the faith of reason.
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Stranger still, without this grounding, then, is the suggestion of the centrality of 
education to these questions regarding reason and faith, o f the possibilities within the 
educational enterprise today to assist us in these struggles. Education, as we know it or 
generally construe it, has become little more than schooling, divorced or at least 
sheltered from the larger context o f living, o f human existence in the world, except as 
preparation and hopefully insurance for economic and material survival. However, we 
see a small measure o f its Platonic legacy now and then, the seed o f this faith; for 
example, in the expectations collectively placed upon schools and in the harsh 
judgements issued against them when they fail to meet those expectations.11 Clearly, 
though, most o f us, most communities, most people-most teachers, most students, most 
parents, most principals, most educational superintendents, most professors of education, 
most philosophers even—do not generally conceive o f education in this light: it is not a 
journey; it is not a quest; it has little to do with the pursuit o f the good, at least as Plato 
conceived of it. Nothing o f faith is to be found explicitly in our discussions about 
education, and little o f reason, in fret.
Like weeds devouring Plato's grave, there has proliferated a grand forgetfulness 
covering over that foundational insight o f the "fathers" o f education, expressed most 
directly in the words o f Socrates: the unexamined life is not worth living. The so-called 
birth o f education in the West comprehends no split between knowledge and value, 
reason and frith. In fact, education is established, undertaken, taken as an examination
The work of Jonathan Kozol (1975/1990) is exemplary o f this harsh judgment 
against public schools in America and this disappointed frith.
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of life toward this end o f living that is worthy, toward apprehending and actualizing the 
good, true, and beautiful in human life. As problematic as this notion is, there remains 
the possibility that this legacy, and these origins, stand in a  position to support us in 
addressing our present difficulties in regard to faith, to reason, to education—in 
addressing the crises o f our times; and certainly to give us insight into them. We pursue 
then, with these things in mind, these excavation sites in our archeological expedition, 
seeking in Part 1 (Chapter 3): to uncover and brush off this Platonic image o f education 
as the faith o f reason and clarify more specifically this notion o f reason's faith, and to 
explore broadly the sweep o f this faith in terms o f the Platonic vision as it has been 
played out historically and ontologically; and in Part 2, (Chapter 4): to probe into the 
ever-smaller context o f its operation in the educational institution, explicitly concerned 
with education, and implicitly with the advancement o f reason; the historical 
development o f the field o f education, exemplary o f the endurance o f this faith.
I.
But if we are persuaded by me, well believe that the soul is 
immortal and able to endure every evil and every good, and we'll always 
hold to the upward path, practicing justice with reason in every way.
That way we'll all be friends both to ourselves and to the gods while we 
remain here on earth and afterwards... Hence,... well do well and be 
happy.
(Plato, ca. 380 b.c./1992, p. 292)
None has so profound a commitment to education as has Plato, or so great an 
ambition for it. Through education—through perseverance and constancy in a blessed 
journey, through the faith o f reason, through the pursuit and practice o f reason as 
ultimate concern directed toward the good itself—to do well and be happy, here on earth
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and afterwards, befriending both ourselves and the gods: here is a grand and glorious 
aim indeed. This is ambition, indeed, and faith—the ambition and faith o f Plato.
This metaphor of the upward path which Plato sets forth in the Republic, as we 
inquire into it, serves to give us insight into this somewhat foreign notion o f education as 
reason's faith. He likens the process o f education to the journey of underground cave 
dwellers out o f the dark enclosure o f their world into the wide world o f light. Not only 
does the uneducated person live in the cave, but he is also a prisoner of the cave: his 
neck and legs are bound, he can turn his head neither to the left nor to the right. The 
field of his horizon is the cave wall. Plato vividly describes the conditions o f the cave; 
behind the prisoner on higher ground is a fire which both gives light and casts shadows. 
The prisoner sees his own shadow and the shadows o f others who walk behind him 
carrying artifacts which too cast shadows upon the cave wall. The only truths this 
prisoner knows are the shadows he sees before him. He takes shadow for substance: the 
shadow is the real; it is his sole reality.
In Plato's explication o f his own metaphor, he first identifies the cave habitat, the 
home of the prisoners, with the sensible or visible realm; and the fire's light within the 
cave with the sun's efficacy. The pilgrimage o f ascent from the cave and the exploration 
of those things beyond its entrance is likened to the education of the soul as its journey 
upward to the intelligible realm.12 In this sense, we glean that education is here
“Plato's sharp distinction between the sensible and the intelligible realms is 
believed to have involved the accommodation o f Heraclitus' insight that all is flux into 
Plato's more firmly established foundation in stability, the permanence of the Forms. The 
Forms bear the influence o f Parmenides' notion o f being, die belief that all is one. In this 
sense, for Plato, good, virtue, reason, being, god, are all terms for the same thing, that
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developmental in nature, a progression o f the soul from matter to mind, an ascent from 
the physiosphere (matter) and biosphere (life) to the realm o f the noosphere (mind). 
Education is then also, ultimately, about transcendence. We take note o f and highlight 
quickly this fundamental feature in Plato's construction, not only because it resonates 
powerfully with our notions o f frith as they are generally construed, but also because it 
contrasts sharply with our conceptions o f reason; and yet here it is the case in which 
reason figures prominently in acts o f in the aim o f transcendence.
The intelligible, or knowable realm, at its pinnacle, consists in the form of the 
good, sight's finale-arrived at only with great difficulty. The good is realized as the 
origin of all that is true and beautiful; the visible realm's source, too, is found herein as 
the good is also the bearer o f light. It directs understanding and apprehension o f truth; 
thus, to live most sensibly with oneself and with others, to act in the world in a way most 
fitting, it is required o f one to indeed gain this sight o f the form o f the good. For Plato 
then, the uneducated can have no experience o f truth. While such an assertion is 
generally offensive as it falls on modem ears, in the light o f its own context, it makes 
perfect sense because education itself is in part the pursuit o f truth and the experience o f
which is, unchangingly. Obviously in this vein, o f great importance for him is the 
maintenance of an ethical order and the stability o f the concepts o f justice and the other 
virtues (Grube, in Plato, ca. 380 b.c./1992). Including the sensible then, yet separating it 
from the intelligible, he can leave intact his preference for the all as One, the unifying 
Forms, admitting still to multiplicity, diversity, and the reality o f change. With such a 
separation of realms, and denigration o f one by the other, it is not difficult to see the soil 
in which the seeds o f the Logic o f Death (see Chapter 2) may most easily sprout if left 
unattended, and it is at this point, in fact, that Plato has found a great deal o f subsequent 
criticism. However, ours is presently to grasp his vision as a whole, his unifying faith, 
which in many ways serves to undermine this separation and this bias.
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such. In like manner, the educated are, in fact, the virtuous; for "only really virtuous
people can actually gain genuine knowledge o f ethical truth, because they alone can
achieve genuine understanding o f the good itself (Grube, in Plato, c.a. 380 b.c./1992, p.
xv), and this understanding is o f course achieved only through education.
Plato (c.a. 380 b.c./1992) contrasts his own, perhaps radical, notion o f education
to those o f others:
Education isn't what some people declare it to be, namely, putting 
knowledge into souls that lack it, like putting sight into blind eyes.... The 
power to learn is present in everyone's soul and... the instrument with 
which each learns is like an eye that cannot be turned around from 
darkness to light without turning the whole body,... cannot be turned 
around from that which is coming into being without turning the whole 
soul until it is able to study that which is and the brightest thing that is, 
namely, the one we call the good.... Education is the craft concerned 
with doing this very thing, this turning around, and with how the soul can 
most easily and effectively be made to do it. It isn't the craft o f putting 
sight into the soul. Education takes for granted that sight is there but that 
it isnt turned the right way or looking where it ought to look, and it tries 
to redirect it appropriately, (p. 190)
The aim o f education,13 by Plato's assertion, is not to put knowledge into a person's soul,
but to change the desires of the heart; what is required is that the soul must be turned
“The word "educate" is said to have come from the Latin educare. meaning to 
rear, to bring up, or to train. In former times, it has been associated with the physical 
nurturing or rearing o f plants or animals, and the support o f growth in such (Oxford 
English Dictionary. Vol. V, 1989). The Latin fidu&fflfi, however, has also been 
associated with our English transliteration "educate," signifying to draw or lead out.
This origin resonates well with Plato's notion o f education as the upward journey of the 
soul—the "student" is drawn or led out o f the cave's darkness, away from lower desires 
to higher ones. The term is shown to have been used in a number o f senses including the 
leading forth or bringing out o f troops for military battle, a bringing forth into a country 
or province, or a bringing forth of, for example, a person of magnitude. In addition, 
educere can mean to draw forth or unsheathe, as in a sword (Oxford Latin Dictionary. 
Vol. 1,1984). The link made between educate and educere as a leading forth or drawing 
out of intellectual abilities has been traced back to nineteenth century romanticism.
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around, in order to face and thus see light, directed toward the good as envisioned 
through the faith o f reason, in order to look upon it and take it in. It is at this point 
where human desire becomes central to this notion o f education as reason's faith. Thus, 
Plato weaves into his story his belief in the three parts o f the human soul: the appetitive, 
the spirited, and the rational. Three different kinds o f desire they are, residing within the 
human soul, one o f which generally maintains dominance and thus governs the life of that 
soul, its existence in the social world, hi the appetitive, food, drink, sex, or money for 
the acquisition of things are the goods toward which the soul strives; in the spirited, 
honor, victory and the comfort o f a good reputation are its aim; the rational is motivated 
by the search to realize knowledge and truth. Education is, then, a transcendent sojourn 
of the soul in which the educated moves from being predominately ruled by the 
appetitive part to that divine rational one, with the faith that by the rule o f reason, the 
good, the true, the beautiful—virtue, justice, freedom, human and divine friendship, 
happiness—can be obtained.
What follows from these three variants o f desire is an embryonic theory of 
psychological types (Grube, in Plato, c.a. 380 b.c./l992), or at least a schema by which 
to characterize souls dominated by these particular desires. Three types are identified: 
the money-lover, dominated by desires that are appetitive; the honor-Iover, motivated by 
longings that are spirited; and the wisdom-lover, governed by reason, desires that are 
rational. The three types are embodied in the social world o f Plato as producers, 
guardians and philosophers. That desire which rules the soul, directs the personality, and 
much o f what is desired, depends on what the good is perceived to be. For Plato, the
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only claim that can be ultimately14 supported is the claim o f reason upon the soul, the 
notion o f the good as perceived by philosophers, or those along reason's transcendent 
path.
To be virtuous is to be a lover o f wisdom—it is to have achieved the place where 
the reign o f the soul is in its rational part. Education, then, as it aims in making souls 
virtuous, seeks to turn souls from desires that are spirited or appetitive, and to change 
those desires, or to encourage and establish those souls already ruled by reason. It 
involves teaching the faithful pursuit of true happiness, found in knowledge, truth, the 
apprehension o f the good. Education, if successful, makes one virtuous. It is what 
happens as the internal rule o f the soul moves from the desires in one part o f the soul to 
those in another part, progressively leading to that part o f the soul which is rational. In 
this sense, education is exactly not about obtaining a body o f knowledge or acquiring a 
set of skills, although such possessions are secondary gains. Education is the way to 
inner transformation—and faith in such—that makes virtue possible and that effects a way 
o f being, or living, that is meaningful, worthwhile, imbued with value.
In the context o f these human desires, Plato explains the progress of education in 
this way through four stages: first, there are prisoners who see only shadows o f models 
o f things, the uneducated who are ruled by unessential appetites; next, where there is 
education in a craft o r in music, poetry, or physical training, some of these prisoners are 
freed from their chains to see the models o f things and to be possessed only by appetites
"Herein is Plato's faith, as frith directs itself toward care or concern that is 
ultimate.
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that are necessary; then, through education in math and science comes liberation from 
appetitive bonds and the authority o f spirited desires—the cave is left behind and, for the 
first time, things themselves are seen; finally, education in the dialectic and in the 
practical governance o f the city ushers in the rule o f the rational-achieved is the sight o f 
the good itsel£ and the greatest object o f study.
Further clarification is made o f four conditions of the soul, also progressive in
nature: imaging is the lowest condition o f the soul; belief follows as a level above
imaging; next proceeds that which is still greater, being thought; and finally, the highest
of all such conditions is understanding. Imaging and belief are along the order of
opinion, whereas thought and understanding are functions of the intellect. The source
of opinion's care is becoming, while the intellect's is being. Being is to becoming as
intellect is to opinion, as knowledge is to belief as thought is to imaging. Thus, we
have an outline for a general developmental schema o f the soul's journey upward, its
education, and evolution as fleshed out by Plato:
[VISIBLE] [INTELLIGIBLE]




It seems apparent that Plato privileges being over becoming;15 that the path to bliss and
“Perhaps, in this privileging lies the seeds o f repression, of violence against 
becoming, and thus o f subsequent pathology. Plato may in fret be interpreted here as 
one who devalues and denigrates imaging and belief, rather than highlighting them as 
fundamental to the development o f full-bodied thought and understanding—as prior to,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
112
thus the course o f education entails a certain betrayal o f the sensible, o f becoming, in the 
quest for the intelligible, for being. The implication is that the good cannot be seen in 
that which is coming into being, but only in being itself Yet perhaps, as Wilber (1995) 
posits, within the entirety of Plato's thought, the main thrust centers around the 
incompletion o f becoming, the need of diversity, of flux, to find its meaning, and its 
completion, in its relationship to being, to permanence, to the transcendent. For the 
enlightened, educated soul is charged with the responsibility to  return to the cave, with 
this larger, greater context, this higher sight, through which to view shadows and 
artifacts and models o f things in the cave; is summoned to participate in the creation of 
human life "worth living" by education's contemplative light, with the sight of the good 
that is brought home to the soul only through this journey o f examination.
Hence, we have this quest for being, a striving toward that which is, with the 
anticipation o f blessing. In such a quest, too, the one undertaking it is changed, 
transformed: the desire o f the soul—the soul itself—has been turned, moved. As the path 
to being, Wilber likens Plato's vision to those o f the contemplative traditions the world
foundational to and constitutive o f thought and understanding. The problems of 
modernity may be traced to this condemnation, in terms o f a loss o f the symbolic life so 
fundamental to thoughtful living, the removal o f the imagination and o f belief from the 
production o f knowledge, from what is taken for knowledge. Even Plato must use this 
image o f the cave and the human journey out o f it to the light o f the sun to impact the 
beliefs of, to evoke thought in, to promote understanding in his readers, his listeners.
We see faith, as well, figures prominently in this debate, as the great mediator o f 
becoming and being, of the historical and the eternal; as the state o f being ultimately 
concerned, faith engages also the whole person, serving an integrative function which 
takes up, frames and brings together images, beliefs, thoughts and understandings. 
Plato's faith o f reason and its explication here evidences this integration well, although 
perhaps its denial by him too.
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over: it is akin to the path traversed by the mystics—who have spanned the centuries, 
male and female, from every religion, culture and walk o f life. His is primarily a journey 
o f inner transcendence that achieves this "good” blessed vision and insight o f the Many 
encompassed in the One or All, and vice-versa.
O f course, few cast Plato in this light, and more, in feet, diametrically disagree 
with such a cast; certainly, Plato is not normally perceived or considered in this way; 
rather upon first hearing, it sounds ludicrous even to compare Plato to the mystics at all 
or the Platonic tradition to the mystical one. Indeed, should we continue further, 
fleshing out his own explication o f the cave metaphor, and the "curricular" and 
"methodological" implications he gleans from it, would we not be presented with this 
traditionally "narrow" path o f study marked out by reason as we know it? Not exactly. 
But it is not our aim here to map out all the details laid out by Plato, delineating from his 
cave allegory, regarding curriculum design, pedagogical methodology, etc., nor to make 
of Plato a mystic; rather, we seek to investigate broadly his foundational concept of 
education as the feith o f reason.
The disciplines o f study, the sequences and methods prescribed therein, are 
themselves beneficial, necessary, pursued, in the larger context which aims at moving the 
soul through reason to a  vision o f the good, and to a life empowered by such a vision.
We simply state that what Plato's exegesis does seem to evidence is the radical import 
and influence of historicity, o f particularity, o f the social and cultural conditions of 
existence, upon the concretization o f an image or narrative such as this, its application or 
perceived actualization in human life, in the actual education o f real individual souls, in
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both personal and public domains. For we even read the Republic as a whole and marvel 
at the conclusions to which Plato is drawn, or to which he has Socrates come—markedly 
different from those we should make given the same images, addressed with the same 
questions, even following the same general logic—in fret, we are appalled by many o f his 
proposals—such as, for example, separating the young for early educational inculcation, 
or the censorship o f stories, tragedies, poets, and storytellers.
What we take note o f here is his radical—and radically different from our ow n- 
portrait o f education. It is the education o f the soul, for one; and it is its transformative, 
transcendent ascent to the good, the true, the beautiful—to wisdom, to happiness, to a 
life o f meaning and worthwhile efficacy, to virtue. It is its spiritual journey, undertaken 
in and through frith—"from frith to frith" (The Holy Bible. 198S, Romans 1:17), as it is 
said, the faith o f reason as divine. For, says Plato (c.a. 380 b.c./l992), comparing reason 
to other virtues o f the soul: "The virtue o f reason seems to belong above all to 
something more divine, which never loses its pow er..." (p. 190-191).
It may be contested that Plato's notion o f "divine" is markedly different from the 
contemporary one handed down to us through Christianity—that, in fret, his notion is 
along the order o f mathematics, that Pythagorean divinity centered around numbers and 
geometric forms. Yet, such an argument does not hold when we look further at the 
specifics Plato lays out in regard to the study o f math and its place in the divine journey, 
and at his explicit teleology, the aim and end o f this quest. Plato neither questions the 
existence o f the gods, nor their divinity, nor the importance of the human need for a 
relationship to the divine, which is more than numerical if that. More importantly,
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though, we remind ourselves that the key pedagogical and curricular question for Plato is 
this: "What subject... draws the soul from the realm o f becoming to the realm of what 
is?” (p. 193). He identifies that which awakens understanding, in this way, as that which 
by sense perception brings to pass no sound result. Aporias, perhaps, or paradoxes, 
these he calls "summoners,” shooting off into opposite perceptions at the same tim e- 
like a thing that through the senses announces itself as x and as counter-x in one and the 
same moment. It is the mysterious, the puzzling, the inexplicable or incommensurate— 
the antinomy—which draws us, intrigues us, lures us, evokes inquiry which leads the soul 
to and upon this path of ascent. Again, one judges if a matter is worthy of study in this 
wise: the criteria consist in whether or not the study o f such matter shall move the soul 
to attend to being, rather than to becoming alone.
Math—i.e., the study of numbers, ratios, geometric forms—is counted worthy, 
then, as an object of study by Plato as that which directs the soul to truth because it 
concerns numbers, where one is able to see the same entity as both one and unlimited, 
whole and part, finite and infinite. The danger, he adds, is that calculation and the 
various mathematical functions can be practiced for the sake o f a trade alone; and if 
pursued not for the sake of knowing, the understanding is not compelled to enter into the 
pursuit o f truth. When pursued knowingly, however, this study can drive the soul's sight 
to things above, and promote the desired ascent to the invisible world. It is true that 
Plato has a certain obsession with numbers and ratios, directly attributable to a 
Pythagorean influence, yet probably more a result o f Plato's intense desire for stability, to 
define with certainty those concepts o f concern, at issue for him and his society, which
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seem to evade definition, like justice, beauty, etc. (Grube, in Plato, c.a. 380 b.c./1992)~ 
and numbers can give one this sense o f security and definitiveness. Indeed, the West is 
marked by this Platonic desire, indelibly ingrained in it, and much of its history has been 
guided and directed either consciously or unconsciously by this concentrated need.
However, is this Pythagorean study the aim, the end o f the divine journey? Is it 
the culmination and crown o f reason divine? Definitively, it is not. Plato vehemently 
concludes: "Don't you know that all these subjects [including those which are 
mathematical] are merely preludes to the song itself which must be learned?" (c.a. 380 
b.c./1992, p. 203). The song is that which dialectic sings, intelligible and echoed in the 
agency o f sight. As through sight one may apprehend the visible at its height in 
beholding the sun, "whenever someone tries through argument and apart from all sense 
perceptions to find the being itself o f each thing and doesn't give up until he grasps the 
good itself with understanding itself he reaches the end o f the intelligible" (p. 204). 
Dialectic is said to bring the soul to a peaceful abode, in a sense, to the end of 
journeying; for the soul has reached the end o f the journey, and its aim. In the language 
of faith, the soul has reached the ultimate; its ultimate concern has found intelligible 
realization.
Plato, of course, has developed this method he calls "dialectic" from the elenchus 
of Socrates, a procedure o f examination in which contradictions, inconsistencies in 
reasoning, are realized and rectified. And this search for sufficient definitions o f the 
concepts of things is pursued with nothing short o f moral transformation as its goal 
(Grube, in Plato, c.a. 380 b.c./1992). The habitual performance of such examination
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assists humanity in worthy living, promoting virtue and blessedness; it gifts the giver, 
and those with whom the giver shares this gift, with truth, beauty, and goodness.
Thus, the effect o f pedagogy, in the Platonic sense, is dramatic—concerning such 
things as beauty, truth and goodness. First, the soul must be set free—the shackles 
removed—and turned from the cave wall toward and brought into the light which shines 
through the opening o f the cave above. The aim and intent in education, then, is 
liberation, in fact—it comes to set the captives free. The process is described as a 
dizzying, dazzling, confusing experience. With it lies the temptation to turn back, to 
choose shadow over substance. When the eyes accustomed to shadows first meet light, 
they are blinded and still cannot yet see what is. It takes a while to get used to the light. 
But once this is accomplished, the vision—the view—is never the same. Curriculum as 
conversion? This portrait resonates noticeably with that one of the Christian experience 
of St. Paul, blinded by the light on the road to Damascus. Or in more contemporary 
terms, curriculum as paradigm shifting, perhaps. O f course, Plato precedes Christ—and 
Kuhn—in the chronology o f things. By any comparison, Plato's notion is pretty radical, 
in fact, and it is not as absurd as upon first consideration to see something of the mystic 
in him.
More to the point, Plato has a faith which abides: it is the faith o f reason, of 
philosophy, to effect such a profound and blessed transformation o f the human soul, and 
through such, o f the human community, as well. True philosophy is that ascent to what 
is, for Plato, and education, too, as the upward journey, and the hope o f reason, is true 
philosophy, the philosopher’s path. In the Phaedo (c.a. 395 b.c./1951), he fUrther
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describes philosophy as that vigil over death—being towards death, as it were, and care in 
such being. It includes that concern and that attempt to reconcile the seemingly 
irreconcilable: flux and permanence, the particular and the universal, the historical and 
the eternal, mortality and immortality, diversity and unity, becoming and being, being and 
nothingness, the Many and the One—in such a way that life may be lived fully, in contrast 
to the unexamined life which is little more than the life of the living dead. In this way, 
for Plato, reason—including education as reason's faith and the enactment o f that faith, 
directing one to a vision o f the form o f the good—is the ultimate, the object of ultimate 
care and concern, or is at least indelibly tied to the ultimate as the only path for 
apprehending such (i.e., the good, true and beautiful, etc.); thus, via education, the 
persistent hopeful quest for it, the search for its actualization. Plato's notion of reason is 
constitutive o f the transcendent function. And, o f course, it is, in fact, this whole nexus 
exactly within which faith is said to operate.
Now at this point—according to Plato in the unpacking o f his own image, the 
saved cave-prisoner, of course, cannot go back to the cave. He sees the world in 
altogether different terms. He cannot see as once he did. In fact, he pities those whose 
eyes chase after shadows as though they were the substance o f tangible things. If he 
were to return to the cave, he would be ridiculed for his poor eyesight. Shadows no 
longer signify the real or ultimate to him. In Plato's allegory, he explains that a soul 
having seen the light and returned to the darkness of the cave would rather be as Homer 
choosing serfdom over the opinions o f dark imprisoned souls; he quotes here, in fact, 
from the Odyssey (c.a. 1000-850 b.c./1980), echoing the words spoken by Achilles'
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ghost-shadow to Odysseus during his visitation in Hades (Grube, in Plato, c.a. 380 
b.c./l992, p. 189, ftn.). In this sense, likening the cave inhabitants to the dead—the living 
dead, Plato is making the claim that education brings life to the otherwise lifeless, dead— 
the uneducated. And here we have another image which coincides strongly with the 
Christian one o f regeneration—an image found, o f course, in mystical traditions o f all 
varieties. Reason is divine.
Thus, the soul proceeding in its education, in due time, looks happily upon the 
sun itself rather than just its rays reflected upon the water, and the light of reason has 
dawned. Herein, in Plato's description of education, is presented most clearly the schema 
for an "Enlightenment." Within some schools of thought, Plato's cave metaphor should 
be seen as indeed descriptive o f the upward journey humankind has taken historically, 
and not just literally (beginning as "cavemen," etc.). The discovery of the rational part of 
man, it would be claimed in this case, marks the birth o f reason and ushers in the age o f 
Enlightenment. Clearly, the age o f the Enlightenment is characterized most frequently 
and faithfully as the age o f reason, or perhaps more directly as the craze of reason, and a 
neo-classicist revival—although obviously inclusive therein is a neo-reason, and hardly 
exactly the reason o f Plato. The phrase we have taken up, "the faith of reason," has in 
fact been previously taken up by Charles Frankel (1948) in a book of that name on 
Enlightenment thought and the idea of progress foundational to it and to the present 
legacy of reason's faith. Frankel points out that while such a faith is construed by 
contemporaries to be a mistaken one, it involves "a complex and uneasy combination o f 
beliefs" (p. 2) which needs careful examining, especially as the predecessor of our liberal
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faith, "the idea o f human improvement through the use o f organized intelligence... 
central to liberal philosophies" (p. 4). Thus, we move now from the frith o f Plato, and 
his reason, to the archeology of its significance in the development o f Western 
Civilization: a  basic and broad exploration into the structures built upon this foundation 
as well as the rents and cracks, the unleveling and sinking effects rendered upon it. Our 
inquiry concerns the enduring presence o f the Platonic vision, the historical operation of 
the frith o f reason, whether manifested via its alteration, denial, repression, inversion or 
aggrandizement.
n .
Clearly, the Enlightenment represents a most visible high point in the history of 
this vision in the West (at least seemingly so)—though some 2000 years since its 
inception—as the advocate and beacon o f reason, reason's cultural triumph and pinnacle. 
Thus, its obvious import in this archeology. Yet, just as certainly by this time, something 
has already happened to reason and to the journey of the soul indelibly tied to it, to the 
faith o f reason—things are neither as they once were, nor rarely as they seem. It is 
necessary to remember that in early Greek thought, the Kosmos is one (comprised of all 
domains—physiosphere, biosphere, noosphere, and theosphere); all o f its different 
aspects constitute an interrelated and unbroken expression o f Spirit, all essential and 
intrinsically valuable. Extant is this great chain of being and this journey from matter to 
life to mind to soul, and then to spirit, telos and summit. Wilber (1995) claims, in fact, 
that this view o f the world persists in some form until the close o f the nineteenth century. 
For Plato, then, reason is the way of human access to spirit: "To be rational [means]
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attunement with the Kosmos" (p. 399). The heart o f the Platonic quest in which reason 
is central is this knowledge o f the One, the good, that beyond being, Spirit.16 Such 
involves two reciprocal and continuous movements: the ascent from the Many to the 
One, the intelligible realm, transcendent spirit; and the descent from the One to the 
Many, the visible realm, immanent spirit. The first involves the contemplation o f the 
good, the second, participation in the world's goodness.
“Reason, in Greek—logos, is divine. Martin Heidegger (1927/1962) suggests 
that, for Plato, logos signifies discourse primarily—constitutive o f the term "dialectic’’ as 
well, the meaning o f which is obscured historically, however, through numerous 
translations. The logos involves a making manifest in discourse, it is an expression 
which allows something to be seen, in a sense by pointing it out, in its "togetherness."
Its relationship to truth, then, is found in terms o f discovery, o f manifestation, in which 
something is revealed, is taken out of hiding. In its function o f letting things be 
perceived, it signifies reason. It has the character o f speech, of utterance—an active, 
living efficacy. Divine reason speaks things into being.
Logos is generally translated as reason, judgment, concept, definition, ground, 
relationship, reckoning, account, and also as utterance, discourse or speech, mind. In 
this sense, it is inward thought itselfj the embodiment o f a concept or idea, the revelation 
of a message (uttered or expressed), generally construed as divine: thus, the cause or 
ground, divine expression, the Divine itself—God (Oxford English Dictionary. Vol. XIII, 
1989; Strong's Exhaustive Concordance o f the Bible: Dictionaries o f the Hebrew and 
Greek Words, nd.: Vine's expository dictionary. n.d.l. For Heraclitus, the logos 
controls the pattern o f the Kosmos; as the principle o f order in the universe, it not only 
determines pattern in the physical world, but also in the world of events, imbuing all with 
purposiveness. The logos is the source of all human thought, recognition o f truth, and 
moral judgment. It is this sense o f order which fascinates the Greeks, especially the 
Stoics, and Plato as well, and thus, a devotion to reason. Such is the power which puts 
coherence and meaning into the world; it speaks it into being, puts it into motion, keeps 
it growing and going. Reason, from this Greek perspective, pervades all things: the 
thought o f God branded on the Kosmos; through it, the worlds are made, and all things 
therein bear its stamp. Reason is the great mediator between God and the world, 
between the divine and the human, between the intelligible and sensible realms (Barclay, 
1955). William Barclay (19SS) calls it the priest which brings the soul before God, the 
manifestation o f the creating, guiding, directing power o f the divine.
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While it is true that in Plato's cave allegory he emphasizes the movement of 
ascension and disapproves o f humanity dwelling solely and persistently in the "cave" of 
the world's manyness, in his explication o f the image he affirms the necessity of 
descension, an enduring response o f the one who has made the journey upward. In fact, 
while the father o f the "Ideal realm," Plato likewise is said to have possessed an 
"exuberant kind o f this-worldliness" (Lovejoy, 1936/1964, p. 45); Arthur Lovejoy 
claims that for Plato, "the shadows were as needful to  the Sun as the Sun to the 
shadows; their existence was the very consummation o f its perfection" (p. 53). In the 
Timaeus (c.a. 360 b.c./1965), Plato speaks o f the Kosmos as a visible sensible God, 
spirit-infused—all matter, life, and consciousness. Wilber (1995) calls Plato's journey a 
great circle—which we note is a symbol o f wholeness and eternity, and the way o f faith— 
in which the upward path and the descending return find communion; the injunction is: 
"Flee the many, embrace the one; having found the one, embrace the many as one” (p. 
326). In a concrete way, the importance o f this injunction is seen in Plato's intense 
concern over establishing the ideal city, the "republic," and his emphasis o f the 
responsibility upon philosophers—those having undertaken the upward path—to return to 
city life and serve the people. But the West, it appears, has not heard the injunction 
aright, or only part o f it. More appropriately then, the Western tradition, in this way, is 
comprised o f "fractured" footnotes to Plato (p. 320). Thus, early on, reason as well—the 
reason o f Plato—is alternatively construed, or misconstrued, perhaps.
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This two-directional or "circular” nature o f the soul's journey, o f humanity's 
education, seems to undergo a kind of splintering17 as early as with the thought and
l7Admittedly, I am here attempting a very broad, impressionistic presentation o f 
human history in the West, specifically with regard to humankind's ontological stance 
toward the journey which is life, and tendency toward "splintering"--privileging the one, 
the universal, ascent fit the many, the particular, descent. In this way, I am, o f course, 
guilty o f a good deal o f over-generalization, although such a crime seems inescapable 
given my present aim, the nature o f the task I am seeking to undertake. Theorizing, at a 
certain level, requires over-generalization—desirable, as well, for a glimpse of a larger 
view, particularly when one is addressing cosmological and ontological concerns. For 
example, it is as important to be aware of and take in the forest as it is to study and 
examine the trees, and the bark (of the trees) finds its meaning, or at least a greater or 
more expanded meaning, as viewed within the larger horizon and contextualized 
landscape of the forest.
This is not to ignore, undermine or discount the legitimate criticisms made 
against the problem o f theory, particularly against its tendency toward abstraction and 
discourse that is universalizing and totalizing, hi this way, clearly, in and of itself such 
discourse runs the risk of violence—silencing, excluding, erasing the multiplicity of 
diverse voices, perspectives, the reality of particularity and difference. Herein, unwilling 
to run such a risk, I would like to say from the outset that the following historical 
presentation is merely an attempt at an overview of a particular line of dominant thought 
in the West which seeks to evidence this "splintering" tendency. In this sense, it lacks 
the subtlety and complexity required of a fUll-bodied, in-depth historical study or 
investigation o f these time periods, which given the aim and scope of this work I have 
been unable to undertake here. The view set forth is undoubtedly like a view o f the 
forest, though not in an attempt to undermine the importance o f looking further at 
individual trees and the barks o f those trees to supplement o r challenge that view. 
However, today, with attention directed, understandably (as I think the following 
presentation will show), so singularly at difference and at the voices and views of 
particular peoples and cultures not represented or heard in the main, the problem seems, 
to me, to be more along the order of missing the forest for the trees, or the tendency to 
discount the legitimacy o f the forest altogether.
In addition, it is important to differentiate between the thought of influential 
individuals, and their thought as inherited, taken up and propagated by mainstream 
culture and by subsequent generations. Plato is not equal to Platonism, nor Aristotle to 
Aristotleanism, nor Marx to Marxism. Neither is the complexity of medieval thought 
equal to medievalism, o f Christianity to Christendom, of modernity to modernism. I am 
here focusing on something of the "isms” which have dominated, the prevailing effects o f 
ideas as reduced and assimilated culturally, their social sedimentations and presentations 
(or "conventionalizations”). Such is not to deny the margins o f culture, nor the voices o f 
dissent and resistance ever present in every age, though I do not deal with them here.
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impact o f Aristotle, Plato's student. Ironically, while Aristotle is traditionally taken as 
the "this-worldly" philosopher in contrast to Plato, his Divine—in which we have seen 
Reason plays a key role—turns to represent a kind o f Pure Ascension, Transcendence; 
god becomes primarily altogether other-worldly. The two paths taken separately are 
contradictory—antagonists, opposing directions and journeys. It becomes a matter o f 
choosing the world or losing the world-rejecting it. After Aristotle, then, the 
upwardness o f the journey takes precedence. Moreover, with the subsequent reign o f an 
official Christianity, influenced by Aristotle, the split is decisive and esteemed is the path 
o f ascent only (Wilber, 1995). This world, the body, the senses are denigrated, despised, 
declared evil. The church's legacy and lineage becomes repression, asceticism; the 
violent and dogmatic rule and domination o f Ascension, o f the mind, o f the One as 
construed by the Church, at the expense o f and in abnegation of the Many, o f the body, 
of the import o f Descension. Pathological Ascent.
Since I am relying heavily on the work of Kenneth Wilber (1995) in this regard, who has 
been accused of reporting a caricature history o f the West, I have felt the need to 
comment on these things. My construction, as with Wilber's, is but one story about the 
development o f thought in the West, specifically concerned with the notion o f the 
universal therein, as well as an attempt at a generalized cosmological and ontological 
story of the West—fully aware that "the West" itself is no simple, well-defined, unified, 
unchanging, non-contradictory construct. Obviously, no one story or interpretation o f 
history can claim to be truly representative o f reality, and to profess a full and genuine 
understanding o f any historical time frame is to make a false profession (Munro, 1996). 
The problem o f history—its "appearance of unity, o f coherence, of order, [which] is 
predicated ... on the suppression o f contradictory stories,... this silencing" (p. 3); its 
need for origins and ends; and its affection for simple linearity—is the problem, too, o f 
human understanding, constituted by narrative selectivity and unity, and in the search for 
intelligibility.
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Interestingly enough, however, the ascent promoted by the Church as 
establishment is not only severed from any return or descent, and in fact privileged over 
against descent, but also this ascent is ironically truncated, thwarted, controlled, cut off. 
The seeds are sown for dualism to prevail: body versus mind versus spirit, nature versus 
culture, human versus divine. This god threatens becoming absolutely separate from this 
world. Wilber calls this god "the unearthly trinity" who, ironically and tragically, is 
denied the status o f the truly transcendent, in fact, but is rather made in the image of the 
establishment: anthropocentric, geocentric, egocentric to the core. As the achievement 
of reason at its core is antithetical to such an image,18 perhaps what occurs is the actual 
denial of reason, in the name o f reason, and the relentless prevention o f its actualization
"From a developmental perspective o f the human individual, as well as of 
humanity at large (like those o f Kenneth Wilber, Jurgen Habermas and Jean Piaget, for 
example), reason is seen as an advance, a higher form of thought, over archaic, magical 
or mythical thought—or sensorimotor, preoperational or concrete-operational function. 
Reason represents, in its best manifestation, a transcendence o f the physiosphere and 
biosphere into the realm o f the noosphere, o f mind. True transcendence, it should be 
noted, does not involve the repression or denial o f these more fundamental spheres but 
their negation and embrace in the more significant sphere of the mind, in which we might 
also include spirit. Even those who eschew developmental notions o f the person and of 
the history of humanity seem to retain something o f this structure in their discourse. 
Reason, for example, correlates with Jacques Derrida's (1992/1995) discussion of the 
birth o f the human subject, marked by this movement toward interiority, and o f 
responsibility as the defining element in history, as well as with Paul Ricoeur's 
(1969/1974) look at the emergence o f atheism, its critique o f outward form, 
unacknowledged desire, and thoughtless practice and belief (see Chapter 1). Kenneth 
Wilber (1995) identifies reason with the possession o f "a new interiority to transcend and 
operate on the rules o f thought themselves ..., bring[ing] with it a new world o f feelings, 
o f dreams, of wild passions and idealistic strivings. It is true that rationality introduces a 
new and more abstract understanding ..., b u t... quite secondary to the primary and 
defining mark of reason: reason is a space o f possibilities, possibilities not tied to the 
obvious, the given, the mundane, the profane,... the beginning o f the invisible worlds..." 
(p. 231, emphasis in original).
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culturally. At any rate, full transcendence and ascension (in the Platonic sense) is 
deemed heresy; the upward journey o f the Christ is forbidden to others, the path 
anathema: transcendental reduction, limited ascent under the sole/soul direction o f the 
Church. Moreover, the powers that be ferociously and vehemently come against those 
who seek the upward path without such imposed limitations; they are mystics or 
profanes, whether secular or religious, who blasphemously pull God down from his 
throne, or strive pridefolly to reach up to that sacred place themselves, tainting the divine 
with their impure touch; they must be extinguished. Many are burned at the stake, in 
fact. Reason ripped of reason, truncated— unreasonable reason, if that. Therefore, 
instead of the ascent to the Light o f the Sun, the Dark Ages.
It is at least by this point that "the West was locked into a perpetually frustrated 
Ascendant yearning—a yearning for a Goal that would never be officially allowed" (p. 
335). The "desperate free," Janus-like, o f the West, as we know it, finds the source of 
its present countenance and incessant spiritual hunger, perhaps, here exactly. This 
hunger never fulfilled, the blessedness sought in this journey constantly denied, it is not 
long before the faith of it, already altered, is further changed, denied altogether even, and 
the path itself despised. O f course, this is not to say that reason itself is denigrated—it is 
simply not what it was and is becoming progressively other than it was. In fact, reason is 
again lauded, yet it has no consciousness o f its own faith, or only a faint one. Incessant 
debate has threatened the complete separation of reason from faith, and the overthrow of 
faith—faith, o f course, as defined by the Church to control thought and silence the voice 
o f rational criticism. The path o f ascent, via the Church, is delegitimated, has been given
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I l l
a bad name, and faith with it in some measure. With the Renaissance and the 
accompanying rise o f science, the call o f reason is again taken in hand, the journey as 
prescribed by religion rejected or undermined, and a new course drawn up—and with it, a 
reversal, a new direction: the journey of Descent (Wilber, 1995). Reason released and 
yet redirected, and the faith o f it lost in the shuffle, and redirected as well.
Wilber identifies the initial shift o f emphasis from ascent or transcendence to 
world descent and immanence with the Renaissance and the science of the Renaissance. 
The center o f interest turns around "the great plenitude;" it is now "this" world which 
has preeminence, the other world out of fashion after the long disquiet—failed attempts 
to apprehend it. The domination of ascent is zealously broken, one stunted reason 
replaced with another; one insufficient god conquered by another; frith underground 
yet likewise re-routed. Renaissance science seeks still the laws of God, but the logos or 
reason of this descending god—creative, effluxing. Again, only a part of Plato has been 
taken up: in this case, his doctrine of plentitude. These ideas of Plato predating the 
establishment o f scientific evidence for their support are the aprioris substantiated in the 
research program o f the Renaissance. Nature consists in this great chain of being, the 
task of science being to uncover the missing links. The encyclopedia is bom here as 
well, classifying, organizing, putting together the pieces to gain a comprehensive view of 
the world. This world is not just the many, but now also the one. The quest gathers 
around solely that which can be seen, the exteriors. The rise o f science contributes to 
these changes: crude instruments, though partial, purport to reveal all the world. Wilber 
calls it the flatland or collapsed cosmos, also and better known as the mechanistic
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worldview. In addition, the second law o f thermodynamics adds to such deterministic 
thinking, and the thinking o f descent—the order o f the universe, rather its disorder, or the 
universe in decline.
Yet, with Darwin, evolution, and the developmental conception o f the biosphere, 
the split that has already occurred is brought clearly into view, even within the empirical 
sciences dedicated to the external world alone. The "mechanical" physiosphere is 
winding down while the organic biosphere is winding up. Incommensurable descent and 
ascent. The Kosmos is now the cosmos, neither spirit-infused nor exactly whole: matter 
dead, mind disembodied. Radical efforts are offered to try to restore the Kosmos: 
materialism considers the idea that all is matter, phenomenalism suggests that all is mind. 
Eventually, however, the natural sciences are separated from the human sciences, natural 
philosophy from moral philosophy, and the biological sciences are caught between the 
two poles (Wilber, 1995). Things are not as they once were, the path is forked, if still a 
path, and even the journey o f descent is not as secure as it at first seemed. Reason's faith 
is tom, its aim perhaps conflicted.
Yet still, reason marches on—and underneath, the "everlasting" arms of faith.
Akin to Derrida's (1992/1995) look at history as responsibility, a human evolution o f 
increasing interiorization, the crux o f which he locates in Christianity (see Chapter 1), 
Wilber (1995), among others, has considered the history o f the very Kosmos as 
evolutionary movement toward greater depth or interiority. Human consciousness is 
construed in this way as the manifestation o f the Kosmos conscious of itself. Reason, as 
well, plays a key role in this inward turn. Even in its apparent perverse manifestation in
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the West, interiorization seems to utter a particular kind o f wisdom—the wisdom o f the 
ancients speaking across time and culture, in fact, whom Wilber describes as "figures o f 
the future,” rather than primarily o f the past, prophets o f human possibility. In 
concurrence with Derrida's thought, Paul Tillich (1967) has identified Augustine, a 
Christian father, as a central spokesman for the West, its rendering o f the soul's journey— 
the message: Go within to get beyond. Within is ascent; depth is ascent, which ought 
to take the soul beyond to include a descending embrace.
Both Wilber (1995) and Habermas (1976/1979) identify the emergence of this 
greater human interiority with the time o f Plato, the "Golden Age o f Greece." A 
movement o f the soul from a dominant role identity to the beginnings of an ego identity 
corresponds with this emergence, and with the human "birth" o f reason. However, both 
scholars, as well, see reason, this ego identity, the manifestation of the noosphere, 
reaching cultural fruition in the sixteenth century. Also, with the emergence o f the ego 
identity comes the accomplishment, in evolutionary terms, o f the differentiation of the 
Kosmos: physiosphere, biosphere, and noosphere, at least. Development is seen 
likewise as envelopment, proceeding from the most fundamental to the most significant; 
thus, to move powerfully into noospheric awareness is movement upward. In this sense 
then, the upward path, the journey o f ascent, the telos of transcendence, in some 
measure prevails despite the people o f the West, their historical vengeance against it.
Yet with greater advance, and thus also complexity, lies the potential for greater 
pathology as well. Differentiation is distinguishable from dissociation or alienation, and 
the call of integration ceaselessly follows upon it. And of course, there is, in the West,
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already this truncation, this stunted growth, this splitting—the presence o f pathology. 
Reason, faith, humankind, is not what it could be. Yet it is interesting to note that in the 
sixteenth century, for the first time, reason in the name o f faith is asserted against the 
unjust, unreasonable domination o f the Church. The Reformation claims for the 
individual the ownership o f this upward journey, the mind to read, interpret and 
understand for oneself the divine as expressed in the Scriptures. Still, the splits remain, 
grow and perpetuate; historically, it seems, faith is heard for the last time in relation to 
reason, and that only peripherally. For faith has already been identified with pure ascent: 
that evil, oppressive and controlled sojourn against reason, against the pursuit of 
knowledge, against humanity itself. Nevertheless, the faith o f reason is bolstered in this 
historical moment, and with it, if only indirectly, the path o f ascent.
Thus, accompanying the Enlightenment, is this resurgence o f human agency and 
enthusiasm and passion for reason; with the bold confirmation o f the descending 
journey, taken as the whole journey o f reason and the antagonist o f the upward 
pilgrimage, the quest o f ascent is likewise unwittingly reinvigorated, "ever-ascending 
yearnings for the light" renewed (Wilber, 1995, p. 323). The journey rewritten— 
transcendence simultaneously incorporated, denied and translated—becomes the quest for 
progress, the sojourn forward. The solution of the "infinite ahead" as aim seems to 
answer the frustration and feebleness, the disheartening dissatisfaction and divisiveness 
felt in both the purely ascending and descending paths. Wilber claims that in the 
Enlightenment creed of progress, the intuition o f the infinite is displaced onto the horizon 
o f a temporal and disturbed and unquenchable hunger for this material world—infinite
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yearning denying the infinite. In religious terms, Enlightenment faith is idolatrous faith, 
attempting to make ultimate that which never can be so.
The eye o f reason's faith is strong and yet strongly directed toward that alone 
which can be seen. Ironically, then, the faith and the reason which thrive constitute the 
bare bones of each, in fact, denying their own ground and essence. For reason and faith 
by nature concur on at least one point with the "divine” intuitions purported in other 
traditions centered in God, the Tao, etc., which is that things are not as they at first 
seem; that the cosmos is much more than what the naked eye beholds or the senses 
perceive; that beneath the visible world in all its diverse singularities lies some deeper 
order (Wilber, 1995), some unifying pattern. By faith, the invisible is beheld; the eternal 
is held within the temporal, the infinite within the finite; reason, likewise, is the gateway 
to the unseen, the universal, the realm of multiple possibilities beyond the given and the 
apprehension of their interrelationships. However, in the Enlightenment, the zealous 
pursuit o f reason is the pursuit o f a reason, in betrayal o f its nature, that regards exteriors 
only. Its faith rests in gaining this world alone, minus its interiors. The reason affirmed 
is monological reason, the ascension esteemed merely progress forward in the 
descending path o f studying the visible world. For, it is this world alone which is real, 
and reason which is real is that which obtains this world through empirical science.
Wilber (1995), arguing for reason as a legitimate advance from mythic thought 
that is literal and egocentric, summarizes the Enlightenment in this way: "The necessary 
collective evolution from mythic to rational was the Enlightenment's great achievement; 
the unnecessary collapse o f the Kosmos to the holistic flatland was its great and enduring
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crime" (p. 344). The surface, the interlocking order o f exteriors, is taken for the whole 
world. Differentiation, thus, though having been realized, has pushed itself to excess; it 
has become dissociation: the interior split off from the exterior, likewise, the individual, 
the singular, the organism, being, split off from the communal, the plural, the inter- 
relational, the environment, being-with in the world. Existing uncomfortably, even 
antagonistically, together—though more predominantly apart—are the mind and the body, 
culture and nature. The Enlightenment advance indicates a strange and mutated 
transcendence, in one sense gone too far, into repression—denying nature and the body 
(both physiosphere and biosphere), rather than enveloping them in a higher embrace 
(negation without preservation); in another sense not gone far enough, into regression- 
cutting off access to transcendence, having denied also depth and interiority and 
qualitative distinction. The charge is not merely against the "gross" reductionism of 
thought that is atomistic, individualistic, or behavioristic; but also the "subtle" 
reductionism of thought that is holistic, functionalistic, structuralistic, systemic, 
instrumental. In either case, the "inside" of the universe is dismissed; attended to is the 
material alone. Yet still, the atomists and the holists battle it out over their "cardboard 
cosmos" (Wilber, 1995); they war over its most fundamental aspects, and disqualify its 
most significant ones. Brought to fore in the Enlightenment is the perplexing problem of 
a subject who can describe an objective world but cannot account for himself or herself, 
who has little to say about the consciousness which, in fact, does the describing and 
which can render accounts (of the world). As Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960/1992) puts 
it, with its "prejudice against prejudice," Enlightenment thought can neither
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acknowledge its faith nor its inner ground—reason working against reason, which is also 
reason working against humanity, and ultimately against all the world.
The Enlightenment inheritance is a  profoundly paradoxical reason, identified by 
some scholars with "the dialectic of progress" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944/1972); its 
world holism makes for the atomistic self. Humanity, via this reason, is left with a 
"disengaged ego dangling" in "self-autonomous agency," who can't find its place in a 
tight-knit closed system o f interlocking objects, an empirical and objective world 
(Wilber, 199S). The subject separate from the object and the objectified world in which 
he or she lives, and the external world taken for the whole—even ever so subtly through 
"holistic" world perspectives regarding structures and functions and systems, not only is 
the Kosmos itself under palatial erasure, but also the subject itself—erasing itself in fact, 
and this via reason, and the force of reason's faith. By denying the unseen, by 
approaching all things through objective empiricism, by construing objects o f awareness 
instrumentally as merely parts o f the whole; this stunted, monological, contradictory 
reason reigns, in the service o f what has been in retrospect called a "dehumanizing 
humanism."19 Such reason compels the subject to become object, the all objectified, and 
as value and meaning are functions of the internal world, o f depths not acknowledged, 
they too begin to lose hold, to pass away.
’’Richard Bernstein (1991b), in "The Rage Against Reason," lays out the thought 
of Max Weber, Theodor Adorno and Martin Heidegger—thinkers he identifies as central 
to the critique o f reason—with regard to this historical development whereby the West is 
left with a humanism that is ironically and tragically dehumanizing He indicts Heidegger 
especially for a view devoid o f redemptive possibility: humanism, freedom, and the like 
are farces only. Bernstein, however, seeks to redeem reason, and a humanism which 
might humanize.
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By the close o f the eighteenth century, then, the dominance and increase o f this 
rationality, accompanied ever by a loss o f significance, works to firmly establish world 
dissociation and human alienation, the tension building between the human subject and 
the world object. In addition, extensive growth in humanity's knowledge o f the external 
world via science serves to further overwhelm and undermine the interior world, and 
heighten this tension (Wilber, 1995). The reason, then, that brings the West to the 
modern age—though with all its promising advantages and genuine achievements—is 
evidently problematic, climaxing in this fundamental agonizing enigma concerning 
subjectivity and objectivity, the human subject's place in and relationship to the world, 
including its relationship to the world o f other human subjects and human communities. 
Rather than the realization o f Plato's ideal city, forerunner historically o f a plethora of 
social utopian visions never actualized, reason has indeed brought humanity it seems to 
eviction from the garden, from Eden as such—ontological homelessness; and to enmity 
with each other, the earth, the divine, and oneself as well. In the words o f Martin 
Heidegger "How far [modem] man [sic] is from being at home in his own essence ..." 
(1953/1959, p. 156). Effected is what Augustine (c.a. 398 a.d./1982), in feet, calls evil: 
the journey taken brings humanity to a within that is withdrawn, rather than a within that 
transcends and moves beyond (Wilber, 1995); for evil is reflexivity enclosed in on itself 
(Taylor, 1989, p. 139). And we are reminded again of the tree o f knowledge—o f good 
and of evil, but sadly evil mostly; the good seems to ever elude us.
Lost, then, somehow is the good and true and beautiful aspired to by Plato, those 
aspirations once indelibly tied to the feith o f reason. Truth, in a sense, becomes the only
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valid measure by which to judge things in a world reduced to the "Big It" (Wilber, 1995), 
the objective visible realm; o f course, truth, as well, is other than it was, as defined by 
this truncated reason apprehending this truncated world; and itself becomes a major 
problem in the issue o f reconciling subjectivity and objectivity, humanity with all the 
world. Wilber utilizes his concept o f the "Big Three" to highlight the distortions o f 
modernity and~we might add—its distorted reason and perverse, pervert-ed faith. First, 
objective, interobjective truth, Plato's sense of the true, corresponds to both the 
individual, behavioral, organistic and social, structural, functional, environmental aspects 
of the external world—Wilber's "Big it" and the primary realm and "truth" acknowledged 
and legitimated in the modern paradigm; second, the good connotes rightness, justness, 
mutual understanding, in the intersubjective, internal cultural realm, the "We"; third and 
finally, the beautiful is discerned internally as well, though subjectively in terms of 
intention, truthfulness and sincerity centered in the individual, the "I.” Wilber finds his 
schema o f three differentiated realms, each with their own claims to reasonable (reason­
able) knowledge and validity, analogous not only to those o f Plato but also of Popper, 
Habermas, and Kant.20 Obviously, ideas regarding what constitutes the good, the true,
“Plato's major issues are with the true (concerning objective truth), the beautiful 
(concerning the personal-aesthetic) and the good (concerning cultural justice). Popper 
speaks of three worlds: World I (inclusive o f the objective "It"), World II (inclusive of 
the subjective "I"), and World HI (inclusive of the cultural world of "We," including, 
embedded in, material social institutions and systems). Habermas discusses three 
different criteria for validity: truth (regarding objects), truthfulness/sincerity (regarding 
subjects), and rightness/justness (regarding intersubjectivity). Wilber (1995) likewise 
claims that his three realms correspond in some measure to the critiques of Kant: o f 
pure reason, o f practical reason and of aesthetic judgement.
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and the beautiful evolve together and in regard to each other, in this sense the "Big 
Three" are integrally related: behavior affects intention, structure affects meaning, 
cultural notions o f life rely upon existing social bonds and practices, conceptions of the 
self and its narrative forms—and vice-versa. Yet, at his point, the good and the true and 
the beautiful, and judgements concerning them, whether repressed, split, dissociated or 
delegitimated, have collapsed in a sense—M en to the monological truth o f 
representation. The good, true and beautiful are subjected to the criterion o f truth as 
defined by the "Big It."
"Modernity as it actually unfolded (and still unfolds) was (and is) heavily 
weighted toward the knowing and manipulation of the first world [the it-world, external, 
objective and inter-objective realms], o f a 'disenchanted' and objectified world dominated 
by an 'instrumental' or 'technical' rationality (Berman, Habermas, Heidegger,
Horkheimer, Marcuse, Merchant, MacIntyre)" (p. 417). Moreover, the substance of the 
internal world of the I and the We is increasingly subjected to arrangement as afforded 
by the system o f empirical science and this calculative reason. Reason no longer aspires 
to attunement with the Kosmos; reason, and its advocate truth, has become simply the 
methodology o f mapping out the cosmos. Likewise, behavioral fitness is emphasized 
over personal meaning, and social integration or the smooth operation o f the system over 
cultural values and understanding.
Herein truly is blind faith, and misdirected. Only that which can be seen is 
legitimated, the unseen depths needing interpretation forsaken: humanity's self-betrayal- 
faith's and reason's as well. As Foucault has said o f modem thought: "If it couldn't be
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laid out on a flat table o f representation, then it didnt exist" (p. 420). Of course, the 
consciousness doing the representing cannot itself be accounted for within this frame— 
the table's inner drawer whose existence is objectively inexplicable. Even with the 
monological world o f a monological reason's construction, a great divide, a rift and split, 
persists. And while the modem project is primarily one o f descent via reason exploring 
the material world, the path o f distorted ascent endures as well, translated into the path 
forward and ahead, the creed o f progress. The West, then, is saddled still with two gods 
(Wilber, 1995), in fact, both wanting. These gods basically purport incommensurable 
and antagonistic worldviews, embodying different ideas o f what constitutes the good life 
and humanity's ultimate aim and end, different values and corresponding behaviors and 
lifestyles, and contrary notions about what it even means to be human. The modem god 
is a "schizoid god," irreconcilable forces whose "secret marriage remains secret" (p.
363)—each vying for humanity’s soul. Full ascent is denied, and full descent is lost, all in 
the name of reason, and its newborn child, progress.
Even after the "death” o f this god as such (primarily the god of ascent), in 
modem times, the tensions and rifts find no real reconciliation—the aftermath consisting 
of a period, whether slowly or rapidly, waxing worse. The death, in fact, might only 
signify the recognition of the splits and tensions, only the very beginnings of a realization 
that it is not well with the soul o f humanity, also possibly with its beloved and central 
reason, only unfortunately perhaps signaling a desperate and reinvigorated denial which 
actually perpetuates and reinforces the split, inferior reason and inferior faith. In some 
instances, reason is lauded against the ascending god; in other cases, reason is seen as
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being operative with the enemy. As Martin Heidegger (1952/1977b) has put it, for 
example: "Thinking begins only when we have come to know that reason, glorified for 
centuries, is the most stiff-necked adversary o f thought" (p 112). Thus, from then till 
now: mounting stress, mounting conflict, mounting confusion. It is "the agony o f 
modernity," two warring poles, both right and both wrong: The "ego camp" 
(representative o f wayward ascent) radicalizes the ego—the noosphere, the human 
individual and mind. In this instance, spirit is relegated to this alone, an absolute subject; 
the "eco camp" radicalizes the eco-sphere—biosphere, physiosphere, environment 
(representative o f contrary descent). Spirit is consigned to this realm only, an absolute 
object (Wilber, 1995).
Of course, historically, the progressive force o f the ego has proved strongest, 
thus most visible, including its negative impact on the cosmos and upon the psyche in 
hyper-ego alienation. The claims of the eco camp, then, are partially a reaction and 
response to the excesses o f the ego, but the solution offered is partial, and bears as well, 
if only unconsciously, the Enlightenment negation of the internal domains o f the cosmos. 
Rightly attacking the Enlightenment heritage o f infinite and unbridled progress, its anti­
traditionalism, and its hyper-individualism, eco-advocates conceive of regression as the 
only alternative, and the path o f wisdom. Differentiation is taken in all cases to be 
dissociation—and transcendence, repression. Reason slides into disrepute; for it would 
seem that it is responsible, that it is reason alone, in fact, which has brought us to where 
we are; and this place is obviously wanting, actually terrifying and outright shameful in 
its global presentation. The ego camp, aware o f these problems, still cannot concede to
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the dissolution o f noosphere into biosphere, the eco camp actually utilizing egoic 
advantage to denigrate the egoic.
Post-modern thought makes attempts at some form o f reconciliation, integration, 
or at least aporetic resolution, if only in ambiguity or paradox, and the revival or retrieval 
of slighted inner realms; but, in many cases, reason is still seen therein as the ultimate 
culprit-like before, the faith construed by the powers that be, the church, once was; 
reason is taken to be what Westernism, scientism, materialism, capitalism, an idolatrous 
faith, has made it. Remaining opposition to any kind of ascension, and residual 
promotion of a kind of creed o f progress, is evidenced perhaps, if only tacitly, in the self­
reference and identification o f current philosophies: they are post-modern, post- 
structural, post-colonial—always "post" and never "trans."
The fetish o f the West for reason thus taken leads it into compulsive, incessant 
and often violent argument over dualities: ego-agency versus eco-community, reified 
subjects against objects as equally absolutized—and historical, astronomical violence. 
And/Or into existential angst and despair and a sharp and biting crisis of reason’s faith: 
"No longer protected by anthropocentric gods and goddesses, reason gone flat in its 
happy capacity to explain away the M ystery,... we stare out blankly into that dark and 
gloomy night, which will very shortly swallow us up as surely as it once spat us forth" (p. 
263)—alienation from both source and summit. It is as if having for centuries "binged” 
on reason—and something o f a cheap substitute for it (an inferior strain of it) at that, the 
West, stuffed and sickened, cries out and calls for a grand cultural purge. And thus we 
arrive at Bernstein's declaration of the present historical moment as "the rage against
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reason." Faith goes unscathed, o f course, perhaps unheard, unnoticed; for it was 
overthrown long, long ago; still, it too is in dire straits. Forgotten long ago, as well, is 
the reason o f Plato, and its faith in the virtuous, good, true, and beautiful journey of 
education. Rather, reason's faith, as experienced today, has been found false; as it is 
said, "the sweet dreams o f reason" dying. It is not surprising then, that education, too, 
as the designated guardian of reason, to which we now turn, finds itself presently in 
something o f a nightmarish and arresting place, humanity's hopes regarding it profoundly 
stressed or already dashed.
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CHAPTER 4
EDUCATION, THE UPWARD JOURNEY AND THE FAITH OF REASON (2)
While in modern times it does not go without saying, the relationship between 
civilization (culture, society, etc.) and education is strong-integral, intimate, reciprocal; 
many scholars have in fact said such, as well as worked to investigate, evidence and 
explicate this relationship (Apple, 1979/1990; Counts, 1962; Dewey, 1899,1916/1966; 
Freire, 1970/1993; Giroux, 1992; MacIntyre, 1984; Purpel, 1989; etc.). O f course, an 
age dominated by dissociation, repression, the logic o f severing, warring ascending and 
descending aberrations, seems to have little consciousness o f such relationships, and 
further, serves to sever them. The enduring remains o f Enlightenment ahistoricism 
contributes as well, perhaps, to this perforation and lack o f relational awareness.
Without bearing out, then, the whole history o f education in the West, we may yet note 
certain points o f parallel development with the path reason, the faith o f reason, has taken 
as highlighted in the "biographical" sketch we have just drawn concerning it—though 
education historically has been increasingly excluded and separated from such a 
biography; it once was the biography. The survey should serve to help us glean insight 
into this phenomenon, the state of education today, as well as into the activity and 
influence o f the faith o f reason, even as it has mutated throughout history, in the project 
of education and its institutionalization.
David Hamilton (1990) in his Curriculum History—which is a history o f education 
of which, he argues, curriculum is a central concept, particularly in the development of
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its face in the West—begins his account with the faith of reason (though not with Plato), 
humanity's hope in the potential achievements o f the noosphere. Hamilton says:
At some point in its early history, Homo sapiens developed a 
capacity to think and to reflect upon its circumstances. Earlier 
experiences—stored as memory traces—could be revisited, re-evaluated 
and recast. Humans re-imagined the past and, in the process, rethought 
the status quo. Thinking became a productive activity—a means o f 
grasping the world and rebuilding it in the form of new (mental) 
constructions.... In the process, human beings enhanced their capacity to 
make the future something different from the past. The concept o f social 
change became thinkable; and the practice o f social change became 
doable. As the human species began to appropriate nature (Ingold,
1986), it took over its own history....
Human beings began to pay attention to child-rearing. Young 
members ... were given a lifestyle (or culture) by their surrounding adults. 
Children did not grow up; they were brought up. Their lives were 
shaped jointly by their material circumstances and by the conscious 
intentions o f their carers. Just as human beings adopted routines and 
rituals to domesticate their environment, they also invented routines and 
rituals to domesticate themselves and their successors. And such 
intention-laden upbringing entailed a uniquely human activity—education.1 
(Hamilton, 1990, p. 5, emphasis in original)
David Purpel (1989) makes central to this intention-laden activity a certain "faith 
in the [very] educability of humanity" (p. 10), faith that we can "contribute to the 
creation of a more loving, more just, saner world" (p. x), faith that we can "overcome 
the demons" (p. xi). It is the faith of reason to effect transformation in terms o f what
‘"We are strongly impressed by the fact that wherever men have lived together 
there has been some group interest in education” (Frost, 1989, p. 207). Since the dawn 
of humanity, in fact, it appears that people have sought to learn, from others and from 
their habitats (Smith & Smith, 1994). The universality of education is here posited and 
affirmed, as well as its ancient character, its long history. We might also suggest its 
foundational history and nature, for education is tied up with human faith, involving 
profound trust and committed action with regards to the ultimate concerns o f humanity. 
In this sense, education is prior to, and the ground of, all disciplines o f study and human 
endeavor.
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Plato would call the good, the true and the beautiful. Or as Purpel would put it, it is the 
human conviction "that we can and should intervene in nature to create a joyful and 
abundant society" (p. 54)—an intervention directed, o f course, by some common vision 
of meaning including the good, true and beautiful.
Clearly, at this point, education is felt to be central to human survival: it is 
integral to social life (Hamilton, 1990) and to the preservation o f humanity. Children are 
taught how to hunt, gather food and prepare it, defend themselves and their people and 
war against adversaries. The growth of customs and traditions brings about the need for 
new, more expansive and comprehensive forms of instruction: the elders tutor the young 
in cultural lore, religious beliefs and rites of initiation foundational to such education. 
Naturally, centers for learning tend also to be places o f worship, and religious leaders 
and thinkers first assume the role o f teachers (Frost, 1989). At issue, then, are the most 
fundamental and significant questions o f human existence. By its early official "fathers"2- 
-philosophers, for whom education was a major concern—education is deemed to be, in 
fact, a matter o f life and death. Wilber (1995) speaks of the death o f Socrates as a 
martyrdom for reason—Socrates lays down his life for reason's faith.3 For Purpel (1989),
JWe refer to the "fathers" o f education, and indeed they were, at least formally, 
for women did not have the opportunities of men at that time (nor, perhaps, even today). 
Yet, in fact, the earliest Greek—and thus we might say, Western—educator on record was 
a woman named Sappho (c.a. 630-572 b.c.), head of something akin to a women's 
finishing school. Little is known o f her educational ideas and practices, however, 
because by the authority o f Rome in 1073 her writings were publicly burned. Only 
fragments of her poetry were not lost (Smith & Smith, 1994).
3Of course, such an interpretation of Socrates' death is not without controversy. 
For another view, opposing what is perceived to be the valorization o f the man, see 
Smith & Smith, 1994, pp. 13-20.
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the trial o f Socrates is a compelling metaphor for conveying the import and power o f 
education, its value and its danger—what we may say, its interest in that which claims 
ultimacy. As Plato himself has said: "The virtue o f reason seems to belong above all to 
something more divine, which never loses its power but is either useful or beneficial or 
useless and harmful, depending on the way it is turned" (c.a. 380 b.c./1992, 190-191).4 
Education here encompasses the whole o f the human journey, ascent in aspirations o f the 
higher, descent in embraces o f the lower. Its faith is strong, at least unquestioned, 
among its advocates.
While not a great deal can be known with certainty regarding the ancient past, it 
is true that classical education makes more of teachers and texts than some formalized 
notion of schooling, or codified one of curriculum. There are as yet, in fact, few or no 
such notions. Rather, the classical "school" consists in an informal congregation o f 
interested persons around a well-known master who teaches a variety of subjects and 
talks equally as much or writes about teaching itself, and learning (Hamilton, 1990). 
Teaching appears in the context o f strong personal relationship (Smith & Smith, 1994), 
education itself highly personal—in terms of engagement and investment. Of course, we 
have already looked at Plato on the subject, one o f the first to actually elaborate a theory 
of education. And it is the philosopher who is the educator—concerned with the nature 
o f reality, the meaning o f humanity and o f the Kosmos, in search of the good and true 
and beautiful; once found or believed to be found, the question becomes how others
"Plato, in his Republic, also warns strongly o f the ill-effects of philosophy in the 
wrong hands; education must be accompanied with virtue, a sight of the good.
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might be helped to enter into this knowledge, this virtue, this bliss—into reason, and 
reason's faith. "And the answer [is] always through education'" (Frost, 1989, p. 209). 
For Plato, heir o f Socrates and his dialectic method (aimed at common meaning—that 
which could be agreed upon—by delving deeply into issues to uncover their essence or 
truth), education is liberation and delivers humanity to happiness; the happiness o f the 
individual is consistent with the welfare o f the whole community or society. O f course, 
it follows that what can be dangerously if only tacitly justified, then, is education as a 
form o f social control, though in the service o f social good.5 The faith in education- 
more specifically in control through education—either in the perpetuation o f the status 
quo or in the creation o f a new social order is a faith manifested again and again in the 
history o f the West, and one often attacked (Doll, 1993, 1997). We notice, though, that 
the ego and eco spheres here are interrelated; personal freedom and social responsibility 
are one.
Aristotle, while he agrees with Plato on the aim of education being virtue in its 
social context6—the creation of good "men" and thus also good citizens, denies in part 
the ascending path o f reason, Plato's transcendental soul. As we have said, such in 
effect, begins the truncation and severing of the soul's circular journey encompassing
*For example, some scholars have called attention to Plato's disillusionment with 
democracy, following Socrates' disdain for it. The view is "that the soul must order and 
control irrational and chaotic impulses within the individual, and philosopher-kings must 
order and control the chaotic and irrational individuals in society" (Smith & Smith, 1994, 
p. 23).
‘The path o f which is, of course, the contemplative life, which is also "ultimate 
happiness," in the words of Aristotle.
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both upward and downward paths. It is Aristotle who is credited with the first major 
theory o f the divisions o f knowledge, knowledge's breakdown into three different 
sciences o r disciplines: theoretical knowledge, which includes theology, mathematics, 
and physics or natural science; practical knowledge, comprised o f ethics and politics; 
and productive knowledge, involving art and craftsmanship, the technical arts. In fact, 
the contributions o f this period are generally purported to be not only the proliferation 
and preservation o f ideas, but also the formalization o f knowledge, or at least the 
beginnings o f its organization (Hamilton, 1990). Herein lies the seeds o f the redirection 
of reason's faith, as subtle a shift as it is. The mapping out o f our knowledge of the 
external world, the import of method, will in time become something o f an obsession, 
education's aim and focus, to the exclusion o f all else—faith's object. Yet, Aristotle as a 
teacher is said to have encouraged his students to pursue whatever interested them, 
whichever forms o f knowledge to which they were particularly inclined (Smith & Smith, 
1994)—rather than mapping out for them a course of study.
Of course, rivals o f the times, the Sophists, are said to actually have had a greater 
impact upon the educational practices o f the day (Frost, 1989), emphasizing more 
strongly the individual, and education as a personal pursuit o f success and happiness— 
this, too, perhaps, bearing a seed that would later sprout: individualism and what Tillich 
(1957) would condemn in modem times as the false "God of Success." Whether or not 
such is in fact the case, even with the Sophists, education is centered around value: 
education is in the service of encouraging human growth, making a person better in all 
ways; the best orator is also the best "man" (Frost, 1989). Individual interests, even
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when central, do not powerfully conflict with the interests o f society and culture. Yet 
still, the Sophists perhaps encourage a growing skepticism in regard to the passive 
acceptance of the traditions and beliefs o f the day, what Julian Jaynes calls "the 
development of consciousness" (Smith & Smith, 1994).
From the Romans specifically, we inherit the patriarchal underpinnings which 
seem to endure in contemporary conceptions of education. In some ways akin to Plato's 
faith, the hope is achieving through education divine guidance for excellence in public 
service, a large part of which, however, is military service. Thus, while the mother 
teaches in the home, the sons must soon follow the father, or pater and governor o f the 
home, who is equipped to teach them the ways o f war and to initiate them into public 
life. Several levels o f schooling are available: the ludus (much like our elementary 
school), the grammaticus (although the rich prefer hiring in-home tutors), the tirocinium 
fori (providing apprenticeship), and the rhetor (oratory training). Cicero, something o f a 
paragon of Roman education, states that the aim of education should be to produce 
"wisdom, patriotism, courage, Aristotelian temperance, moral goodness, and oratorial 
eloquence" (p. 39). Such includes a strong working knowledge of logic, law and 
rhetoric, for which the Greek, Aristotle, is especially prized. Yet, in Rome, education is 
primarily oratorical, for what seems to be given the greatest weight is the ability to 
impress the people with one’s persuasive power (Frost, 1989). Perhaps, Plato's honor- 
lover is more ideal to the Romans than his lover of wisdom. Still, the quintessential 
Roman educator and first hired chair in Rhetoric in the empire, Quintilian, while he 
speaks o f the necessity of eloquent speech and exalted thought, reaffirms the first faith,
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as it were: through study, a person acquires the good, is brought to goodness; 
education produces virtuous souls (Smith & Smith, 1994). Even in this, there appears to 
be a much more "this-world" oriented approach to education in comparison to the 
Greeks, though one which does not last for long. At this time, however, it is the collegia 
(the Latin word from which we get "college”), the congregation of priests responsible for 
conducting public worship, who govern the practices o f law and of keeping legal records 
and documenting cultural history—tasks soon to be taken up by Christian monasteries.
Rome undergoes intensive and extensive change with the advent o f Christianity. 
The torture o f early Christians and their persistence in the face o f martyrdom, perhaps, 
actually serves to give greater force to the movement, stamina—vehement, revolutionary. 
Soon, through Constantine, Christianity is made legal and promoted. The "Church" is 
bom, now political and powerful and home of the aristocrat. The Bishop claims as much 
honor as the Emperor, and the Roman church claims the task of education in the 
broadest sense, preserving and passing on language, law, and custom, creating and 
building Rome. Like Derrida (1992/1995), Smith and Smith (1994) say of Christianity, 
however, that:
at the heart o f the new religion was a potential increase in consciousness, 
for it stressed ... correct thinking and self-analysis. What one thought 
was as important as what one did ... The Christians did not invent the 
ideal o f perfection, but they combined it with a powerful frith and added 
the notion that anyone—free or slave, poor or rich, man or woman—could 
achieve it. (emphasis in original, p. 44)
The ideal realm, the human quest for perfection or completion, what Plato calls rest and
the end of journeying, is re-affirmed and renewed in the Christian turn, and in a sense,
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democratized. Central in consciousness and in discourse is now the virtue o f faith; still, 
it is faith in the Word, as it were: in Greek, Logos, akin to Plato's Kosmological Reason. 
This early faith urges humanity toward reason perhaps in the pursuit o f peace and 
wholeness for all of humanity against the accepted violence of the journey as 
promulgated by the establishment o f the day. Yet, its institutionalization and uptake by 
the establishment thwarts, distorts, changes it radically. The potential o f this movement 
is little realized. Rather, conflict, debate over differences in interpretation, nationalistic 
coalitions around interpretations, and violence abound. Wilber’s stunted ascent, reason 
de-reasoned.
The Medieval Period or Middle ages is a misnomer in part, however, because 
more than a dark era or an "in-between" period which saw no progress in reason, in 
education, no innovation or classical revival, it represents the marriage or synthesis of a 
number o f diverse and powerful practices, beliefs, cultures, worldviews: primarily 
Greek, Roman and Christian (rooted in Jewish Culture). This amazingly complex and 
conflicted coalition is foundational to the materialization of the West as we know it, its 
influence reflected not only in modem educational structures, but also in many of today's 
other social/cultural institutions. It is the substance, the language, the thought, from 
which the West is formed, shaped and created. The best and worst of our culture, as it 
were, can in many cases be traced back to this time in history, as we have already seen.
It is the Middle ages to which we can actually attribute the preservation o f classical 
thought, rather than its decline. We note here the contribution o f Cassidorus in 
promoting the practice o f collecting the existing fragments o f classical thought and of
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copying these fragments, o f reproducing texts. Boethius (c.a. 523 a.d./1963), as well, in 
The Consolation o f Philosophy, produces a comprehensive look at the philosophy of 
antiquity (Hamilton, 1990). Bishop Isadore de Seville also attempts a compilation o f 
human knowledge in his Etymologies (cited in Hamilton, 1990).
Thus, a commitment to study endures throughout Roman and post-Roman 
culture, through the possession of both Christian and pagan texts, both drawn upon 
though not easily reconciled. In both, however, religious concerns still figure 
prominently. Augustine manages to achieve a semblance, at least, o f peaceful 
coexistence between these different texts and belief systems in the form o f an affirmation 
that theology is concerned with all things, and that all things are helpful in the study of 
theology, Christian or pagan. Thus, an updated version o f classical education, in the 
form of the "liberal arts" is still promoted, particularly as providing a body of analytical 
tools with which to uncover the mysteries o f the sacred texts (Hamilton, 1990). Yet of 
Christian education even after Rome's fall, it is said: "Although the Roman empire was 
dead, Greek and Roman cultural ideas flourished in Christian schools fastened securely 
on Roman underpinnings" (Smith & Smith, 1994, p. 53).
Hamilton (1990) cites "On the Marriage o f Mercury and Philology," a fifth 
century piece o f prosaic verse by Capella, as the "seminal representation" of the liberal 
arts. Taken from the myth, the bride Philologia (scholarship) is attended by seven 
maidens, each an advocate o f one of the liberal arts. The seven arts include grammar, 
dialectic or logic, and rhetoric, corporately called the trivium (with a primary focus on 
language, the internal world); and geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and harmony,
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known together as the quadrium (with a primary focus on things, the external world). 
The content and aim of the liberal arts are seen as practical—the word "art," the Latin 
translation o f the Greek techne. from which we get "technique." Hamilton adds, 
however, that both Latin and Greek words for "school," schola and ludus are rooted in 
earlier significations connoting leisure. Some argue that the liberal arts are not exactly 
the pursuits o f free persons as such, but perhaps of persons with free time, the 
contemplative life a luxury afforded few (Piltz, 1981). This "rift" o f sorts—between 
thought and action, theory and practice7—is something which will endure and grow and 
continue to plague debate over the aim and end of education, even up to the present day.
With the rise of Christianity, re-emphasized, of course, is education in the service 
of something "more divine," in this instance though, increasingly of the church and its
Tieidegger (1954/1977c) makes an interesting observation about language and 
the radical changes which may be effected or at least reflected in translations from one 
language to another. For the Greek theoria. from which is drawn Plato's notion of the 
"contemplative" life fbios theoretikos). is viewed as "the consummate form o f existence" 
(p. 164). A distinction is made contrasting such with the practical life fbios praktikosl 
only insomuch as the practical life is "dedicated to action and productivity" (p. 164), 
while the life o f "contemplation," is "the way of life of the beholder, the one who looks 
upon the pure shining-forth o f that which presences" (p. 164). The way o f beholding is 
seen, according to the Greeks, "in its purest form as thinking, the highest doing" (p. 164, 
emphasis mine), as a reverent attendance and a watching over truth. Obviously, one with 
leisure time may be freed up for this kind o f doing, for time to think, yet the contrast is 
not as great as we might assume; this kind o f activity is the consummation of practical 
human existence, not its opposition. Heidegger goes on to explain that with the 
translation from Greek to Latin, theoria is transformed into contemplatio. which brings 
to the fore the inclination toward "a looking-at that sunders and compartmentalizes" (p. 
166). For "this translation, which issues from the spirit of the Roman language, that is, 
from Roman existence, makes that which is essential in what the Greek words say vanish 
at a stroke. For contemplari means: to partition something off into a separate sector and 
enclose it therein" (p. 165). In the very work of human language we see a sort of 
sundering and severing occurring.
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interpretation o f the divine. Reaffirmed is the place o f religion in education, the 
centrality of addressing the cosmological and existential questions of humankind.
Students as members o f a community of faith, though, are required to learn its dogmas 
and customs and adopt them; instead of the initial Christian impetus toward self- 
examination and genuine internal personal belief in the name of Christ, the Church 
secures its representation o f the Christian movement and the spread o f its religion 
through inculcation, another case o f education as social control.' The faith here 
manifested is in reason to exert power over the minds o f others, to "de-reason" them in a 
sense, to maintain the political order, perhaps believed ultimately to be the order o f the 
divine. Pagan schools increasingly looked down upon, monasteries appear, grow and 
flourish. Some scholars actually credit the birth of the monastery to a reaction against 
the corruption o f the Church. Religious thinkers like St. Benedict are said to have 
chosen and initiated the monastic way in order to escape the evils of Rome, free to 
pursue fully a pure religious life (Frost, 1989). Others identify the monastery with the 
control of the Church (Hamilton, 1990): well-studied apologists are made and the
*A shift in perspective is, perhaps, represented here: that granted authority is no 
longer "truth disclosed to mind and heart" but "an external norm for the obedient will" 
(Tracy, 1981, p. 99); authority collapses into authoritarianism, tradition into 
traditionalism, and the dogmatic stance bom. Another aspect of the problem might be 
seen in the nature of institutionalization itself. Practices, religious or educational or 
otherwise, it would seem, only endure with the support o f institutions, but such practices 
are also threatened by these very institutions. Practices are concerned with internal 
goods, while institutions are o f necessity concerned with external goods. The ideals and 
creative advances of a practice are, in this way, susceptible to institutional 
"acquisitiveness." The competitive nature of the establishment can undermine the 
cooperative care for common goods internal to a practice (MacIntyre, 1984). Heidegger 
(1952/1977a), in like manner, defines institutionalization as "the making secure o f the 
precedence of methodology over whatever is" (p. 125).
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pedagogical form o f the catechism is developed, a question and answer strategy, all to 
assist in the defense o f the faith, the faith o f the Church.
Under the rule o f Charlemagne in the ninth century, the monastery finds its 
institutionalization, as the guardian o f education and reason's faith, largely in service of 
the powers that be and the interests o f the Church—though not always, and often 
unwittingly. The Emperor organizes in his court a committee o f "academics" for the 
improved management of his kingdom. Most notable is Alcuin, a lover o f classical 
thought, who implemented a program o f sorts for the education o f the people. Inclusive 
of the liberal arts, Alcuin is said to have envisioned an academy (in reference to Plato's 
school) in France, blessed with what he calls the "seven-fold gift of the Holy Ghost," the 
resurrection o f Athens (Piltz, 1981). Ironically perhaps, and wisely, Charlemagne, in 
order to govern more securely, calls for the education of all, and urges that the monastics 
content themselves not with solitary life alone, but with the active service o f teaching 
those who can learn. Thus, monasteries become, in every sense, centers o f learning, and 
priests open "cathedral" schools in villages and towns throughout the Empire. There are 
schools intemi. or internal schools, to prepare one for monastic life; and schools extemi. 
or external schools, for the instruction o f those who will return to the life o f the 
layperson (Hamilton, 1990). Salvation o f the soul is ever an aim, as well as competence 
in the arts, deemed to assist one in the way of salvation. At issue is whether the faith 
expressed here lay primarily in education or reason as the path to inner transformation, 
Christian conversion, eternal life, or more profoundly in its power to establish and secure 
an empire, cooperative subjects for the-here-and-now. For Charlemagne, it is perhaps
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more strongly the latter, for Alcuin, the former. Not altogether mutually exclusive, 
education in both cases profoundly influences human consciousness.
Schools at this time are built around texts more than anything else, for example: 
Cicero and Quintilian for rhetoric. Little else can be said o f the "curriculum” the 
students received as it were; writing, reading and singing figure prominently. The liberal 
arts, rather than comprising a unified and organized course o f study, are probably seen as 
an aggregate of instructional materials upon which to draw. Representations of them 
tend to be pictorial and suggest no real chronology or sequence, figured in circular 
fashion (Hamilton, 1990). The claim has also been made that the quadrivium suffered 
until the first millennium, barely addressed, and that dialectic too was excluded: either, if 
dealt with at all, not with intellectual rigor but as exercises in rote memory (Knowles, 
1962). This disciplinary and intellectual reduction persists in many forms in 
contemporary approaches to education, as well. Rhetoric, in good Roman fashion 
perhaps, is given pre-eminence at this time. Yet, more importantly, these negations seem 
to support the claim made earlier that something has indeed happened to education as 
the upward journey of the soul, to reason and the faith o f reason. With the dismissal of 
the quadrivium, the world o f things are denied, or at least undermined as legitimate 
objects of study—descension repressed, severed from and rejected by ascension. The 
absence o f dialectic, however, points to the truncation o f ascension as well—"yes" to 
reason, but "no" to it, really.
The liberal arts increasingly fade or are at least expanded and changed with the 
onslaught of new texts and new ideas upon Europe in the thirteenth century, primarily
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from Spain and Sicily, "important frontier posts between Eastern and Western thought" 
(Hamilton, 1990, p. 14). Of greatest significance is the discovery o f the later works o f 
Aristotle, unknown to the West before this time (his Physics, c.a. 340-323 b.c./1929- 
1934; Metaphysics, c.a. 340-232 b.c./1947; Ethics, c.a. 340-323 b.c./1973; and 
Politics, c.a. 340-323 b.c./1959), the content o f which becomes "the new logic." The 
new logic, new knowledge, new ideas about what constitutes knowledge, rethinking the 
old and the new and the horizons o f knowledge—such characterizes scholasticism and 
scholastic schools. New interpretations and reinterpretations, especially o f the classics, 
are propelled further by acute arguments between those compelled to embrace the 
advances and those convinced to hold to the established thought of the day—faith divided 
in terms of reason's aim and effect.
Basically, revived, in some measure, is intellectual rigor, and dialectic, though 
seriously reduced and narrowed. It is perhaps not so much a newness, as a renewal—the 
enhancement and clarification of formally existing intellectual practices and methods of 
inquiry. Dialectic is again emphasized, most directly as a method of discerning truth.
The Church, o f course, claims possession of the truth. The orthodox have already 
identified faith and reason as irreconcilable, worlds apart—one spiritual, the other secular. 
Reason has come to be seen, then, as a threat to faith, the faith of the Church. Yet, with 
the path o f reason re-energized, debate over frith and reason abounds throughout the 
middle ages. Education directs itself around the interrogation of the claims of the 
Church with the assistance of dialectic, or also with this tool, the re-affirmation of 
theological doctrines. Students gather ardently once again around teachers and texts, the
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explication and interpretation o f texts paramount, Christian and classical. Hamilton 
(1990) seems to suggest that no normative order yet exists, though, in terms of 
pedagogical method or curricular content—the dialectic studied is itself fluid and diverse 
in practice, not much about it agreed upon or set, or maybe even understood. Study 
does center, at least, around issues, ideas, topics, customs, that are believed to be of 
ultimate concern—they are matters o f faith, whether promoted in the name o f reason 
against faith or not.
Even before this time though, Anselm and Boethius, for example, work to 
rationally solidify the faith, particularly the belief in the existence of God, and in the 
Divine Trinity as triune and yet one. In addition, during this period, foremost is Aquinas 
who, embracing the new forms o f thought and inquiry, claimed that faith and reason 
were, in fact, not adversaries; that faith was a matter o f understanding and that theology 
required an attitude o f inquiry toward all aspects of the world and o f life, a 
comprehensive view of reality. Here, however, reason, for many, appears as an enemy 
o f the faith. Academically, on the rise is the secularization o f philosophy, its growth 
beyond the narrow scope o f strictly Christian concerns, its redirection to the things of 
this world (as inspired by Aristotle); many teachers are perhaps more self-consciously 
philosophers concerned with the new logic than theologians concerned with religious 
thought. Bom is, then, a seed of anti-Christian sentiment, insurrection against the 
monopolization and mutation o f humanity's upward path by the Church. Contributing to 
the waning supremacy of the Church is the rise o f guilds, schools designed primarily for 
vocational purposes apart from religious concerns; and the widening appeal of neo­
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classical ideas about education, emphasizing harmony o f the soul, mind, body and spirit 
(ex. the school o f Vittorino Da Feltre). O f course, classically, such ideas make no 
distinction as such between sacred and secular. The rift, though, is now set in place, a 
rift that will endure and increase and pose problems over and over again throughout the 
history o f the West, even up to modem times, and not only in the realm o f education.
Through the Renaissance, and the triumph o f reason over faith as now separately 
construed, education begins its embrace of the descending journey, and reason's 
paradoxical rejection o f ascension, transcendence and the "invisible world." Religion 
maintains a fight for its claim to education, but education primarily falls into secular 
hands. With the rise o f the kinds o f separations and reductions, repressions and 
regressions o f the Kosmos we have formerly traced, education begins to lose any o f its 
former sense as a spiritual journey, but increasingly becomes rather a narrow instrument 
o f use in the journey, although humanity progressively seems to lose as well, in this 
process, the unified conception o f life as a journey (Sartre, 1943/1992; MacIntyre,
1984), especially as a spiritual one. In line with education's narrowed conception, it is 
this time at which the notion o f curriculum is bom and reaches centrality within the 
enterprise o f education—specifically in Northern Europe which becomes the primary 
patron o f the West, one still dominating educational thought. The new emphasis on the 
visible world in all its plenitude, at this point, sets in motion the further transformation of 
the liberal arts, thinkers o f the day in search o f a method by which to map out the 
external world, and humanity's knowledge o f it. It is a faith akin to Adam and Eve's: 
through human agency, through the human mind grasping, getting hold of and
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consuming knowledge as its object o f desire, all the world may belong to them. The 
good figures here as well, though perhaps not as explicitly, and with lessening reference 
to the sacred or divine.
An art is an abundant collection of propositions.... B u t... in 
setting up the various arts a certain, short and direct way, a kind o f short 
cut has to be used.... This the Greeks call method... such as may be used 
for teaching and communicating. (John Sturm, founder o f the Strasbourg 
Gymnasium, 1539, cited in Hamilton, 1990, p. 23)
"Method," according to Hamilton (1990), becomes the catchword o f humanist 
educators from the early 1500's on—the shortcut to reason, of reason, and faith’s 
relinquishing o f the infinite, eternal, invisible journey. Method, moreover, is the womb 
from which curriculum is bom. This practical emphasis on procedure reflects the 
ideology o f order and routine to which scholasticism gave way in the early sixteenth 
century. For scholasticism, it seems, breeds too much independence in thought and 
belief to fit in with the Europe o f the Counter-Reformation and of advanced Protestant 
dogma. The movement is made by teachers away from individual classroom example to 
a more generalized notion of (what would become) a humanist "curriculum," an interest 
in a range o f institutionalized "curriculum" subjects and their arrangement and 
organization.
Peter Ramus, whom Hamilton has called "the high priest o f method" (p. 23), 
might rightfully bear, as well, the title, "father of curriculum."9 A prominent professor at
’Petra Munro (1996) challenges this gendered perception of curriculum history, 
the predominance o f the "fathers o f the field" discourse pervasive in most historical 
renderings, in that it works to perpetuate the subjugation and exclusion of women that 
has characterized the patriarchal West, failing to acknowledge and serving to erase 
women's contributions to Western thought, culture and achievement. She strives to
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the University of Paris, Ramus gives preeminence to the dialectic, which has come to 
mean basically "the careful sorting out of ideas," and begins the grandiose task of 
mapping out the totality o f human knowledge, hi the Ramist Method, related "common 
places" or topics are clustered in a branching taxonomy. According to Ramus in 1569, 
in method "that enunciation is placed first which is first in the absolute order of 
knowledge, that next which is next, and so on: and thus there is an unbroken 
progression" (cited in Hamilton, p. 22). The earliest recorded use o f the word 
"curriculum" in an educational context has been found in a Ramist Map appearing in the 
Professio regia, a collection o f Ramus' maps published in 1576. Curriculum is bom of 
method, method's child. The educational journey turns into a "course" to be run,10 
mapped out and pre-determined.
"What" to teach (the totality of knowledge) is now presumably given, and the 
logical maps of Ramus appeal to educators as a powerful aid, providing also an answer 
to "how" to teach. In addition, Ramus makes the universal claim that his method
recover the female voices in history, particularly in curriculum history, which have been 
neglected o f silenced. The task is a difficult one, and the issue complex, for much o f 
Western history and thought has been shaped, dominated, recorded and preserved by 
men—the accomplishments o f women wittingly or unwittingly left out, lost, forgotten or 
passed over. I am not herein, through the use o f the term "father," supporting a 
patriarchal view, though the history o f the field o f education has seemingly been 
constituted by certain patriarchal ideals, and the academic curriculum field dominated by 
men. Ramus is the "father" o f curriculum only in the sense that the first use of the word 
"curriculum" educationally applied is attributed to him.
"Curriculum comes from the Latin currere meaning "to run." While once it 
signified a course for running literally, or the vehicle for racing itself—the chariot, it came 
to be used in the context o f curriculum vitae, the course o f life; from which then was 
drawn its educational sense as we know it today: curriculum as a course o f study or 
training, or a career (Oxford English Dictionary. Vol. IV, 1989).
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(including the maps produced thereby) is nothing less than the extemalization (the ever­
growing emphasis on the external) o f the cognitive processes of the human mind. An 
order unprecedented is brought to teaching; with the series o f templates, the mapped- 
out routes o f Ramus to direct teachers, little more is required but to carry them out, 
deliver them to students. With the recognition o f the power and efficiency this kind o f 
formalization can bring to schooling, the ideas o f Ramus are widely embraced. The faith 
o f reason to control, achieve certainty, gain mastery over the natural world, is 
manifested. The "will-to-power" as it were overrides the good, the true, the beautiful as 
humanity's ultimate concern.
Of course, Ramus' ideas are not without controversy, and some critics level 
against him that his methodization not only irreparably dilutes education but vulgarizes it 
as well. Apparently, not everyone wholeheartedly embraces such abstraction o f the 
cosmos; such detachment from actual engagement with the real world, visible or 
invisible—things and activities and ideas; such objectification and eventual reification of 
knowledge and thus also o f the world; nor do all concur with this notion o f the pursuit 
o f knowledge or o f world-existence as constitutive o f some pre-packaged, pre-delivered 
bundles brought to pre-determined destinations which teachers load faithfully into the 
minds of others. Not everyone concurs that education's ultimate concern is adherence to 
rule, and delivery, and efficiency o f delivery. Perhaps, there are no short-cuts to 
thought, to worthy living. Plato's educative journey o f reason certainly knows none.
Yet, Ramus' success—as "master of the short-cut"—with his new "analytical 
apparatus" to create a new order, and absolutism, resonates powerfully with the
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concerns o f the sixteenth century Reformation and is taken up, as it were, by the political 
powers coming-to-be. In the disorder o f the times and in the perceived need for 
reformation, the positing and promise o f order is compelling. Ramist method not only 
links up nicely with the Calvinist emphasis on discipline, but the term "curriculum" is 
already in widespread use by Calvinists as curriculum vitae, the course of life. In the 
works o f John Calvin we find an idea persists o f life as a course full o f obstacles through 
which Christians must traverse, o f course without the idea o f the "shortcut" involved. 
This notion, though, is not exclusively Calvinistic, and we might find in any system of 
thought tightly tied to the text o f the Christian Bible glimpses o f this life-as-course motif. 
The New Testament is full of images of life as a course, and the follower of Christ a 
runner in it (The Holy Bible. 1985, Acts 20:24, Heb. 12:1, 2 Tim. 4:7). Inclusive here, 
however, is this holistic notion of life as a spiritual journey uniting all of its different 
aspects, a notion under erasure historically, ever fading away, especially in conceptions 
of education, ever narrowing in its scope.
Some historians make the controversial argument that Renaissance teaching and 
humanist schools primarily served the social function o f perpetuating the status quo.
They claim that the rote-learning and regimentation was not directed primarily at 
character formation and the ideal o f the humane public servant but rather at creating 
servants o f the interests in power. What is clear is that by the seventeenth century the 
establishment o f discipline is central in matters both church and civil, and Ramist and 
Calvinist ideas serve to strengthen and support the ground and growth of political 
absolutism. The world of absolutism is one o f route-plans and approved destinations,
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and the absolutist underpinning o f the concept o f education as curriculum seems hardly 
deniable—the power o f reason used against reason itself, at least by those in power 
seeking to dominate the thought o f all. We see, then, this image o f reason’s faith 
directed toward control, predictability, certainty—a very stunted faith in a very stunted 
reason to apprehend the whole world by merely mapping it out; humanity hopes in its 
power through reason to command, determine and fix "the good" and the external world, 
rather than behold and experience and participate in them; humanity seeks to gain the 
whole world (now, thoroughly external) through losing its soul. Such is an image and a 
faith that will dominate the field o f education for some time. Education, via curriculum- 
productive o f reverent, disciplined, methodical and intellectually deferent souls—becomes 
absolutist through and through. Of course, even the existence o f "soul" will also 
eventually be brought into question.
"Criticism"—the application of the intellectual powers o f discrimination and 
judgment—becomes the catchword in eighteenth-century Europe, and its distinguishing 
feature (Koselleck, 1988). Hamilton (1990) suggests that behind the rise of critique and 
dissent, which served as the catalyst for transforming the dogma o f the Reformation into 
Enlightenment attitudes, is the extension and growth o f reason. We shall call it the re- 
introduction of the ascending journey, though an altered and stifled conception o f it, for 
reason naturally aspires to transcendence—growth, enlightening development, the 
"moreness"11 not discovered by method and material alone. Reason—content neither
uThe term "moreness" used here is taken from an article entitled "Education and 
Spirituality" by Dwayne Huebner (1995, in press). Huebner coins the term to express 
the reality that there exists always more than we know or can know or will ever know.
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with the material world, nor biosphere, nor physiosphere alone—needs soul and spirit, 
inferiority and depth.
Originating earlier, most prominently in the work o f Francis Bacon (1561-1627), 
reason begins to replace divine light as the source o f knowledge—the old knowledge or 
reason against faith construction. The laws o f nature more telling than divine revelation, 
the focus is re-directed toward God's design as it can be extracted from nature rather 
than from the sacred revelation o f the scriptures. O f course, later nature would lose its 
character as God's design altogether, and the notion o f revelation would be seen as little 
more than mythic residue. "Driven by efforts to harness the power o f reason and unravel 
the complexities o f nature" (Hamilton, 1990, p. 35), this spirit of critique and freedom is 
bom, compelled to question established authorities and accepted truths. To 
unquestioningly accept the "method," the map o f knowledge handed down via education, 
is blind faith, as erroneous as resting on the frith o f the Church was in former times. The 
hope seems to be re-directed in terms of its emphasis on what humanity may achieve 
through reason, how humanity may progress through mind, over what may be secured or 
set in stone.
The spirit o f the times addresses the search for new knowledge and its 
incorporation into more sophisticated taxonomies, which actually eventually leads to the 
increased fragmentation and specialization o f knowledge—and ironically, perhaps, its 
reaffirmed reification. Central, though, is the new emphasis on freedom. Out o f it
His moreness refers to the world-presence of excessive complexity, depth, richness, 
strangeness, mystery.
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emerges the modem university, founded on an open-minded search for truth, and the 
seminar, a pedagogic form constituted by research and discussion rather than by lecture. 
In fact, the growth o f criticism has been associated with the rise o f the seminar 
(Hamilton, 1990). This form is akin to Plato's dialectic, in a sense, in its faith in 
dialogue, study, the work o f reason to reach truth, beyond mere appearance or sight.
Hamilton accents the restlessness o f the movement. With the unity that once 
existed between science and theology rapidly disappearing, the secularization o f teaching 
rapidly progresses; with the destabilization of once-revered authorities, the field o f 
education is characterized by controversy, perhaps more than anything else. Such 
restlessness gives rise to certain strands o f thought brought to light and developed after 
the Enlightenment in the modem period, what Hamilton calls "post-Enlightenment" 
thought, among which includes: the assertion that curriculum is a selection from 
available knowledge, a selection made on the basis o f secular purposes, and made to 
promote the advancement o f society. Taken up, however, in the service of an on-going 
critique and an assertion o f freedom from the establishment, they can be seen as a 
continuation and extension o f Enlightenment thought. Hamilton traces these new 
insights back to the initial inquiry o f Herbert Spencer who, in 1859, asked the question: 
"What knowledge is o f most worth?"
The question is interesting because the issue o f value has explicitly come to the 
fore again; however, it is strictly asked around the context o f knowledge as ultimate 
concem—no longer the examination o f life toward the creation of blessed living, or only 
tacitly. The curriculum insight may have been that method is not o f most worth, that the
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most worthy is perhaps beyond technique. It may also have been a realization that
efficient social control may not work in the service o f true social progress or human
good. One result is the proliferation o f alternate maps and paths in the curriculum
"course." Hamilton focuses primarily on the critique directed at culture and society from
the seventeenth century to the present and the emphasis upon the individual, and
freedom. A movement in the field toward the experiences o f the learner and away from
the experiments o f curriculum design is described—definitely an inward turn, toward
depth and ascension. The declaration o f Rousseau (1762/n.d.) is picked up and taken
seriously: "Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains" (p. 5). Faith is a matter of
freedom, and where humanity finds itself captive, faith is found to be wanting or false,
but as faith is becoming a concept little thought, attention is turned to reason at least,
and reason seems to rest in the individual, society its hinderance, and its burden.
Hamilton goes on to situate John Dewey in the line o f Rousseau and
progressivism, and to highlight him as a central figure in this curricular turn—the
movement from absolutism to enlightenment, from method to critique; a novel re-
incorporation of reason's ascent. Dewey (1902/1964a) says:
We get used to the chains we wear, and we miss them when removed. .. 
Unpleasant because meaningless activities may get agreeable if long 
enough persisted in.... Yes, that is the worst o f it; the mind, shut out 
from worthy employ... takes an interest in a cabined and cramped 
experience, (p. 355)
While the journey o f reason, through the Enlightenment, has become, for the most part, 
the "infinite ahead," progress o f the individual and o f humanity as a whole, its upward 
aspirations and its faith are re-invigorated—meaning and worth again at issue, evidenced
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here in the words o f Dewey. Herbert Kliebard (1986), a historian of curriculum in 
America, describes Dewey as something o f a "ghost" hovering over the field o f 
education as a whole. For Dewey does not describe himself as a progressive, and fails in 
many ways to  fit into the currents o f his day, but still exerts a strong kind of influence 
upon it, at least the haunting presence o f his thought felt therein.
Though centuries after the Enlightenment, it is Dewey, in fact, who is credited 
with this ascending revival of reason in educational thought. Clearly, at some point in 
this history occurs the solidification o f the cultural presence of the two separate, 
distorted gods at enmity o f which we have formerly spoken—broadly described as the 
descending god and the ascending god respectively, which war it out in the West over 
the centuries over a world no longer quite whole, with incomplete reason, incomplete 
faith. Historically manifested, then, is the recurring dominance of one or the other, or 
the hegemonic battle between them, even in the realm o f education. Perhaps Dewey fails 
to find an identifiable place in the field o f education because of the nature o f his faith in 
regard to reason, particularly in an American field that was during his time dominated by 
an altogether different one. Perhaps his book, A Common Faith (1934), is inspired by 
his awareness o f such incommensurable faiths and by his attempt to reconcile them.
An example of this reversal and recursion (of descendant versus ascendant 
dominance, manifested in innumerable splits, such as practice versus theory, eco versus 
ego, etc.) can be seen in the development o f education and educational thought in the 
United States, from its foundation destined to become the patron and pinnacle o f 
Western thought. With its Puritan absolutist underpinnings, the path of ascent is lauded
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in the New World yet in fact cut off, akin to the work o f the Church in a Europe of 
former times. The focus being the creation of a city set upon a hill, the New Zion, with 
all o f their infamous practices o f self-examination, the Puritans actually effect a program 
of social control, subduing the wilderness and the evils o f the human mind and soul.
Faith, and the good, features strongly, but it is, perhaps, more akin to what Dewey 
(1922/1964b) has described as the "pathology of goodness."12 This legacy endures, 
despite the Enlightenment ideals upon which the United States is established, especially 
in the realm of education.
William Pinar, William Reynolds, Patrick Slattery and Peter Taubman (1995), in 
Understanding Curriculum, begin the story of curriculum in the United States with the 
publication o f the Yale Report on the Defense of the Classics in 1828. The report, 
reminiscent o f pre-Enlightenment faith, emphasizes the importance o f mental discipline. 
The rationale for the classicist curriculum is faculty psychology in which the mind is
“Dewey (1922/I964b) describes the pathology o f goodness as that sort of 
"goodness" nurtured in the separation o f morals from the reality of human nature, 
physiologically and psychologically, which accounts ofttimes for the"badness of good 
people" (p. 63). For example, the following description is one which we might apply to 
Puritanism: "There are others who take seriously the idea o f morals separated from the 
ordinary actualities o f humanity and who attempt to live up to it. Some become 
engrossed in spiritual egotism. They are preoccupied with the state of their character, 
concerned for the purity of their motives and the goodness o f their souls. The exaltation 
of conceit which sometimes accompanies this absorption can produce a corrosive 
inhumanity which exceeds the possibilities of any other known form of selfishness” (pp. 
65-66). The introspective emphasis in Puritan thought, paired with strong social 
imperatives and convictions, may have served to promote such pathology. The 
autobiographies of many of these believers bear this out, like that o f John Bunyan, as 
well as the expository writings o f many Puritan thinkers, for example: Alleine's Alarm. 
by Joseph Alleine (1671/1978); Precious Remedies Against Satan's Devices, by Thomas 
Brooks (1652/1987); and The Christian's Great Interest, by Wiliam Guthrie 
(1658/1982).
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deemed to be a muscle in need o f vigorous exercise in order to stay fit and active. Thus, 
recitation, rote-learning and memorization are again esteemed as primary instructional 
methods in education. Incidentally, Cotton Mather (1662-1727), the founder o f Yale 
University, advocates from the start the logical and exhaustive approach o f Johann 
Alsted, who published his Encyclopedia in 1630 (cited in Hamilton, 1990), a 
comprehensive work which relies heavily upon Ramist diagrams for much o f its 
organization, and a foundational resource in most Calvinist-inspired universities 
including Yale (Hamilton, 1990). The infatuation is with reason as the power by which 
humanity may reign securely over the natural world-taken externally, clarified and 
organized; and subsequently, over the social systems built through such mastery.
Notions located in earlier European history resurge, then, in American educational 
development and, it would seem, increase in strength.
There are to be found, o f course, voices crying out in the wilderness; the 
ascension of Enlightenment reason has also made its way across the Atlantic. Francis 
Parker (1837-1902), dubbed by some as the father of progressivism, is one such voice: 
he posits the common school as an "embryonic democracy," yet he is largely unheard. 
The leadership o f Charles Eliot (1834-1926), a proponent of faculty psychology, and the 
influential committees on secondary and elementary education of 1893 and 1895 procure 
the victory of classicist ideas in the nineteenth century. G. Stanley Hall (1844-1924), 
also something o f a progressive, challenges the status quo and calls for change, positing 
education as the major hope of the world. Education is, however, the hope, too, of 
those who hope to keep the world as it is. Yet Hall's strong faith in progress is coupled
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with an equally strong faith in the role o f social science, which—modeled after science—is 
primarily defined by its method, the careful application of the scientific method to 
humans. Even the dissenters perpetuate the notion o f education as curriculum as method 
and its preoccupation with order, development, procedure, stability.
William Torrey Harris (1835-1909), commissioner o f education, emphasizes 
school as a force for social stability. Hamilton (1990) points out this general tendency in 
humanism to lose sight o f the individual, o f the particular, in its gaze upon "abstract 
man," real human persons in the concrete world are generalized out o f the picture. 
Though primarily secular in name at this point, education serves purposes in accord with 
those served by the Puritan forefathers. Curriculum standardization is sought; 
curriculum is a powerful tool o f social control, and long forgotten is education as an 
inner journey central to the spiritual life o f the student. Rather, it is an institutional 
program, a policy to be implemented. It is schooling.
Later in the nineteenth century, and into the twentieth, other faint murmurs 
against the faith o f reason as control and masterful method can be detected with the 
curricular move toward child-centeredness o f the Herbartians. Johann Herb art (1776- 
1841) brings to curriculum the concept o fBildung. central to educational thought in 
Germany. Curriculum is primarily a North European concept extended to the United 
States. Bildung, drawing attention to the notions o f social shaping and cultivation, shifts 
the gaze o f scholars in the field from the map o f knowledge to the map o f the learner; it 
is a movement within, o f depth, transcendence, and yet still a map to be comprehended—
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and unfortunately, perhaps, regulated. The active nature o f the child in learning is 
highlighted, and passive rote methods are discouraged.
Yet even the focus upon the child—and curriculum as mapping out, attending to, 
and mirroring the developmental growth o f the child—is still bound to the search for the 
method in education, or better foolproof methods. Faith is placed, it seems, ever in 
reason's capacity to procure the extemalization and regulation o f things. The president 
of the National Herbartian Society, Charles De Garmo, brings Herb art's ideas to the U.S. 
for the first time in 1889 with the publication of his Essentials o f a Method (cited in 
Hamilton, 1990). Through the notions o f concentration and correlation, the 
preoccupation with the development of curriculum is strengthened. In concentration the 
aim is organizing curriculum around topics or concentrations. Such concentration—and 
the advocated correlation of all subjects, an attempt at curriculum coherence and unity— 
leads to the schematization of a general and clearly defined route to be followed in both 
curriculum planning and implementation. The well-paved path consists of a series of 
sequential steps to be taken: preparation, presentation, association, generalization, and 
application. Curriculum becomes almost synonymous with method and continues to 
focus on design to the exclusion of all else.
At this time, the landscape is, to be sure, peppered with voices of dissent, the 
stirrings o f another direction for faith on the rise, in the numerous predecessors to the 
progressive movement o f the early twentieth century. Yet even the movement itself—its 
success—is short-lived, not to be fully voiced and articulated in the states until some time 
later, falling beneath the fear of reason's power to transform, to critique, to effect
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unpredictable change. Progress is ever the American vision, at least rhetorically. Vet, in 
actuality, it conflicts with an enduring love affair with certainty, control, the 
domestication o f  the North American "wilderness": real progress, deeper thought, could 
disturb the content o f the American dream.
In the name o f reason, scientific curriculum making with the aim o f social 
efficiency, this on-going absolutism of method, prevails for much of the twentieth 
century. Edward Thorndike (1874-1949), a prominent figure in the field in the first part 
of the century, is strongly informed by the behaviorism o f experimental psychology. He 
says: "Education is a form o f human engineering, and it will profit by measurements o f 
human nature and achievement as mechanical and electrical engineering have profited by 
using the foot, pound, calorie, volt and amphere" (Thorndike, cited in Pinar et al., 1995, 
pp. 91-92). Such allegiance to method allows for the prediction and manipulation o f 
behavior to desired ends, humanity’s quantification. Frederick Taylor's (1856-1915) 
theory of scientific management is readily taken up by scholars in the field in the interest 
of efficiency. Through "task analysis," education can be further specialized and 
routinized. Factory and labor metaphors abound in an ever-growing "assembly-line 
curriculum." In contrast to Plato's notion of education as the journey of the soul toward 
expanded consciousness, it is now the business o f schooling toward dumbing 
consciousness down.
Some historians even locate the beginning o f the story of curriculum in the U.S. 
with the publication o f The Curriculum in 1918, a book directed at improving the 
performance of schools, by Franklin Bobbitt (1875-1956). By this time, the field is so
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deeply entrenched in the dogma o f social efficiency, it is taken as a given not to be 
questioned. Ralph Tyler’s Basic Principles o f Curriculum and Instruction in 1949 
undermines and basically drowns out the criticism o f progressives which had become 
audible in the twenties and thirties. Identified by Pinar et al. (1995) as "the single most 
influential curriculum text ever written," the book serves to perpetuate the emphasis 
upon social efficiency and curriculum as method.
Curriculum is achieved through a series o f steps: the selection and definition of 
learning objectives, the selection and design o f learning experiences corresponding to 
those objectives, the arrangement and organization o f those learning experiences for 
optimal effectiveness, and the evaluation o f outcomes in terms of their ability to meet 
predetermined objectives and to meet them efficiently. The "Tyler Rationale" inspires 
the notion of curriculum as technique—a functionalist, instrumentalist conception of 
education. One might ask, then, what education has become, and if it still works at all in 
the service o f life and the human journey. One might inquire, in fact, what education has 
to say in modern times about what constitutes life, and the creation o f life worth living, 
and how humanity has come to construe human existence in the world.
By the 1950s, and continuing through the 1960s in the U.S., many begin such 
questioning. There is a growing discontent in the field with curriculum as method and 
technique, with its absolutist underpinnings. Herein, in such disquiet, is the beginnings of 
something very much like an enlightenment within the field of education. The "old" faith 
waning, and reason, averse to being strapped down, reconsiders the import o f reaching 
the heights and plumbing the depths, the import o f meaning and value. As Hamilton
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(1990) puts it, absolutism breeds its own antithesis and inevitable breakdown. The same 
might be said o f any reason, any faith, directed at pure descent or pure ascent. Reason 
aspires to higher things, though in preservation o f the lower, thus, may be characterized 
as progressive, in a certain sense—which is perhaps why Hamilton associates the growth 
and expansion o f reason with critique (of what is, in the sight o f what could be, with 
faith that the mind o f humanity can effect good) and the progressive movement in 
education. In its spirit o f critique, the whole notion o f education is problematized, at 
least what this notion has become. As Malcolm Skilbeck (1984) has observed: "One o f 
the consequences o f the progressive's concerns ... was that the term 'curriculum* itself 
had to be reconceived” (p. 24). The god o f disengaged descent is challenged.
A call toward reconception and a renewed interest in the ideas of Dewey—more 
specifically, in the experience o f democracy in education and in the critique of society 
become, then, central features in the movement o f the 1970s in the American curriculum 
field, what Pinar et al. (1995) describe as a movement from an emphasis on development 
to one o f understanding. Joseph Schwab (1969), a key figure foreshadowing this 
movement in the states, pronounces the curriculum field "moribund" in 1969. The 
indictment is repeated in the 1970s: Dwayne Huebner (1976) declares it "dead," and 
William Pinar (1978) describes the field as "arrested." Definitely, seen here is a crisis o f 
faith in education, in reason, at least as it has been construed and manifested in and by 
the field. Yet, we might ask. Is the faith utterly dead? Perhaps, but as Nietzsche 
(1883/1982a) has said so directly: "Only where there are tombs are there resurrections” 
(p. 225). Reason demands, in a sense, the resurrection o f the upward journey, the
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journey o f the inner realms and of spirit. Coming up from the grave is like coming up 
from Plato's cave.
Pinar e t al. (1995) locate the roots o f what would be called the 
"Reconceptualization" o f the field in the activity o f the 1960s. Certain lone individuals 
are found questioning the basic assumptions underlying work done in the field and 
critiquing the dominant Tyler Rationale. The two primary prophetic voices, described as 
the "intellectual parents” o f the reconceptualization, are Dwayne Huebner and James 
McDonald. Both resist the existing traditional paradigm and stand for the creation of 
freedom. Rejecting the dominant technism, methodism, reductionism, they seek new 
ways in which to talk about curriculum—ways that may promote personal meaning and 
growth and the creation o f a more just society and world. Glimmers again o f the good, 
the true and the beautiful, o f the interior realms.
In this movement away from method via criticism, Pinar et al. (1995) place the 
beginnings of the Reconceptualization. Rejecting the traditional preoccupation with 
method and development, the purpose o f the movement is understanding, o f the land 
sought after in the humanities. Before in the grip o f the social sciences, the field is 
introduced by these prophets to other perspectives and forms of inquiry associated with 
the humanities, such as history, philosophy, theology, and literary criticism. Herein is 
seen a reconstruction o f sorts, of education again as referential of life's journey, a 
unifying effort toward wholeness, a spiritual infusion.
By the 1970s, the field, "moribund," in crisis, is ripe for a metamorphosis of 
spirit, or "paradigm shift." The disarray is the culmination of a number of factors: the
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discontent stemming back to the 1950s, the fall o f the progressives, and the blow to the 
field in the 1960s when the Curriculum Reform Movement essentially ignored curriculum 
thinkers (Pinar et al., 1995). O f course, the spirit of criticism is already unleashed at 
large with the worldwide protests o f students in the 1960s, calling for cultural revolution 
and bringing on "counter-culture." Conventional ideas are not only challenged but the 
whole notion o f convention itself. This kind o f challenge is exactly what is levelled at the 
traditional field o f education by the Reconceptualists in the seventies (1970s).
Beginning in the academic conferences o f the 1970s and continuing into the 
nineties (1990s), William Pinar, a prominent figure in the reconceptualization of the 
curriculum field, is called upon on several occasions to define the movement. Such a 
task proves to be difficult in one respect: to seek to define the reconceptualization might 
suggest a thematic unity not present therein. One point o f undisputed cohesion is in its 
criticism o f the traditional field. Agreement centers around the common contention with 
the reigning Tyler Rationale as reductionistic, de-politicized, ahistorical, anti-ethical, 
esteeming procedures over persons.
What can be said is that a definitive move is made away from an emphasis on 
development to an attempt at understanding—away from method to critique. Curriculum 
is reconceived along experiential and structural lines; a proliferation o f understandings 
are set into motion: autobiographical, existential, phenomenological, political, historical, 
racial, feminist, post-structural, post-modern, cosmological, etc. Yet the thousand 
voices are united in their criticism o f the absolutist rule of "methodism,” in their attempts
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to re-humanize education, and in their collective introduction o f a "sophisticated 
theoretical wing" to the field.
Counter-attacks are made against the bearers o f this new faith, new line o f 
reason-ing, in the field. Denounced as "new alchemists and concierges o f counterculture 
ideology" (Tanner & Tanner, 1979/1981, p. 390), the "reconceptualists" are accused of 
attempting to denigrate and overthrow reason. Ironically, the rise o f criticism and 
dissent associated with the movement, and its search for new knowledge outside the 
limited domain of social science, suggests that it represents more appropriately the actual 
and logical extension and enhancement o f reason. Understanding and "enlightenment" 
liberate reason from its cramped, cabined, burdened existence in the narrow confines of 
method, order, procedure, scientism; o f the external world alone.
Yvonna Lincoln (1992) says o f this new line of thought within the discipline o f 
education:
What began [in the 1970s] as a radical but small group of critics o f 
contemporary curriculum theory has now become a groundswell. .. The 
reconceivers o f the curriculum studies are not just postulating that a new 
world could exist but also creating it—voice by voice, criticism by 
criticism, (p. 94)
Yet a world cannot be made solely through critique; curriculum cannot live by critique 
alone. The educative journey o f reason strives after a vision of the good. Pinar et al. 
(199S) report that as early as the 1980s, the movement begins to lose its cohesiveness: 
its opposition to Tylerian conceptions o f curriculum are no longer strong enough to keep 
the thousand voices agreeing to speak a common tongue. Perspectives proliferate within 
the movement, going their separate ways or turning in upon each other to continue their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
177
critiquing there. The new "ascension" o f reason prevails, perhaps in a battle won too 
well (Another M ure  at a descending embrace?). As Pinar et al. (199S) suggest, the 
success o f this metamorphosis in the field is also its own demise.
The field today, one could say, is still dominated by this spirit o f critique, and yet, 
it is critique ever turning in upon itself it seems. Very soon, in the field, its own ground 
in the faith o f reason will come itself into question. It is as if  the temperate wisdom of 
Socrates has pushed itself to excess: Yes, the unexamined life is not worth living, but 
the examined one is sometimes not worth living because not lived, at least, the overly- 
examined one. It is Socratic tyranny, Nietzschean madness, and reason's ascending 
negation without preservation, and a new battle call, as it were—mounting tension, again.
O f course, in his history, Hamilton (1990) leaves the field o f education as a whole 
in the West (European and American) in the twentieth century, up to the present time, 
with this permanent tension (our two gods)—introduced, he says, in the aftermath of 
Enlightenment upheaval: the attempt, on the one hand, to re-establish the world of 
absolutism with certain methods, maps, routes and destinations; and the effort, on the 
other, to redefine curriculum thought along progressive lines with a primary interest in 
the autonomy o f teachers and students—the inner freedom and unhindered growth of 
persons. Both sides defend their position in the name o f reason, at least originally, with 
the view o f the opposing side as reason's adversary.
While the tensions and disputes over education persist at large, and the public 
faith in education waxes and wanes, the faith o f reason to promote the "best" for and in 
humanity has tended to hold, until the most recent times. This faith is directed toward
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education generally though, primarily through schooling, whether such is reasonable or 
not—truly representative and supportive of, in the service of, human reason or not. The 
dis-integration o f the Kosmos which has occurred has led to the virtual dis-integration of 
all things, including education, the faith o f reason, life, as a unified, spiritual, 
transcendent journey o f the soul; in fact, the idea of the soul, having basically been 
replaced by the notion o f the "self' in modem times, even falls prey to the divisive-ness 
o f critique, claims regarding any unified view of the self regarded as "essentialist." The 
arrival o f the "self' itself represents a reduction and amputation of what soul once was— 
individualistic and separate from the Kosmos.
Such dissection is attested to in the matter o f education—of faith, of reason. In 
relating its history, even broadly and briefly, a cosmological perspective is lost over time; 
in chronologically or progessively marking time, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
maintain the grip of this perspective, because education itself, as conceived and 
explicated and practiced, loses this hold, ever narrowed, relegated to small, incomplete, 
specialized domains. Where we begin with life, the examination of life toward meaning 
and worth, and the upward journey o f the soul, we end with curriculum, a scholarly 
"field," and schooling, a state "institution," a kind o f economic insurance policy. Thus, 
evidence o f the dissolution and division o f the human journey is manifest, stunted ascent 
versus stunted descent. In the now small world of education, it is evidenced most clearly 
in what seems to be this irreconcilable rift and war between practice and theory. The 
changes here traced, then, particularly from the modem period, occur primarily in the 
scholarly field o f education alone; schools remain little changed, and an absolutist
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conception o f education endures in them in the mainstream, even today—the same 
managerial, mechanistic metaphors dominate (predominantly in the United States). In 
this sense, the examination of life has been almost completely separated from the living
of it.
Some educational scholars have, perhaps wisely (especially given the state o f 
schools as they are), supported the maintenance o f a certain distance from the schools to 
prevent the field's reduction to only what is, on the surface o f existing institutions. This 
position evidences the call o f reason, a universalizing structure which aspires to 
transcendence, the transformation o f what is through a vision o f the good. The work of 
the theoretical wing, a scholarly sector in the university, is construed, in this way, to be 
grounded in but not limited to educational experience. Such grounding, it is hoped, will 
prevent the field's collapse into discourse.
Yet the present situation threatens, in a sense, just this kind of collapse. Having 
lost its paradigmatic unity, the field, even within itself apart from the practice o f schools, 
suffers from something o f a fractured identity. As we have said, curriculum cannot live 
by critique alone. The field risks being tom  apart by sectors knowing neither how to 
speak to one another nor listen; the field risks balkanization with its contemporary 
tendencies toward localisms and particularisms (Pinar et al., 1995). Thus, the small 
comer of refuge in the realm of education, for reason, a reason which again, it seems, 
seeks the upward path, some vision o f meaning and value, some examination toward the 
worthy and the good, some view of a larger cosmological context, loses sight, too, o f 
this search. Battling internally, it finds itself ineffectual, in a crisis of sorts, in which
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reason comes to be seen as the culprit. Reason, it seems, is not multi-cultural, is not an 
advocate o f the marginal and disenfranchised, is not consistent with freedom. Reason, it 
appears, is rather European, white, male, patriarchal (Pinar, 1997). Mainstream 
educational thinkers plod along, attending directly to the problems o f school and its 
narrowed context, in which case reason is not really brought to task or questioned, nor 
the faith upon which their work is grounded. The program is simply carried on in the 
schools, regardless, it seems, o f what is happening, what anyone is saying or feeling. 
Clearly, though, by all the "war," the division, is felt in term's o f reason's emptiness: its 
split from value, meaning and goodness. Education, the faith o f reason as such, has not 
brought humanity to life worth living; rather, as we have seen, death seems to achieve a 
global reign (evidenced in the rise o f pollution, toxic waste, violence, suicide, divorce, 
feelings o f hopelessness and despair, anomie, etc.; see Chapters 2 and 3). Education is 
blamed, but not wholly, because it now sits somewhat ambiguously in its relationship to 
smaller personal issues and larger social and cultural concerns.
David Purpel (1989), in The Moral and Spiritual Crisis in Education, stresses this 
forgotten relationship between education, culture and society as integral to what he calls 
the larger moral and spiritual crisis constitutive o f enormous dangers to the cosmos and 
threats to our most treasured ideas about human life. The power o f education is 
evidenced, he continues, in the perpetual debates over it between so-called conservatives 
and liberals, the most important dimension o f which revolves around the issue of faith in 
the educability o f humanity, a question regarding the very nature and destiny of 
humanity. Clearly, education is a source o f political and pragmatic power, which can
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operate in the service o f humanity's liberation or captivation, o f perpetuating existing
power relations or o f challenging them. In this sense, education can be construed as
both the child and parent o f culture.
Yet, its narrowing in all this world dis-integration, and its adoption o f the illusion
o f neutrality, has made education appear to have little to do with culture or society or the
fundamental questions o f human existence—the orphaned child, the cast-off parent.
Education is schooling, a cultural vestige o f little import. Purpel calls it the trivializatinn
o f education, evidenced in its discourse and in its proposed reforms—evading and
neglecting issues o f critical significance through distracting obsessions with the merely
technical. Focusing on the American scene, he chides the contemporary institution of
education for failing to address or even acknowledge these larger pressing problems in a
time of human crisis—o f meaning and faith and moral courage. He complains:
The public is trying to grasp what is fundamental to life, liberty and the 
pursuit o f happiness, and in response educators give them more 
standardized tests; the culture yearns for meaning and hope, and the 
schools suggest more homework and a longer school year. The world 
teeters on the edge o f a new holocaust and our leaders urge us to 
consider merit pay. (p. 22)
The trivialization o f education is also its vulgarization and its abnegation o f 
responsibility. Educators, in an attempt to avoid moral choices, are making them 
nonetheless, though without thought, or are unquestioningly submitting to such choices 
already made; thus, the field o f vision is the confined and cramped "accessible present,
... vocational preparation and economic need" (p. 2)—the vulgar god o f success (Tillich, 
1957). Schools are not neutral, are not peripheral or inconsequential to the spiritual
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crisis at large. They ignore the search for wisdom, truth, meaning, goodness, and rather, 
choose to propel and embody this empty faith: materialism, secularism, scientism, 
technolatry—progressive representatives o f a  culture in its worst, most unreason-able 
aspects. As such, schools prove themselves to be, according to Purpel (1989), 
"intellectually and morally bankrupt": enhancing the growing sense o f alienation and 
meaninglessness, contributing to mindless instrumentalism, perpetuating the reification 
and externalization o f knowledge—and reason's split from faith and value, and antithetical 
even to the true spirit o f science, and o f reason, which encourages serious inquiry. It is, 
in fact, without reason, irrational, to discuss education or to engage it apart from the 
spiritual concerns of humanity, from some moral vision o f who we are and what we hope 
to be and become, o f the culture we would like to make for ourselves and the world. 
While such a realization is articulated by few, it is felt more and more by many, as this 
crisis of our faith in education, and in reason as that journey to human good.
Henry Perkinson (1977), however, in The Imperfect Panacea. American Faith in 
Education. 1865-1976. argues that to "convert" social problems to educational ones is, 
in fact, a way for adults to abnegate responsibility. The schools are saddled with all the 
ills of society. Such, in effect, diminishes the already limited authority o f schools, 
making them subject to interest groups o f every variety. Perkinson also makes the 
distinction between the faith of educators in education as a panacea for the world's ills, 
as the answer to society's problems and progress, and of the general public, parents with 
desires for their own children specifically, as an avenue by which to personally escape 
social ills.
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Yet, his argument appears as something o f  a covert affirmation o f Purpel's 
position. In each instance, social ills figure prominently, whether viewed from a 
personal/individualist perspective or from a public/communalist one. The views 
themselves represent this educational problem as a social one in which the individual 
project is seen as antithetical to the communal one, and vice-versa. He recognizes the 
faith o f both in crisis—the efficacy of education as either a social or personal panacea 
now seriously in question, and sorely doubted, which cannot be separated from larger 
societal, cultural, and world problems and the felt sense o f crisis they stimulate. He 
acknowledges, as well, the problem of construing schooling as a way to escape from 
social evils, rather than as an avenue through which to address them. In contending also 
that the school is not the primary advocate o f culture, that extant are a host o f other 
informal agencies o f education, and that, unfortunately, the school has come to be 
believed in and seen in this light as primary, Perkinson tacitly identifies and disapproves 
the narrowing and trivialization of education o f which Purpel has spoken. He has, in 
fact, shown that educational concerns are social ones, and social ones, educational.
Perkinson admits, then, to the social power o f education, and to an all- 
encompassing faith—here, o f Americans—in its political function, traditionally in the 
preservation o f civilization and in the preparation o f the young for economic survival, 
more—he feels—than in a true sense of progress. As a panacea in service of the national 
purpose, though imperfect, schooling has been, for most o f its history, effectual for 
white, middle-class America, sustaining its position, the status quo. Yet even this has 
been brought under duress not only with the generations o f middle-class students
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rejecting the values o f their parents and the educational institutions which are seen to 
embody those values, but also with the public indictments o f revisionist historians and 
curricularists against schools as sites o f oppression and indoctrination and moral 
abnegation (Apple, 1979/1990; Giroux, 1992; Purpel, 1989; Kozol, 1975/1990; etc.). 
Some o f the stronger critiques have argued that education actively promotes injustice 
and inequality, the capitalist virtues o f exploitation and manipulation and power- 
mongering. Moreover, education seems to no longer insure security and power for even 
the privileged. These things serve to only deepen and darken the crisis o f faith in 
education. The conclusion is: schools actually hurt humanity; thus, they must be 
radically altered or abolished altogether. And according to Perkinson, "with this last 
wave of radical critics we reach the edge o f educational nihilism" (1977, p. 235). 
Education is not as far from culture as we thought. The question of, the search for, 
"worth" echoes again in Perkinson's final questions, questions for which he says none o f 
us seem to have responses: What then are schools for? What is education even about? 
What knowledge is worth knowing?
And we are drawn back to the major premise of the Platonic quest that through 
examination humanity might find worth-life worth living, that education as the upward 
journey o f the soul by the faith o f reason might bring humanity to an apprehension of the 
good and true and beautiful. Of course, this premise, if remembered, is seriously in 
doubt. The examined life, it turns out, is also not worth living; in fact, reason 
seductively lures one in an infinite regress away from life: the examined life seems to be 
unlived—worse still, against life. This time, then, faith, if any remains, is aimed against
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reason as the obstacle which has prevented the human race from valuable, meaningful 
worthy axistcnoc and thwarted the reafaation of goodness, truth sad beauty. Or at least 
its faith is stumbling, undergoing greatrials of jamsease doubt-the frith of reaaon on 
trial.
Richard Btnmdn (1991b). in attempting also to understand this contemporary
rage against reason, associates its movement with Nietzsches genealogical unmasking of
reason’s history. In the Nietzscbean critique, our reason takes us to nihilism, and does so
logically. At this point, it is not surprising to us at all to find reason, whffiin and the
death of God within the same nexus. Reason is (fivine, or some might say dttDQOic. and
has been operative through a fiuth involving uhonacy. Bernstem seeks to tdl the story,
as it were, of reason in Western civilization through four characters, philosophers he
finds central to the tefling of it: Condoccet, Weber, Adorno, and Heidegger.
Admittedly, he sayi, the tale is partial,11 for it is not yet told out, the narrative of reason's 
development incomplete and also held together by lots of tension.
‘’The tale is perrial, as well, obviously in the sense that Bernstein makes no 
attempts to inchide in Ins inquiry critiques of reason made by yeomen or people of color, 
for example. Yet, in las defense, he is drawing on thinkers he feels to be GfiBBll to the 
teUagofthe story ofieesoo in the West. Clearly, women and people of color have not 
been given centrality traditionally in any Western mem ratrarive, particularly that of 
reaaon-4tek involved in the Eafightenmem project, outright silenced or exduded from 
it, or relegated to its marpna. Via the cult of reason, many voices, lives, stories, 
cultures, have been excluded obviously, invafidatcd by the rational center which has 
determined what counts as lagjtimale knowledge (Monro, 1996). Thus, many of the 
ooniflfHporaiy cnuQim 01 fw oii u v t pmd h m  n w n .
" " " " n  mpt iI t , | .  " IF  <TMH rn M aTP d r ——  wuwu -Tmmmtwi Q | |
bem usri to juatifr mate donainarion over women, to rarionaliaa it away as "natural" 
They have also pointed out the potential violence or injustice to which any totalizing 
discourse is a wraprib Is (Hey, 19—). Perhaps, however, what is primarily being attacked 
is the baggage with which the notion of reason has bean saddled, the assumption of the 
autonoaoua self and of absolute freedom; foe denigration of the emotions and etways 
of knowing which do not foil within the project of science; and the privileging of certain
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values o f objectivity, neutrality, mastery, hierarchy and control, for example The 
problem with some o f these critiques seems to be in the way reason is construed as a 
unitary and non-complex construct, as an essentialist idea, the way it is unquestioningly 
associated with imposition and reification, and the way it is pitted against meaning and 
context and value, and rejected as irredeemably male—linearity, rationality, logic, and 
clarity equated with "male"; and non-linearity, non-rationality or irrationality, emotion, 
intuition and ambiguity equated with "female" (Flax, 1990; Harding, 1991; Munro, 
1996; Okruhlik & Harvey, 1992; Sawidd, 1991). Even the work o f eco-feminists 
which seeks unity, to speak beyond women's concerns solely, for the whole cosmos, 
evidences a certain failure to move beyond perpetuating essentialist male/female 
dualisms. For example, Irene Diamond and Gloria Feman Orenstein (1990), in 
Reweaving the World The Emergence o f Ecofeminism define "our culture's 
devaluation o f natural processes [as]... a product o f masculine consciousness [which 
has]... denigrated and manipulated everything defined as 'o ther'..." (p. be).
Jana Sawicki (1991) affirms, in response to such problems, a "politics of 
difference," with the recognition that there are battles within feminist discourse itself 
among the various strains—womanist, radical, and liberal, etc. She also highlights the 
"double bind" within which feminist scholars must work: to critique the tradition 
necessitates an entering into that tradition and into the very discourse which has 
marginalized women in the first place. In like manner, some thinkers have called for a 
sort o f reconceptualization o f reason, the creation of a new epistemology, in which the 
traditional standards o f rationality that have served to exclude women are undermined 
and new standards, inclusive o f women’s ways o f knowing, are posited (Okruhlik & 
Harvey, 1992) In addition, Wendy Kohli (1995), a committed feminist, is also an 
advocate of reason, unwilling to give reason over to the rule o f the patriarchy. In the 
final analysis, "some notion o f reason hangs behind all scholarship [feminist or 
otherwise], scholars speak in the voice o f reason" (Pinar, 1997, p. 6). For it is reason 
which makes appeal to human rights, justice, and equality. One cannot fight, then, 
against oppression or injustice without some kind of appeal to some idea o f universal 
reason (Seigei, 1987). In this way, it might be said that the feminist project has emerged, 
in fact, from the Enlightenment project o f reason—it follows a "reason-able" and rational 
line o f thought.
There are, as well, many other marginalized groups which have laid indictments 
against reason, all o f which are not without poignancy and importance. As someone 
interested in the history o f Western thought, however, and in the dominant thinkers 
within the modem tradition, I shall focus here, with Bernstein, on such thinkers. The 
critiques of reason presented by these scholars—primarily white, European males who 
ought to have an interest supposedly in perpetuating reason's reign—are o f particular 
import, I think, in shedding light within a much broader frame on the problematic 
developments o f reason as construed in the West, the fetal flaws internal to this reason, 
productive of oppressing effects universally (upon the earth as well as humanity, for 
example), and not just upon particular cultures and classes o f people.
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The amazing feature Bernstein highlights is how this thing we call reason could
once conjure up visions o f liberty, virtue, happiness, justice and goodness; and yet now
call to mind images of repression, oppression, domination, terror and violence. For
Condorcet, a major figure o f the French Enlightenment, "Reason" is humanity's hero, her
savior. Platonic in this sense, Condorcet sets forth a historical perspective on the
development of the human mind, and reason is that crowning achievement central to the
indefinite teleological progress and perfection o f humanity, to a future utopia.
Reason passes through difficult trials. It must triumph over the devious 
tactics of priests, tyrants, despots, and cunning hypocrites. But in the 
course o f history, it gains an overwhelming momentum; [and]... with the 
discovery of printing, the good works o f publicists and especially through 
public education, the fUll illumination of Reason spreads to all of 
humankind, (p. 33)
Reason makes for virtue, peace and happiness for all o f humanity. By the faith o f reason, 
Condorcet (1795/1955) can hope: "The time will therefore come when the sun shall 
shine only on free men who know no other master but their reason" (p. 179). O f course, 
Condorcet is not the only one throughout history to feel this way about reason, only an 
exemplar.
Yet today, reason is viewed with an altogether different eye, is seen in a very 
different light, if in any "light" at all. Bernstein (1991b) spends a great deal of time in his 
essay with Weber and his biting critique o f Enlightenment thought and its zealous 
devotion to reason, because Bernstein, with MacIntyre (1984), feels our age in its 
commentary o f itself is principally Weberian. Weber unmasks the "dialectic of 
Enlightenment"—a term coined by Adorno and Horkheimer—and highlights its dark side
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which advances its own self-annihilation. His is the exposition of the modern 
"disenchantment o f the world" (see Chapter 2) via a reason increasingly dominated by 
"purposive rationality," oriented to ends and means and results, dominated by science 
which is powerless to tell us what to do and how to live, to give us meaning and value. 
U s conclusion is that our ultimate concerns (i.e., our faith) can rest upon no scientific or 
rational foundation. Paradoxically, this "reason" o f scientific rationality shapes all o f life 
in such a way that, rather than promote, it threatens democracy, freedom and the very 
existence o f humanity, the autonomous agency o f the individual. Weber thus calls the 
future an "iron cage" and perhaps a stage for the drama o f war and oppression. 
"Modernity is not characterized by a universal assent to, and institutionalization of, 
natural rights, but by a new polytheism of warring, incommensurable value 
commitments, by a new and violent struggle o f gods and demons" (Bernstein, 1991b,
P- 37).
In some ways, Adorno's portrait of reason and its rule in contemporary times is 
even more grim than Weber's. All types of rationality appear to involve attempts to 
master reality; thus, at reason's root, at least as reason is conceived in the West, lies the 
will to control; hidden is a repressive logic present in and foundational to the genesis of 
Western culture, "identity logic," which Adorno posits is inherently domination, the will 
to be rid o f singularity, difference, and otherness. The result is the subjugation, for 
example, o f nature, o f women, and eventually o f the self.14 "The Enlightenment has
'The Creation myth including the "Fall o f Man" begun with in Chapter 2 and 
foundational to much o f Western thought is exemplary of this hidden logic o f which 
Adorno speaks. Behind the act o f plucking and consuming the forbidden fruit from the
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always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the hilly 
enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944/1972, p.
3). Of course, one might question if the earth is truly fully enlightened, or enlightened at 
all. Yet even still, Adomo lays claim to some o f the promises o f the Enlightenment faith 
o f reason, for social freedom as inseparable from enlightened thought, for example- 
aware also of the danger o f the dark side, in this case, the realization of freedom's 
opposite. Bernstein (1991b) calls it the "mimesis o f redemption" which Adorno 
presents: the dialectic is radicalized to account for the boundless abundance o f the 
promise, able to break the power o f identity logic, to transform social reality through 
such bursting. Thus, Adorno self-consciously embraces the utopian ideals and hopeful 
aspirations of the Enlightenment, the frith o f reason, though not in entirety and fully 
aware of the dangers. We see here highlighted the risk of faith, and its indelible relation 
to the promise.
Heidegger, however, takes the depravity o f reason to its height, according to 
Bernstein, where it is travesty and something o f a farce to even speak o f humanism, 
liberty, freedom, happiness, anymore—the promise o f good offered through 
Enlightenment reason found to be empty.15 Rather, the "prefigured possibilities o f Plato"
tree of the knowledge o f good and evil is, with this desire for wisdom and the knowledge 
of all things, the will to mastery or control, to identify with God, to possess the identity 
of God. Of course, too, the result is the "curse": the alienation of humanity from nature, 
man from woman, the” soul” o f humanity from itself; and the domination o f humanity 
over nature, and o f man over woman—thus, subjugation.
15While Heidegger is without doubt a critic o f reason, particularly as it has been 
construed and expressed in the modern West, as it has been played out in the history of 
the West, I do not agree with Bernstein's portrait o f Heidegger in this regard. I do not
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have been played out to bring us to the forgetfulness o f being, the "cosmic night" o f 
nihilism, wherein only a god can save us. The specter of Nietzsche is obviously found in 
all o f these critiques, and given the histories we have traced, and the explications o f these 
and other thinkers on the path and destiny o f reason, we can certainly begin to 
understand the cries against it, the wrath unleashed upon it.
Yet, despite all this and perhaps because of it, Bernstein finally reaffirms the faith 
of reason, those Enlightenment dreams o f freedom, equality, peace and happiness for all 
of humanity—hopes actually long preceding the Enlightenment, historically. He claims 
that these hopes animate us still, inspiring even the scholars who are reason's utmost 
critics. For we note, these scholars make use of advanced reason, in fact, to discredit 
reason and posit alternatives. Says Bernstein: "Many o f us still share [this] faith in the 
potential power o f public discussion and education" (p. 35)—education still somehow 
seen as a power, and a central conduit o f reason. Bernstein seeks, then, to revive reason 
or reconceptualize it—the faith o f reason—in highlighting, with Habermas, the rationality 
of communicative action above purposive action.
Habermas complains that the critiques of reason have failed to understand fully 
the nature o f social action, undermining the import and primacy o f communicative 
rationality, evidenced most clearly in speech which is not directed at success but at
believe Heidegger throws over altogether any talk of human and world hope for freedom 
and for good. He does problematize this discourse, the unthought-through notion of 
human agency, and in fact, contrasts what has come to be called "reason" with thought, 
which he extols. See, for example, Poetry. Language. Thought (1971) and The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays (1977) in their entirety.
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shared understanding.16 Instead, undue power and prominence are given to purposive 
rationality. O f course, these critiques perhaps have simply recognized that to which 
dominance has been given, what reason has become—or is in threat o f becoming reduced 
and narrowed to—in the modem age, in the system o f capitalism's selective rationality. 
Nonetheless, while admitting to such selectivity and dominance, and a corresponding 
bent toward the disfigurement/contortion o f the life world, he refutes the idea that this 
plight is somehow unremittably predestined as the teleological actualization of 
Enlightenment thought. Motivated by "the conviction that a humane collective life
II!While I am not ready, as some feminists seem to be, to assign reason to the 
masculine domain, to "give" rationality over to men or to describe it as a male construct 
or characteristic or function, I cede that reason is clearly gendered, at least existentially 
and ontically. However, despite the pathology o f the transcendent or universal function 
in Western culture, I am not ceding the necessity or reality o f this function, though it 
must be counter-balanced with an acknowledgment o f the particularity, the historicity, 
and the temporality o f human existence (including gender, class, race, age, etc.), and of 
all things in the cosmos. This is to say that reason is, as well, a construct which reaches 
beyond gender, laying claim by definition to something universal and transcendent. Yet, 
a fruitful line of inquiry regarding the gendered development o f reason in the West might 
be found in this distinction Habermas makes between purposive and communicative 
rationality. In the sense that reason in the West has been funneled into the much 
narrower expression o f purposive rationality, and that this form o f rationality seems to be 
the dominant one exhibited in males, we might associate the reason which has reigned 
with the masculine. This is not to say, however, that females cannot or do not operate in 
the world purposively, as well. In like manner, females have traditionally been more 
inclined to, or more gifted in, the communicative form o f rationality. Developmentally, 
girls generally outshine boys in verbal and communication skills at an early age.
However, males and females are constituted by both masculine and feminine principles, 
capable o f purposive and communicative expression. Males have typically, in the West 
particularly, been described as agentic, aimed at success over or with the Other—females, 
in contrast, as relational, oriented toward understanding the Other. In this way, the West 
may indeed stand in dire need of the introduction o f the feminine principle, a resurgence 
of communicative reason. It is possible to suggest, as well, that there may be a 
biological element at work in the different rational strengths found in males and females— 
reflected metaphorically, for example, in the figures o f the phallus and the womb— 
although such ideas are hotly debated.
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depends on the vulnerable forms o f innovation-bearing, reciprocal and unforcedly 
egalitarian everyday communication" (Habermas, cited in Bernstein, 1991b, p. 45), 
Habermas claims that rationality is in fact inherently diaiogical, that communication, 
though threatened by contemporary forces, is foundational to, at the heart of, reason.
Interestingly enough, in affirming reason in this light, in attempting to salvage it, 
Bernstein turns to Gadamer who not only asserts that humanity by its very nature, that 
being-in-the world, is ontologically diaiogical, but also lauds Plato as the great advocate 
of communicative rationality in the West, and works to revive what he calls an 
underground tradition and forgotten theme of the West, and o f reason. Plato, often seen 
as the great villain who introduced the West to the dualistic destructiveness o f reason, is 
here affirmed as the great hero, the father o f the dialogues, in defense o f spoken and 
written conversation, understanding through communication. Bernstein remains in 
agreement with the insight o f many "post" philosophical critiques that notions like 
communicative rationality, dialogue and community bear with them the potential for 
becoming oppressive and imprisoning ideas, and have become such, in fact, in the past, 
just as has reason, rationality, truth, etc. Indeed, much can go wrong in the "lines" o f 
communication, and in truth, the West has tended to institutionalize monologue rather 
than dialogue, a singular conversation~if it can be called that, a false and fixed "We" 
violently globally imposed, silencing the "other," the marginal, difference.
Still, aware o f the danger—particularly in our present technological age of 
information where communication is often seen as a mere exchange o f data, Bernstein 
sees a greater danger, namely, that dialogue is not even possible without something
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shared: beliefs, passions, values, commitments—mutual care, a common faith. Reason
presupposes virtue, as well: the "good will" to listen and genuinely strive to understand
what is different and other, the humble courage to venture one's own treasured beliefs
and ideals. O f course, herein are points o f deficiency and lack, too often denied with the
pretence o f some enforced consensus, imposed mutuality. Moral skepticism has its
place, then, but as critical if not more so, is moral passion—the faith as well as the doubt
o f reason—for this enduring yet broken and vulnerable ideal o f "diaiogical communicative
rationality." The voice o f nihilism must be heard and heeded, says Bernstein, but not the
temptation to fatalistically assign the West to infinite decline and ultimate destitution and
death, nor to write reason's history in an essentialist manner that ends entirely in
undisclosed forms o f violence. The conclusion, in agreement with Wilber (1995) as well
as Plato (c.a. 380 b.c./1992), is that:
The claim to reason has a 'stubbornly transcending power [emphasis 
mine], because it is renewed with each act o f unconstrained 
understanding' and with 'each moment o f living together in solidarity1 
[Habermas, 1982]. But never before has this claim to  communicative 
reason been so threatened from so many different directions. A practical 
commitment to the avenging energia o f communicative reason is the 
basis—perhaps the only honest basis—for hope.
(Bernstein, 1991b, pp. 52-53)
Hope, commitment, courage, good will, dialogue, virtue, moral passion, shared 
faith—such constitutes Bernstein's ultimate response to the contemporary rage against 
reason, cognizant o f the ease with which these ideals may be spoken of and lauded but 
the difficulty o f achieving their realization. Although he does not directly return to Plato 
or to that original concern around which reason rallies regarding the examination o f the
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life world in the service of its enrichment, regarding education as the upward journey of 
the soul to goodness and worth, he does affirm anew the faith o f reason (through public 
discussion and education). And it is definitely more akin to the reason o f Plato, imbued 
with and indelibly tied to value, grounded in a faith, than the reason o f today so decried.
Reason is perhaps, then, not humanity’s ultimate problem or enemy: not the 
crime of Plato, not the failure o f the Enlightenment, not the compost o f modernity, not 
the discredited history of the West. Reason as construed, manifested, operative in 
contemporary Western culture has, however, become in many respects antagonistic to 
human life as well as the life o f the Kosmos, and thus a problem of ultimate concern.
Yet, it is a distorted, narrowed, truncated and repressive reason-unreasonable, probably 
hardly worthy o f the name. Still, whether reason is raged against for this reason, or 
defended, little addressed is the faith o f it, more fundamentally at issue. For the rage 
against reason or the desperate attempt to salvage it expresses not primarily reason in 
crisis but the crisis of our faith, o f the faith of reason—faith being reason's critical ground.
In our excavation, in the historical labyrinths we have traversed, we have 
uncovered not only or primarily this Platonic image of reason, but of education as the 
upward journey o f the human soul in which reason figures prominently—more directly, 
the faith of reason. We have traced not only its enduring power, its rendering, in the 
West, and the altercations of this faith and thus also o f the image o f reason therein, but 
also its denial, its reduction, its repression, its deformation—its dis-integration. Most 
clearly, we have gleaned it in what education as we know it, via schooling, seems to have 
become. For it is barely even, if at all, any more in the service of reason, splintered
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almost beyond comprehension or meaning, buried beneath the trivial. It is little more 
than a dead relic unable or unwilling to attest to Plato's living transcendent journey o f the 
human soul.
The sundering and narrowing o f reason, its abnegation o f transcendence on the 
one hand and dissociation from the natural world on the other, serve to alienate it from 
its ground in frith, to distance it from a consciousness o f care and ultimate concern, of 
temporality. Nevertheless, there is the presence and pervasiveness of some ultimate care, 
it has simply been overthrown, in the sense that the whole concept o f ultimacy has been 
buried, disavowed, denied. The concept of ultimacy is seen in association with faith, 
which is felt to be operative against reason, that which enslaves rather than emancipates 
humanity. By it, humanity loses not only this world, but its soul as well, in search of 
some other world, nonexistent, always promised, never delivered. Faith, then, is little 
spoken o f or thought about, especially in relation to reason.
Although, with reason disturbed in contemporary times—humanity's new 
scapegoat, its centrality and value definitively in crisis, talk o f frith is again beginning to 
be heard, though perhaps not always directly (Bernstein, 1991b; Derrida, 1992/1995; 
Ricoeur, 1969/1974; Purpel, 1989; etc.; as well as in popular culture through the lyrics 
o f musicians and vocalists like Natalie Merchant, for example, and the literature of 
widely-read writers such as William Bennett, 1993, 1996; and Mother Theresa, 1995). 
For, through reason, it seems humanity is losing itself and all the world. The appeal to 
faith, the call o f frith, at large and in the field of education, entails a common exploration 
of the source and summit of humanity’s ultimate care, or an examination of life, of human
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existence, in terms o f value, meaning, worth. This call o f faith is, in this way, an appeal 
to Plato's faith o f reason, rooted in that foundational Socratic notion that the 
examination o f life may be undertaken toward the creation o f worthy living.
While we must seek to settle our issues with reason, clearly, a response to the 
crisis involves, then, more than the interrogation o f reason: its overthrow, reaffirmation 
or healing restoration; before and beyond this, it entails the question of faith, beneath 
reason, here not as reason's alternative or opposite but as its ground and guide. The 
reason that has reigned—with a subterraneously operative faith, unacknowledged and 
misdirected—has shut out in many ways both body and spirit, lost soul. So reduced, this 
reason has stripped humanity, the earth and the heavens o f their unknowing mystery and 
liveliness and significance: no inspiration, no awe, no wonder before the infinite 
temporality and finite eternality o f the Kosmos. Even language by which humanity might 
express and reflect upon and dwell in the heights and the depths has been stripped o f its 
"glory." Yet, for the ancients like Plato, the very fount o f meaningful knowledge is 
found in this presence and experience of wonder and mystery—reason's alpha and omega, 
its beginning and end (Sloan, 1983). It is faith which is reason's energia, axiologically 
directive and empowering.
Thus, in the call o f faith, against the backdrop o f this rage against reason, might 
lie reason's redemption. It will, o f course, involve a venture into faith, an honest 
examination o f that which Western culture has unconfessedly made ultimate, and an 
inquiry into the source and summit of human care in the context o f our temporal 
existence, our being-in-the-world together. And it will probably involve repentance,
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literally meaning, as Heidegger would call it, a "turning"17: the reconceptualization, 
transformation o f faith, reason, the faith o f reason—negation, preservation, integration, 
transcendence. Reason, by a renewed faith, might then be grounded once again in value 
and worth, in the language o f vision, in spirit, in education as an enlightening upward 
journey o f  the soul, the human-soul, the world-soul. Like the reason o f Plato, it might 
behold an image o f the good, and live in the light o f this view. For as it is written, 
"Where there is no vision, the people perish... " (The Holy Bible. 1985, Proverbs 29:
18), and all the Kosmos, it seems, as well. Indeed, such vision must be self-conscious, 
regenerative, akin to Adorno's self-conscious affirmation o f certain Enlightenment ideals. 
With reason, then, would come affirmation, a sacred "Amen," a "Yes" to life. For now, 
it might be named faithful reason (Phenix, 1981), rooted in "a prior and primary grasp" 
(Sloan, 1983, p. 20) o f the Kosmic whole, or reasonable faith. We should, perhaps, call 
it post-rational reason, or trans-rational. For, it would be a reason beyond reason, as it is 
known this day, able to imagine and seek again the good and true and beautiful in human 
life. Only then, perhaps, will reason have, finally, a reason to hope.
17See Heidegger's (1962/1977e) "The Turning," in The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essavs.
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EPILOGUE: SOJOURNING IN THE LAND OF PROMISE
By faith, he [Abraham] sojourned in the land o f promise, as in a 
strange country, dwelling in tabernacles with Isaac and Jacob, the heirs 
with him o f the same promise. (The Holv Bible. 1985, Hebrews 11:9)
It is required o f me that I leave this work with a conclusion, a summation of
sorts, a closing statement in which I disclose to my reader the implications o f this study,
its meaning and significance, or perhaps suggest from it a future path, program, plan, and
destination, particularly with regard to the project o f education. Yet, to conclude is to
intimate completion, closure, a final word. I am presently, however, more accurately
faced once more with the "inner infinity of the dialogue," the "infinity of the unsaid"
(Gadamer, 1960/1992), and the abiding call o f faith: a venir,1 yet to come, grounded in
hope and the promise. And gladly so. I am personally wary, too, o f the "immediate
presentation"2 o f thought here occasioned, particularly with respect to standing before
'I have borrowed this french expression from Jacques Derrida (1990), in "Force 
of Law: The Mystical Foundation o f Authority,'" in which he discusses the idea of 
justice in its relation to the act o f deconstruction. Regarding justice, Derrida speaks o f 
an infinite, irreducible debt owed to the other, a debt we cannot pay and yet a debt 
demanding payment. Justice, as law, can only be exercised in a decision that cuts, made 
in the "night o f non-knowledge" (borrowing from Kierkegaard), o f non-rule, holding 
within it some irruptive violence; thus, he says: "Justice remains, is yet to come, a 
venir" (p. 969). Justice is, then, that to which we never arrive, but that to which we 
aspire, having the character o f hope and promise. Also, "faith is the sister of justice" 
(cited in Mead, 1989), according to an old Latin proverb.
2Derrida (1989) borrows this phrase, and the cautionary note behind it, from 
Martin Heidegger. The context in which he uses it concerns the question o f reading 
Heidegger, and is a response to those who condemn and censor such reading because o f 
Heidegger's association with Nazism. Derrida unveils the complexity of the issue, 
reiterating the word o f Heidegger in warning against the danger and thoughtlessness o f 
"immediate presentation." Derrida says more generally that this means "less ease in 
armed declarations and morality lessons, less haste toward platforms and tribunals, even
198
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the Mystery, and seeking to "explain" it to myself or others, that which is essentially 
inexplicable, and yet which is the essence o f life—spirit, the animating principle. I am 
again as I was when I began, then, like Abraham, "going out, not knowing whither,” yet 
going out all the same, and also sojourning as in a land o f promise, which is a dwelling 
with others who are also heirs with me of the promise. I find such an image to be, as 
well, descriptive o f this project we call "education”—once stripped, o f course, o f our 
pretensions at certainty and control regarding human knowledge and destiny—or at least 
a compelling image, perhaps, through which to re-imagine what it means to educate.
The Canadian scholar David Jardine (1992) states that education—the word itself 
drawn from the Latin educere. meaning "to bring forth"—is fundamentally concerned 
with the "bringing forth" o f human life. In this way, we are reminded of Plato's notion of 
education via his "Allegory o f the Cave" in which the uneducated is likened to the dead, 
the living dead, and the process o f education to that o f liberating the prisoner and 
drawing the life of the soul out o f its shackles and out o f the confines of the cave to the 
light of the sun, to spirit, and fullness of life. In like manner, Socrates is said to have 
seen himself as a midwife, drawing out the inner life o f his students, and as a gadfly as 
well, stirring up the lazy and lifeless to thought and understanding. Jardine goes on to 
describe education, then, as "essentially a 'generative' discipline, concerned with the 
emergence of new life in our midst, and what it is we might hope for this new life, what 
it is we might wish to engender" (p. 116).
if it were to respond to acts o f violence, rhetorical or other" (p. 8).
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Ideally, this new life is the embodiment o f  human possibility, the possibility that
we might transcend the actual, that we might aspire to that beyond what is, that life also
might endure, ever begetting newness o f life and transformation. Such is, o f course,
both the problem and promise of education: how to "educe new life" (p. 116) and yet
preserve what is, and yet also serve what might be. Education involves, then, our
understanding o f and response to life, and its continuity and ever-renewing character,
and our desire for an understanding and faithful response which allows us to continue
living together with respect for what is (inclusive o f what has been) and with hope and
openness toward what is yet to come. It is the faith o f Socrates we affirm, and the aim
of education: that the examination of life and of the life-world and our place in it—that
an inquiry into them as they are and as they have been and as they could yet be—might
assist us in the creation o f lives of meaning and worth (aspiring to the good and true and
beautiful), personally and collectively; and that through on-going engagement in this
endeavor, future generations might be heirs too, with us, o f this promise.
It follows that central to the educative process or to pedagogical method is
hermeneutical inquiry, because such inquiry differs from others in that it is by nature
educational, directed toward these very concerns:
Hermeneutic inquiry has as its goal to educe understanding, to bring forth 
the presuppositions in which we already live. Its task, therefore is not to 
methodically achieve a relationship to some matter and to secure 
understanding in such a method. Rather, its task is to recollect the 
contours and textures o f the life we are already living, a life that is not 
secured by the methods we can wield to render such a life our object.... 
Hermeneutics wants to recover the original difficulties of life, difficulties 
that are concealed... in the attempt to render human life objectively 
presentable, (pp. 116, 118)
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Dwayne Huebner (1974) affirms similarly the "Hermes Process” as the pedagogical 
process, bringing forth and making present that which is unintelligible or foreign into the 
light o f understanding. I would add that a part o f its task, as well, is to elucidate the all- 
too-intelligible, familiar and thereby unthought, by making it strange and perhaps 
unintelligible. Curriculum content is "Otherness," in a sense, and in one moment, we 
make it a part o f us, opening up to it and taking it into ourselves; in another, we marvel 
at the Otherness within. In this way, the question o f meaning is ever before us, and the 
necessity for ongoing acts o f interpretation. Hermes, from which hermeneutics is 
derived as the art o f interpretation, is the messenger-god of the Greeks, responsible for 
communicating with humanity, for presenting to humanity in receivable form, that which 
is beyond human understanding; as such, he is a mediator between the human and 
divine, and he is also construed as the great trickster, who sometimes trips up the 
vulnerable lines o f communication. Where Hermes is present, present also is difficulty 
and ambiguity and insaturability, and the call to ever engage anew the question of 
meaning, and as Richard Rorty (1989) has said, to keep the conversation going.
Thus, I am here struggling, for the form o f this inquiry has been hermeneutic, in 
order that it might not only be educative in this way, but also in the way o f affirming the 
essential ambiguity and mystery o f human life—its depthfulness. and the need for those 
who are concerned with the project o f education, who call themselves educators, to 
dwell within this affirmation and this difficulty. Herein, as well, is my resistance in 
writing a conclusion, and in seeking to directly apply what I have gleaned through this 
work to educational goals and practices, or concretize its implications in terms of
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curriculum content and design, teaching and pedagogical method, or classroom 
procedure and the practice o f schooling. To many it is unclear if schools actually 
provide education at all, or are even concerned with the process o f educating human 
beings; in fact, some assert that schools actually mis-educate, or serve to hinder the 
educational process. Yet, if so, it does not follow that this has to be the case. I do not 
wish here to enter into this question, although it is related to the problem to which I am 
alluding. Schooling, as an institution, tends to give method and procedure precedence 
over all things, to make human life, and education as the bringing forth of human life, 
something "objectively presentable." This is to say that the overriding concern seems to 
find expression in an attempt to pin life down, to  fix the educational enterprise, in such a 
way so that it might be certain, so that there is nothing left to say, in order to achieve the 
final word. Similarly, it appears to me that such activities which attempt to address the 
task of education by breaking it down into these identifiable separable elements which 
are then delineated definitively, that a great deal o f the discussions on the goal of 
education or on curriculum content or on pedagogical method, for example, are largely 
shaped by this incessant quest for certainty, this faithless or idolatrous need to strip life 
of its difficulty, its ambiguity, its mystery. It is the search for this final word, which is 
more accurately the death o f the word, an attempt to kill it, which is also the death of 
thought, and ironically antithetical, in fact, to the educational impulse.
I concur with David Jardine who speaks, rather, o f education as a hermeneutical 
endeavor and hermeneutics as a "returning o f life to its original difficulty [which also] is 
a returning of the possibility o f the living Word. It is a return to the essential generativity
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of human life, a sense o f life in which there is always something left to say” (p. 119). 
Prior, then, to any discussion of teaching or o f curriculum, is an image o f life, and thus of 
education, from which a particular kind o f discussion about these matters is always 
generated, or in some cases closed off Thus, I have sought first to investigate these 
images in Western Civilization throughout this work, and suggest here the primacy of the 
need to not only inquire into the images we hold regarding education, but also to re- 
imagine them, so that the Word might live, so that there is always something more to 
say, so that life may in fact be brought forth. Technical, methodological, material and 
scientific images, for some time, have dominated, constraining our thoughts about 
education, aimed at overcoming or solving life's difficulty and ambiguity, rather than 
giving voice to them and entering into them in faith. Honored, in this sense, is the letter 
of the law, instead of the spirit of the Word.
These interests, investigations and affirmations are obviously related to what I 
described in the Prologue as a religious critique o f education, concerned with the lack of 
depth and loss o f soul evidenced today, the forgotten questions which life is ever raising 
about its meaning and regarding concerns o f ultimacy. The religious perspective has to 
do with our relationship with forces and powers beyond the known world. Clearly, these 
forces shape what is known, and how we know. Religious questions are directed toward 
our kinship or affiliation with the cosmos, with what is not known and not knowable, 
with what is Other to us, and even with the Otherness we find within—the mysterious 
"moreness" (Huebner, 1995, in press) which ever eludes our grasp, beyond 
understanding, but yet within which "we live and move and have our being" (The Holy
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Bible. 1985, Acts 17:28). In this sense, the religious attitude is fundamentally 
hermeneutical, and gravitates toward questions o f origin, meaning, and ultimacy and calls 
humanity to respond to them (Purpel, 1989). Educationally speaking, for instance, if 
today we are pressed by the need to address our global ecological problems or the issue 
of multiculturalism, we must reinvite the religious in order to attend to this call. I am 
seeking to validate, then, the religious attitude, an attitude I feel is beneath the human 
impulse to "educate,” however denied in modem times. Robert Nisbet (1974) speaks o f 
"religion's profound relation to the structure o f human society and to the deepest regions 
of human consciousness" (p. 157, emphasis mine). Kitard Nishada (1990) has put it this 
way: "The religious demand is the demand o f life itself.... Those who think seriously 
cannot help but feel an intense religious demand" (p. 152).
Obviously, the task o f education is strongly associated with the task o f thinking 
"seriously," with teaching students to think, with exposing students to the thoughts o f 
others we deem important, those we have recognized culturally as significant and serious 
and thought-ful. Unfortunately, we often forget these thoughts have been judged thus in 
their contribution to a particular vision of life, and in their power to speak to present 
human need and to the human condition. Education also involves entering into a 
reflection with students upon what it, in fact, means to think, into a thinking upon the 
very process o f thinking and where such thinking takes us, and upon the products o f our 
thought. Yet, for example, I have this encounter one day in the coffee house with a well- 
esteemed university professor o f science: he inquires after what I have been so diligently 
applying myself to day in and day out—the dissertation. O f course, he then wants to
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know the "field" in which I am pursuing a  doctorate. The mere mention o f the word 
"education" provokes a diatribe by him about the absurdity o f such a field, o f a College 
o f Education finding place in the University, o f such a subject being afforded academic 
credibility. Teaching is merely a question o f skill and technique, not an intellectual 
pursuit, he informs me. He laughs about departments which have their "little" laboratory 
kindergartens and concludes with the assertion that all one needs to teach is a knowledge 
of the discipline, a chalkboard and a piece o f chalk.
My first thought is that I would like to throw him into a classroom o f thirty five- 
year old children with nothing more than a  knowledge of his discipline, a chalkboard and 
a piece o f chalk and see if his hypothesis holds. Clearly, there is a history to this kind of 
thinking about education, a history tied up in the Northern European birth o f curriculum 
with its emphasis on methodological concerns, a history not shared, for example, in 
Germany where the concept o fbildung3 has dominated educational thought, where 
practice and theory are not so markedly distinguished, where research is neither sharply 
separated from teaching, nor esteemed above it. Clearly, as well, this professor's 
attitudes are understandable in light o f the field's attempt to model itself after the 
sciences, which is to make of it a "pseudo-science," and its endearment to images o f a 
technical, managerial nature. Yet, what I find to be so disturbing about his stance is, in
5The German concept, bildung. is referential o f an interest in culture and human 
development and potential; its history has origins in medieval mysticism, and Herder has 
so aptly described it as a "rising up to humanity through culture" (cited in Gadamer, 
1960/1992, p. 10).
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fact, its thoughtlessness: it is a thinking which has stopped thinking,4 which has found 
the final word. The attitude implies that this man is estranged from the very nature o f 
what he does as an educator in the university.
The university is founded on the premise of education, the value o f the open- 
minded search for truth, the necessity and worth o f the practice o f inquiry, o f life 
informed by inquiry. Yet, here is a university professor who neither questions the 
meaning o f his work, nor the boundaries o f the discipline within which he works, nor 
apparently encourages this questioning in his students. He no longer seems to ask 
questions regarding what constitutes knowledge within this frame and how it is 
constituted, or the value o f what is counted as knowledge therein and its limits. The 
assumption is expressed, too, that knowledge is something static that can be finally 
gotten and possessed, like some object which then can be passed on to the next 
generation with the stroke o f a piece o f chalk. Apparent, as well, is the absence o f any 
historical consciousness regarding that in which he engages. He does not consider that 
science arose in the West from the practice of philosophy, and that at one time, 
philosophy and education were deemed to be one and the same. His discipline would not 
exist were it not for the project o f education—it is a part o f that project—and the original 
impulse from which it was generated. I am not here intending to defend the study of 
education against such assaults, but to demonstrate with a tangible example evidence of
'Evoking the image of the Logic of Death spoken o f in Chapter 2, Hannah Arendt 
puts it this way: "Without the breath of life the human body is a corpse: without 
thinking the human mind is dead" (cited in Waithe, 1995, p. 252, emphasis in original).
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this loss o f depth, Nishada's "serious1* thought, o f which I am speaking, thus the need for 
religious critique and the religious attitude brought to bear on the practice o f education, 
and to direct myself, for the benefit o f my reader, toward the implications o f such a 
critique and such an attitude for education.
These matters come together for me, at least, in Heidegger's (1927/1962) critique 
of modernity, characterized by what he calls the forgetfulness or forgetting o f being, or 
the loss o f the very question of the meaning o f being in human consciousness. His 
project, in response to this loss, has been described as the "quest for being” (Spiegelberg, 
1982; Collinson, 1987), what I would submit is, as well, a religious critique of 
modernity—albeit not in name—because he seeks to revive the question of the meaning of 
human existence, of life, and being, the lost dimension of depth or soul. While I do not 
wish to take a detour here into the intricacies and complexities o f this critique 
(particularly because it is in the same line with Kovel's notion o f the despiritualization o f 
life and Weber's discussion o f the disenchantment o f the world we have already fleshed 
out in the substance o f this work), I would like to highlight the inextricable kinship and 
interrelatedness o f concepts like being, spirit, soul and logos, or word. "Being" as 
referential o f life, existence, essence, a person human or divine, is tied to "spirit," 
immaterial being, the animating principle o f life, the vital principle and active essence o f a 
human person, the breath o f the divine (Oxford English Dictionary. 1989, vols. II and 
XVI, pp. 80,251-253). "Spirit" has likewise been defined as the soul of a person or 
being, and "being" as the active, vitalizing immaterial soul, as well, embodied as the 
world soul, or the human soul, or the soul o f the divine (Vine's Expository Dictionary.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
208
n.d.). Soul, too, is that which is immaterial, and also that which is figurative, symbolic, 
mythic.
For Heidegger, the logos, the word, language, is the house o f being and speaks 
the mystery o f being. Gadamer (1960/1992) explains it in this way: "The articulation of 
the logos brings the structure o f being into language, and this coming into language is ... 
nothing other than the presencing o f being itself, its aletheia [truth]. Human thought 
regards the infinity o f this presence as its fulfilled potential, its divinity” (p. 457). Logos 
denotes word, and also utterance, discourse, reason, mind—the immaterial force which is 
said to direct life, at least life human and divine. It is the expression o f thought, the 
creative power which provides inspiration, wisdom, and guidance to humankind 
(Angeles, 1981). With the Stoics, logos is intimately tied to destiny, fate, teleology. It is 
an active, underlying principle, cosmic and divine. As it is said, "In the beginning was 
the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (The Holv Bible. 1985, 
John 1:1). The Greek logos has here been taken up to refer to the divine Christ, the 
incarnation o f the spirit, the embodied manifestation of the deity, the expression o f the 
mind of God (Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible: Dictionaries o f the 
Hebrew and Greek Words, n d ;  Vine's Expository Dictionary. n.d.).
What is then seen is how the forgetting o f being in human consciousness might be 
said to coincide with the excommunication o f spirit, the loss o f soul or o f the religious, 
disenchantment and the death o f the word, i.e., the institutionalization o f the final word. 
Heidegger (1927/1962) describes this mind-lessness or thought-lessness toward being, 
particularly heightened in the modem world, a world reduced by the tendencies o f
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
209
science: attention is directed to the study o f specific entities o r beings, rather than being 
itself or the meaning o f being. In addition, he asserts that because o f initial 
interpretations o f being in Western thought, the question o f being (and its meaning) has 
been viewed as self-evident and superfluous. Its neglect has actually been sanctioned. 
Yet, primary to the problem, like the ambiguity o f life, is the enigma o f being: 
"Everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything toward which we 
comport ourselves in any way, is being; what we are is being and how we are" (p. 26), 
yet since we live already in a vague understanding o f being, the question is trivialized, 
taken as obvious, self-evident, and thus ignored. Thus, the meaning o f being is still 
hidden from us, veiled in darkness; perhaps so familiar, we do not grasp it at all, though 
we conduct all o f our activities in and with this unexamined understanding o f being.
I take, then (and I am suggesting), a religious attitude toward teaching, which is 
not so much characterized by its particular content or method as by its spirit. It is an 
attempt to faithfully dwell with students in "the land o f promise," keeping ever before me 
the call to remember being, to acknowledge the presence o f spirit—the "moreness" which 
speaks and moves beyond me and my own understanding, to remain open to the power 
of the living Word, to inquire into the meaning of my work with students, and to address 
issues o f ultimate concern in the creation o f a vision where the good, true and beautiful 
are ongoingly aspired to, though never fully reached. This is, as well, a critical stance 
which recognizes and interrogates the present pervasiveness o f "powers and 
principalities" (Huebner, 1995, p. 20; forces tied up with idolatry, commandment and 
the reign o f death; see Chapters 1 and 2) which seek to forget being, to exile spirit, to
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say the last word, to undermine questions o f meaning and ultimacy, and to thwart human 
vision. Of course, I also seek to encourage such a posture in my students because I 
believe it is generative o f life, and because I believe in the possibility o f redemption and 
transformation. In this way, my teaching is also an act o f witnessing, of giving 
testimony, for I do not believe I could be an educator unless I could attest to education's 
potential efficacy in bringing forth life, in contributing to the transformation o f my own 
soul.
Students in my undergraduate classes are usually initially very confused by my 
call to examine the unexamined, and by my incessant questions of meaning. They are 
confused because what I ask o f them seems at first ridiculous, a useless inquiry into the 
self-evident. They are confused because they have generally never been asked to think in 
this way, to consider the unthought, or even the meaning o f what they are doing when 
they are being "educated." Knowledge is all too often split from the question o f value, 
and made an object which students are taught to passively receive. Most shutter in 
trepidation, though a few thrill with delight, at my mention o f philosophy’s original 
kinship with education, at my postulation that the philosophical impulse (perhaps, simply 
put as the love o f and search for wisdom) is primary to the notion of education. I think 
at first they suspect that since I love philosophy, I am determined to impose it on them, 
even in a course which is not philosophy. The fear is that I will inflict Descartes' A 
Discourse on Method (1637/1912) on them, although I would be more inclined to 
introduce The Passions o f the Soul (1649/1989), given the deficiencies o f contemporary 
culture.
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"What is education?" I ask, for example. "What does it mean to be educated?” 
"What do you mean when you speak o f yourself as educated or as being educated?" Or 
in the case with preservice teachers, the question is what it is they mean when they 
express a desire to be educators and to work in the field o f education. Statements are 
made which we seek to unpack and possibly critique, but I wish also to go beyond this to 
the soul or spirit behind the statements. Thus, I ask them to conjure up the images they 
have o f education, and also images o f education which they feel are promoted culturally 
and collectively. I introduce the symbolic, the metaphorical and the mythic. For akin to 
the forgetting o f being, "we have forgotten or suppressed that imagination is a 
foundation o f our so-called 'givens,' [that] our language, practices, and resources are 
merely the embodied or materialized images in which we choose to dwell” (Huebner, 
1995, p. 13). We need to consider, then, the images within which we have chosen to 
dwell, whether by explicit intention or unconscious inheritance, if we are to participate in 
ever re-imagining. Are they tabernacles o f faith and promise in which we can peacefully 
together dwell with hope?
Students are then allowed to play these images, personal and societal, against 
each other and against other images, as well, held in the memory and tradition of 
Western culture, and ideally o f other cultures too. These images may include, for 
instance, Plato's "Allegory of the Cave," or Boethius's vision o f Philosophy (the great 
educator, and mother o f all disciplines o f study). Visiting and talking with Boethius in 
prison, she is an enchanting and beautiful figure who enlightens and comforts him, and 
gives him a clearing through which to transcend his plight—to obtain freedom of the soul,
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though body is bound. There is, as well, the first known representation o f the liberal arts 
of the fifth century, "On the Marriage o f Mercury and Philology," from the myth 
describing the bride Philologia (scholarship) who is attended by seven maidens, 
advocates of the liberal arts. Ramist maps o f knowledge and Tyler's rationale (see 
Chapter 4) are also images implying what it means to educate, though more demythified, 
literalized, perhaps manifesting the suppression o f the imagination, or what Huebner calls 
the "hegemony o f technical language" (p. 13).
I believe endeavors like this are important (and we can ask these questions of all 
the disciplines, o f the practice o f study and o f the act of teaching, as well) because o f this 
forgetfulness, this human condition I share with my students. I feel it in my own 
experience o f education; I see it in the experiences of my students; I hear it in the 
dominant educational discourse which trivializes what it means to educate and forgets 
the most significant questions and problems with which the task o f educating is 
challenged. Pervasive are mindless processes, unquestioned assumptions, and empty 
promises. Students, remembering autobiographically, speak o f fragments of meaningless 
names and dates and facts, rote exercises lacking personal investment, and uncaring 
teachers or professors. More often than not, they have never even thought to ask what 
education, or teaching, or history, or study, etc., has been, is to them, ought to be, or 
could be. It is the danger o f sheer socialization into that which exists, which is taken as 
given, which limits the imagination and the future (Huebner, 1974). Even then, in such a 
case, we do not really know what is, and "so long as we do not, through thinking, 
experience what is, we can never belong to what will be" (Heidegger, 1962/I977e).
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O f course, I am reflecting here on that which needs redeeming. There are 
experiences to be remembered from which to draw hope, as well: moments of insight, 
gifts developed and bestowed, and acts o f love on the part o f both students and teachers. 
Such probing activities are akin to Socrates' dialectic in which ideas or practices are 
inquired into, the actual and ideal are negotiated, and light is shed on the ways in which 
the legacy o f the past has shaped both what is and that to which we aspire, the 
possibilities and problems we have inherited through it. As well, we are brought to the 
limits of our own knowledge with a view o f the amazing complexity o f all things beside 
our simple, taken-for-granted representations. We also run up against that which is 
beyond our understanding in the aporia, the oppositions and paradoxes which somehow 
hold in tension and yet in harmony the many in a complex unity. Boethius is both 
imprisoned and yet free. Education socializes us into a tradition and encourages us to 
question that very tradition and revitalize it and move beyond it, binding and yet 
liberating. William Doll (in press) has captured this activity and aim so beautifully: "This 
is an education which questions the being o f all we hold sacred while at the same time 
manifests a faith that such questioning will lead us to the sacredness o f being"
(P- 12).
As a teacher, I, too, enter into this questioning, and am opening myself to 
newness of life. I may present students with texts, questions and processes through 
which to interrogate that which is under examination, yet they bring to them their own 
responses, ideas, experiences and questions. Basically, the act of teaching is no longer 
something I control: covering the material, staying on schedule and insuring that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
214
students take from me what I intend to give or get across to them is now secondary to 
creating a space, opening a clearing, for the happening o f understanding, a happening 
which transcends text, teacher and student, allowing us to experience the moreness, the 
transformative power o f the living Word. Students draw on their own experiences, 
bringing them to bear on the Otherness with which they are confronted, for example, 
individually, through autobiographical investigations, essays and commentaries o f texts, 
and collectively, through discussion, debate, dramatic interpretation and creative 
production. They are making something of this content, personally and together, making 
meaning, which is also a making sense o f life. Yet, I also am doing the same. I question 
the taken-for-granted nature o f what they think they know, and how they know it, and 
their assumed responses. They are living questions, too, about what I take for granted 
(Huebner, 1974). It is my desire that they enter into the discipline (discourse, 
knowledge, subject), the riches o f the Other, our collective wealth and the concerns 
which constitute the public world, but also that they be not overwhelmed or alienated or 
disempowered by the Other. Rather, my hope is that, as with myself, they might be 
blessed and enriched and challenged, engaged by the Other, invited to enter into a 
relationship wherein they, in turn, may bless and enrich, and participate in the critique 
and re-construction of the public world. Education becomes this sojourning together in 
the land o f promise, a living together in which memories, trials, triumphs and aspirations 
are shared, and in which we work and play together in the creation o f shared visions and 
worlds.
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I have taught, for example, a course in the "Curricular Disciplines: Social 
Studies” for elementary preservice teachers at the University for almost three years now. 
Not only has my syllabus changed significantly during this period, and the aims and texts 
and activities I have drawn upon, but also I, myself have been changed, through having 
laid myself open to the questions and before the mystery and through entering into study 
with students. One thing I have learned is that if one listens, the call will come. In this 
case, I can attest to this question which formed itself and began addressing itself to me, 
calling also for my response: How could the teaching of social studies be imbued with 
deep personal and collective meaning? How could teachers and students come to see 
and feel their part in the spiritual civilization o f humanity? More importantly, how could 
they connect their own personal struggles with the struggles of others and the pain o f the 
world? How could this reality and affect be taken up to make social studies an avenue 
for freedom, hope, faith, love, a site to inspire and enable teachers and students to 
become active participants in creating a more just, compassionate, beautiful world?
I have not even begun plumbing the depths o f these questions, but I am on this 
quest, and I invite my students each semester to become fellow pilgrims with me in this 
journey. Every semester is different, every semester I encounter new questions and 
another aspect of the mystery, which includes moments of fear and disappointment, and 
moments o f peace and inspiration. As for my students, those who truly enter in are 
changed too, though in ways uniquely their own. Thus, I begin the course with a 
welcome and an invitation, and openly confess that I do not know exactly what is in 
store for us, only that my hope is that we can faithfully investigate this discipline we call
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social studies and come into some insight about what it might mean to teach social 
studies to elementary school children, hi addition, I also encourage them to find out and 
develop who they are as teachers and to give themselves fully and joyfully to the art 
(their art) o f teaching in the field, as there is a field experience component to the course.
I share my faith, too, that they and I and the children we touch will be blessed and 
changed in these endeavors. I find I must usually respond first, o f course, to the anxiety 
my express not-knowing creates. A jewel o f Nietzsche's (1883/I982a) has become one I 
wear and share: "I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give 
birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: you still have chaos in yourselves" (p. 129).
The challenge is not to reach for the stars, nor to become a star, but to give birth to one 
that not only shines but dances as well, to trust in the hidden order and power of chaos.
What has developed and emerged thus far in this course is broadly an 
investigation of the question: What does it mean to teach social studies in the elementary 
school? Such has entailed uncovering the meanings—often forgotten, taken-for-granted, 
or obscured—buried in the concepts social studies, teaching, schooling, etc., personally 
for each one o f us and collectively as a group. It has meant looking at ourselves as 
teachers (or prospective teachers) and as learners, drawing on our own experiences as 
students o f social studies, questioning our own attitudes and assumptions and beliefs 
concerning different aspects o f social studies like history or geography and regarding 
various social and political issues, and involvement with a number o f "materials" and 
"methods" connected with the teaching o f social studies. It has meant doing all o f this 
together, as well, which has required a willingness to enter into a community, a
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community o f seekers who participate in critical and caring dialogue with themselves, 
with others, with the world—to sojourn together in faith.
Students write about why they wish to teach, for instance, inquiring into the 
underlying impulse behind this desire. This reflection involves how they conceive o f the 
act o f teaching, the life o f a teacher, the practice o f education. They are exposed to the 
visions o f others, as well, like Paulo Freire, or bell hooks, for example. All o f these 
images are shared and compared. Groups o f students create collaborative 
representations o f the typical teacher, of the "actual" teacher, involving what comes to 
mind in the presence o f this signifier and drawn from past experiences as students in 
relationship with teachers. Other images are then generated; yet, this time, they are 
ideal images which emerge from creatively imagining what might be, from thinking about 
the kind o f teachers they would like to be and would like to see their children and all 
children know. In doing so, they address not only the characteristics of the "actual" 
teacher in need o f redemption, but also their own inner calls and the calls o f their 
classmates and the dreams o f other teachers—perhaps, like Ghandi or Jesus or Mother 
Theresa—who have inspired them, in the light o f a vision of education which reflects that 
which is true and good and beautiful.
I am all-too-keenly aware, in this whole process, as the "teacher" in the class, of 
having set myself up first and foremost as the object o f this critique; it is a position 
which is not always comfortable, at times reproving, but always instructive. Yet, I 
believe in the value o f self-examination, and as it is said, to attend to the beam in my own 
eye before addressing the mote o f my brother or sister (The Holy Bible. 1985, Matthew
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7:3-5). I concur with "Aristotle [who] once said that teaching does whatever it does 'as 
to a friend'" (Noddings, 1993, p. 134), which is also as to oneself. I also believe in 
"modeling” that which I encourage, practicing what I preach, at least striving to embody 
the vision I share, however feebly, and admitting my failures.
This endeavor is akin to the process James Macdonald (1974) advocates as what 
the aim o f education should be: "the centering of the person in the world" (p. 104), a 
process he asserts cannot occur unless the teacher is also immersed in the practice of 
centering. He goes on to describe centering as that which addresses the problem of 
alienation from the ground o f one's being (Heidegger’s forgetfulness of being), a religious 
or spiritual experience involving an attitude which "encompasses the search to find our 
inner being or to complete [our] awareness of wholeness and meaning” (p. 104). It is 
also the work o f self-regulation, reaching for wholeness, for the meaningful integration 
of inner and outer realms, striving toward inner integrity and strength. As a teacher 
within this frame, I am ultimately one who is "engaged in the art o f living,... [immersed] 
in the process o f living with others [students] in a creative and spontaneous manner, 
having faith” (p. 115), keeping vision alive and encouraging the same in students.
What is particularly interesting, in this regard, is that in almost all cases, the 
reasons students give for wanting to enter into the life o f teaching are spiritual or 
religious in nature, in the way o f some vision, or ideal, some conviction o f the soul. 
"Theoretically, the presence o f 'God' in a person's life can be measured by his or her 
activity in the direction o f an ideal” (p. 105), says Nel Noddings, in line with Dewey's 
thought. It follows, then, especially once students have gone into the schools and seen
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firsthand the lives o f teachers, so consumed by bureaucratic and managerial demands and
standardized test scores and content coverage, that we need to interrogate these forces
in schools, societies, cultures, within ourselves, which seek to kill "God" in the soul, to
bury these visions, to cause us to forget and stray far from these deep original impulses.
In these cases, what is lost sight o f is the ultimate aim o f education, which Macdonald
identifies with the process o f centering, and Huebner (1995) with the journey o f the soul.
These forces, the overall effect of which I have called the logic or reign of death
(see Chapter 2), seem to dominate our (social/cultural/political/etc.) world in the present
historical moment. Huebner describes them as the principalities and powers—idolatry
and enslavement, their effect: a "derailing" which seeks to direct the soul's journey away
from the pursuit o f "God" and ultimate concern, restricting and thwarting it, defining it
beforehand. Huebner says:
The principalities and powers bring us into their spheres o f interest where 
we serve their ends, rather than the ultimate end ,... the pursuit of lesser 
ends or outcomes.... They restrict and impede the religious journey, 
condition human life to the mundane world, or fixate human life before 
the journey is completed, (p. 20)
They promote a false faith, in this way, in denial o f the ultimate and transcendent, and a
faith not our own, imposed on us from without. We find such a journey with aspirations
(if they can be so called) which do not bring forth life, but death. We find such a journey
of oppression, in which we are enslaved by the edicts forced upon us. Nothing but dying
idols and difficult commandments, once realized.
In many ways, this moves us into further inquiry regarding the meaning of
education, schooling, teaching and social studies, and a critique of the meanings already
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imposed and constructed. Students role-play various ethical positions taken by teachers 
in classrooms (for instance: exclusively neutral or partial, impartially neutral, or impartial 
yet committed) in a panel discussion and reflect on them. They conduct a debate in 
which they defend and challenge the three dominant traditions which regard social 
studies as either citizenship transmission, or social science, or reflective inquiry, in 
building their own living tradition. They bring to consciousness their own prior 
assumptions and memories o f social studies in school. Together, they create collages of 
these histories, and judge them in light o f thinking about what social studies could and 
perhaps should aspire to realize. They engage with texts, critiques o f the dehumanizing 
powers-that-be in education which sanction injustice and work against freedom and 
perpetuate the spiritual crisis o f modernity, like those of Jonathan Kozol and David 
Purpel, presenting commentaries o f them and participating in class discussion.
What is being done is in kinship with Purpel's (1989) notion o f education in a 
prophetic voice: which cries out first against evil, injustice and "sin;" which in 
reminding us o f our highest aspirations, calls attention to how we have failed to remain 
faithful; and which engages in criticism in the hope o f redemption. Believing it evil to 
resign ourselves to evil and faithless to cede to the actual, the prophet not only reproves, 
reminds, reconceives, but also participates in ongoing "research" with those exhorted, to 
continually develop the qualities and gifts which might contribute to the "possibility o f 
justice, community, joy" (p. I OS). In this religious language, it is perhaps the spirit o f 
prayer that is aroused, what Dewey calls inquiry, the "seek and ye shall find" attitude 
(Noddings, 1992). Students inquire into the ideologies hidden in the information
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presented in social studies textbooks to children, comparing them with primary sources
and different perspectives such as are reflected in children's literature, for example.
More and ever clear becomes the power o f language, o f the word—o f the text, its
promise and its danger. In this sense, too, the power o f education is revealed, o f
teaching, as primarily a being with others in language (Huebner, 1968), encountering
texts with them, and encountering oneself and each other and the world through texts,
and through the word—a force that can, in fact, empower or imprison, enlighten or
anesthetize. To confront the principalities and powers, then, is to not only critique the
images o f being they promote, but also the language used to support them. In a
materialistic age, set on pinning life down, the word threatens materialization in the
creation o f the "reified word-thing... [which leaves only] the shell o f the word, [its]
naked corpse" (Bahktin, 1975/1992, p. 292). As teachers, in a system enamored with
the language of technology and bent on reaching the last word, we are vulnerable to this
death o f the word in which it is:
perceived purely as an object.... In such a word-object even meaning 
becomes a thing: there can be no dialogic approach to such a word of the 
kind immanent to  any deep and actual understanding.... It is completely 
separated from the living, ideological power o f the word to mean....
There can be no conversing with such a word. (p. 352)
Certainly, as educators seeking to educe understanding, we must attend to and
care for language, communicate with our students, encourage dialogue and discourse
which "lives, as it were, beyond itself in a living impulse" (p. 292); for we are
commissioned with the "bringing forth" o f human life. Again, we are like "the prophet
[who] is engaged in a battle for language, in an effort to create a different epistemology
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out of which another community might em erge,... [with] the hope that the ache o f God 
might penetrate the numbness o f history, in a yearning that grows with and out o f pain" 
(Brueggemann, cited in Purpel, 1989, p. 1). I believe this is why I am, as a teacher, so 
drawn to the language o f religion which inspires us to surpass our present selves for 
something better, to reach beyond ourselves in loving others, and to the language o f the 
symbolic, the mythic, the poetic, which seems to open up spaces for the breath o f the 
living Word to ever speak. Poetry, drama, art, story and music find their place, then, 
even in a social studies class, perhaps, especially in a social studies class. Through them, 
the person is touched by the Other in a way which lends itself to the experience of 
empathy and intimacy, an experience which draws us out of our present selves into 
connection with another.
This experience is all the more important because o f the forces at work today 
which serve to alienate, dis-connect, provoke indifference-characterized as 
despiritualizing, disenchanting, dissecting, deadening. Kovel (1991) says that spirit is 
revealed in the overcoming of splitting, the lived process o f this overcoming, which is 
the way of emancipation and of life. The concern o f the prophet, which is "with the 
search for meaning through the process o f criticism, imagination and creativity" (Purpel, 
1989, p. 105), is also, then, the concern of the teacher: seeking to invite spirit, the 
healing balm o f wholeness, into what is splintered, without a sense o f connection and 
fullness and significance and solidarity through the logic o f death. Religious language is, 
then, also the language o f the personal, bringing the person to deep understanding, and 
one must come to the self before moving beyond it. For this reason, I take the central
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constructs o f history and tradition and culture in social studies and invite students to find 
meaning therein through personal life history research in which they seek to negotiate 
passages between the public and the private and find the connections between their own 
histories and larger ethnic, racial, religious, cultural histories. Students engage in 
autobiographical investigations, trace family genealogies, interview family members, look 
into family records and memorabilia o f all kinds, and investigate the history of their 
family names and the symbologies behind them.
Together we create a picture history timeline of the world, discussing it in 
relation to our personal histories which we share, the impact o f historical events directly 
or indirectly upon the quality and character o f our own lives. Later, we critique it in 
terms of the voices and histories not voiced in the story we have told, left out o f it, and 
bring some o f these voices to our timeline. Reviving the cross-cultural tradition of 
storytelling, each student peruses the landscape of lore, selecting and learning a folktale 
from one of her cultures of origin. The choice is made not solely upon cultural 
background, but also with regard to personal significance.5 The tale is told in class, and 
a commentary given concerning its cultural and personal relationship to the person telling 
the story. In a sense, we are literally sojourning together, looking at and reflecting on 
our past joumeyings, uncovering the problems and possibilities brought to us through 
them, and finding that terrain we share-telling the stories o f where we have been, where 
we are and where we hope yet to go.
5Ann Trousdale (1994) speaks, as well, o f a kind o f authority that comes from 
self-knowledge, with knowledge of a personal nature. I think we all need this kind of 
authority in our lives, particularly do teachers, as well, in their work.
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In this way, education here is as Dewey (1938) has described it, consisting in the 
reconstruction o f experience, or as Madeleine Grumet (1992) has suggested, it "emerges 
as a metaphor for a person's dialogue with the world o f his or her experience" (p. 29)— 
and with the worlds o f others' experiences. Huebner (1974) has affirmed, in this vein, 
"education as concern for the evolving biography of the person and the evolving history 
o f societies or communities” (p. 37). I believe going through this process with students 
has been my attempt to respond to the questions I had, concerned with endowing the 
study o f social studies with personal and collective meaning, and with calling attention to 
our place in something larger and beyond us, the spiritual history o f humanity. What 
generally develops through it is a strong sense o f community, but one in which a 
multitude o f before-hidden differences are actually brought to light, and appreciated, and 
which serve to enrich the whole. Yet, beyond this, as we are drawn into the lives o f 
others, into their stories o f joy and pain, we are more profoundly left with the 
recognition of our common humanity, that we are bound together in powerful ways 
despite our differences.
Nel Noddings (1992), looking at education in this way, conjures up the religious 
image o f the congregation, because it involves ecologies of love and vocation, the calling 
forth and confirming o f each other’s gifts and giftedness for the divine, that beyond 
oneself. David Purpel (1989), similarly, speaks o f the potential o f schools to be "centers 
of inquiry and growth" where those who dwell there can share their different talents and 
capabilities in "the pursuit o f the common goal o f creating a culture o f deepest meaning" 
(p. 110). I tend to share these sensibilities, although I am not sure schools are receptive
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sites for such activities and aspirations. Both allude, in any case, to the necessity o f 
vision, or perhaps I should say, o f visions, or eternal vision-ing. My feeling is that 
education might be a kind o f shepherding o f being, in the language o f Heidegger. 
Teaching could be a caring for and attending to  this journey o f the soul which includes a 
concern for the sacred, for the transformative presence o f the mystery in the lives o f 
students, and for the creation o f a society which attends to and cares for the sacred. In 
this sense, the suffering o f the oppressed and the pain o f the world is a major part o f the 
curriculum, and pedagogy involves the active exhortation to participate in the creation of 
a world where pain and suffering are no more. It is the call o f faith, as "the substance of 
things hoped for, the evidence o f things not seen" (The Holv Bible. 1985, Hebrews 
11:1), which brings vision to life, making that which is not yet but aspired to operative in 
the present by bringing it into and holding it in the imagination from which the future 
dawns. To educate means, in Hebrew, to commit or to affirm (Strong's Exhaustive 
Concordance of the Bible: Dictionaries o f the Hebrew and Greek Words. n.d).
Thus, I share my vision with students, and invite them to examine and express 
their own visions, and also enter into visioning with me. As it presently stands, then, in 
this particular course, two new aspects have emerged. The first is that I challenge 
students with the very questions with which I have been challenged concerning the 
teaching o f social studies: they now spend their time in the field with children 
participating in a vision, expressing their visions and encouraging students to envision. 
The form these lessons take is open, and highly personal, and dependent on the needs of 
the supervising teachers in the schools. The commission is to make, in their own ways,
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according to their own inner calls, social studies an avenue for freedom, hope, love and 
social justice, a creative site to inspire and empower students to actively dream a better 
world. As it is written, "Faith without works is dead” (The Holy Bible. 1985, James 
2:26). The returns have been, I must admit, delightfully surprising. I could not begin 
here to describe all the kinds of activities I have witnessed as a result of this open-ended 
assignment. Often, in the elementary grades, the subject of social studies is entirely 
overlooked because of the constraints of time and the attention required of reading and 
math. Often, when it is taught, students are not engaged and meaning is lost. Often, 
social studies consists of the "holiday" curriculum almost exclusively, superficial at best.
Yet even one typical Thanksgiving lesson, here, became an occasion for students 
to not only share their own holiday traditions in contrast to the Pilgrims, and reflect on 
all for which they had to give thanks, but also to consider those less fortunate than 
themselves and the life-giving act o f giving. Moved by "The Giving Tree," by Shel 
Silverstein, thirty second-grade students came up with the idea to put together a 
Thanksgiving basket for the children at the homeless shelter, each student parting with a 
favorite toy, article of clothing, book or snack. On Veteran's Day, fifth-grade students 
engaged in a serious discussion about war, and wrote letters to patients in the Veteran's 
Hospital, thanking them for their bravery, and asking them questions about the personal 
experience o f war. Some also shared their feelings about the Gulf War as children of 
men and women who fought. Many o f their letters were answered with powerful effects.
Another lesson I observed in a truly multicultural context—a second and third 
grade combination class of African-American, Vietnamese, white, deaf, and handicapped
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children—was a culmination o f their studies in racism. The students had put together a 
reader's theater performance centered in the life and activism o f Martin Luther King, Jr., 
and the triumph o f the Bus Boycott. They bad constructed a bus on stage to produce a 
visual representation o f the change won. The performance concluded with a reading of 
Langston Hughes' poem, "Hold Fast to Dreams." As one child read, another child 
signed. In the discussion afterward, one little girl noticed the different talents which 
were exhibited, all needed to put on the show—some were obviously gifted performers, 
others attended well to the art o f writing or stage production. Another child liked the 
part on the bus because "you could see blacks and whites finally sitting together and it 
was exciting." Still another appreciated reading the poem at the end. She thought it was 
great to end the play this way because her friend who was signing the poem next to her 
was different, not because o f the color of her skin, but because she was deaf and yet 
they were together too. She said that it would be just like racism to have bad feelings 
about her because she could not hear. This child, unwittingly perhaps, was pointing to 
the universality o f Otherness, and o f the suffering and oppression which often 
accompanies it. In truth, however, the beauty, the power, the wisdom, of those voices 
who have suffered, like the African-American people for whom Martin Luther King, Jr. 
spoke, evidenced in their culture via folklore and art and song and way of life, is 
primarily found in their movement beyond Otherness, beyond oppression and oppressor, 
beyond the self, in transcending and rising above their existential condition. The ability 
of the human spirit to be lifted up in this way is a wisdom, a gift, we all need, regardless 
of race, class, gender, age, time, or place. I was learning some things from this second-
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grade girl, or at least incited to think on these things. There are, o f course, many more 
examples I could give.
The last month o f the course the students present what they have done in the 
schools, reflecting on the experience and its impact on them and on the children, and 
submitting it to class critique and celebration. We also create a four-week storytelling 
program for children at the homeless shelter, which is the second aspect o f the course 
which has emerged in this way, in which we prepare food to eat together, share folktales 
with the children and invite their participation in some drama or art activity. By the end 
of the course, I am no longer teaching my students; rather, my students and I are 
teaching together. My hope is that, within these contexts, my students have experienced 
something o f the beauty and power of the transcendent, of participation with others in a 
common vision o f meaning, and o f tradition that is vital and flourishing. I trust, as well, 
that they have been awakened to the beauty and power o f study and o f Ianguage—o f the 
word, the text, the logos, the Other—to move and transform their own souls and the 
souls o f others. For my own education has blessed me with these gifts, gifts I would also 
like to share. Life with my students is not neutral, then, and generally can never truly be; 
the educator affirms visions and inquires into them, as one who contributes to, critiques 
and celebrates (Purpel, 1989) humanity's participation in the transcendent, and seeks to 
inspire the same in students, hopefully taking part with them in this process o f living in 
love, with spirit and faith.
Education, if it is to truly be the bringing forth of life, then, must dwell in the 
mystery, the strangeness, the complexity, the "moreness" which is life. Such entails a
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recognition of our inability to control or contain life, or even this thing we call
knowledge. As creatures immersed in life,
we know more than we can say, and often say more than we know....
There is more than w e ... can know, will ever know. It is a "moreness" 
that takes us by surprise when we are at the edge and end o f our 
knowing. There is comfort in that "moreness" that takes over in our 
weakness, our ignorance, at our limits or end. It is a comfort that cannot 
be anticipated, a "peace that passeth all understanding".... One knows of 
that presence, that "moreness," when known resources fail and somehow 
we go beyond what we were and are, and become something different, 
somehow new.... The "moreness" in the world... is a  "moreness" that 
infuses each human being. Not only do we know more than we say, we 
"are" more than we "currently are." That is, human being dwells in the 
transcendent, or more appropriately, the transcendent dwells in the human 
being.... The spirit dwells in us.... The fact that we partake o f the 
transcendent means that we are never complete, until death. We can 
always be more than we are.... [This "moreness"] is that which 
transcends the known, the expected.... It is the source o f hope. It is 
manifested through love and the waiting expectation that accompanies 
love. It over comes us.... One whose imagination acknowledges this 
"moreness" can be said to dwell faithfully in the world. (Huebner, 1995, 
pp. 15-18)
What I am reaching for is education imagined in this way, which dwells in hope, 
carrying us beyond the limits o f our own knowing, inspiring us to become more than we 
are, which waits expectantly for transformation. Herein is just something of what I have 
gleaned in this work for the theory and practice o f education. Elliot Eisner has described 
theory as "the result o f our desire to create a world we can understand" (cited in Pinar et 
al., 1995, p. 863). In like manner, we may describe practice as the result o f our desire to 
create a world we can change or act upon, or in the sense encompassing Western 
obsession with certainty and method, to order or control. Perhaps, however, "to dwell
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faithfully in the world," to sojourn together in the land o f promise, implies a desire 
beyond both o f these, a desire to create a world we can love, respond to with a grand 
"Amen"—bringing forth a sacred "Yes" to life. Or possibly rather, this journey-dwelling 
inspires the desire to embrace a world beyond all our acting and knowing, within which 
we are enveloped in its sacred affirmations.
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